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Preface
Anthropogenic climate change has been termed the biggest externality of mankind ever
(Stern, 2007). Its effects are global in nature and due to the burning of fossil fuels such
as coal, gas and oil. The problems associated with global warming have been widely
discussed and need not be repeated in this dissertation. However, the use of fossil
fuels in production and consumption causes various other externalities. These range
from purely local damage such as urban air pollution through smog or the adverse
environmental effects of mountaintop removal mining to global externalities that may
have been underestimated so far. The latter include damages caused by oil-based
polymers known as plastics. Recent research suggests that 40 − 80% of mega- and
macro-marine debris is non-biodegradable plastic (Derraik, 2002). Mechanical forces
and photochemical processes trigger its breakdown into microplastics which pose a
serious threat to wildlife and humans (Moore, 2008).
Despite these pressing environmental issues, countries’ willingness to cooperate across
borders in order to reduce environmental damage has been limited. For instance, the
climate talks (Conferences of Parties, in short COPs) organized under the umbrella of
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change have not reached bind-
ing reduction targets for greenhouse gas emissions. From an economic point of view,
this is not surprising since emissions reductions are contributions to the provision of
the global public good ‘climate stabilization’. As the social costs of its provision ex-
ceed its private costs, economic theory suggests that inefficiently high carbon emissions
will result in equilibrium. Besides this environmental externality, other distortions due
to political motives or constraints arise which may improve or worsen environmental
quality. Staying with the climate negotiations example, it is well documented that
environmental and business lobby groups which are formally accredited as observers to
the annual COP, exert influence on policy-makers in various ways (Betzold, 2013). Ac-
tivities include organizing side events, distributing literature, preparing press releases,
serving on government delegations or lobbying delegates from the home country or
from other countries (Orr, 2006). The COP in Warsaw in 2013 experienced a huge
withdrawal of environment and development groups because they felt that lobbying
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from fossil fuel companies that partly sponsored the event was impeding progress at
the talks.1
This dissertation analyzes in the context of environmental and climate policy the incen-
tives faced by politicians who are at least partly self-interested or by welfare-maximizing
governments that act strategically. By ‘self-interested’ politicians, I mean politicians
who do not solely maximize the welfare of their electorate. Instead, they are also in-
terested to some degree in maximizing their chances of getting (re-)elected or – in the
worst case – in simply collecting bribes. The chances of (re-)election can be increased
1) by raising campaign contributions from special interest groups or 2) by adopting
policy platforms that maximize votes. In the first case, incumbent politicians need
to take account of the welfare of their electorate as otherwise they may be voted out
of office at the next ballot. In exchange for campaign contributions, however, they
also grant political favors to stakeholders such as single companies, organizations rep-
resenting industry, trade or services, labor unions or environmentalist groups, just to
name a few. As a result of this monetary influence, policies are usually distorted to-
wards the preferences of the strongest interest group (Grossman and Helpman, 2001)
and coincide only incidentally with the first-best outcome. In the second case, the
question arises which policy or which set of policies should be chosen by candidates in
a representative democracy in order to win an election (electoral competition). One
answer is provided by the median voter theorem which originates in Duncan Black’s
work on majority voting (Black, 1948) and its extension to representative democracy
by Anthony Downs (Downs, 1957). In its weak form, it states that under majority
voting with exogenously given policy positions by candidates, the candidate that wins
the election always gets the vote of the median voter. The reason is that he or she
is closest to the median voter’s preferred policy and thus closest to the ideal points
of more than half of all voters. The strong form suggests that ‘the median voter gets
exactly what he or she wants – to the extent that the elected candidate delivers on his
or her campaign promises’ (Congleton, 2004). This holds whenever candidates are free
to choose their policy positions in order to maximize votes. For both forms, policies
will be distorted unless the median voter’s preferences reflect the preferences of the
whole society.
Apart from these political motives, policies may also be distorted when governments
are benevolent and maximize national welfare. This is the case when countries need to
1 See, e.g., The Guardian, 2013: Green groups walk out of UN climate talks. Available:
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/nov/21/mass-walk-out-un-climate-talks-warsaw
[Last accessed: 17 May 2014].
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rely on the taxation of mobile tax bases such as capital, labor or fossil resources in order
to provide a local or global public good. These interactions between countries are the
subject of the tax competition literature which goes back to Zodrow and Mieszkowski
(1986) and Wilson (1986). In these seminal articles, a physical public good needs to
be provided by governments that aim to maximize their residents’ utility but take the
world market return to capital as given (because the number of countries is very large).
Since lump-sum taxes are not available for reasons that lie outside of the model, gov-
ernments need to resort to taxing capital use by firms. As a source-based tax on capital
influences the allocation of capital across countries, governments have an incentive to
tax capital at an inefficiently low rate in the Nash equilibrium. The intuition is that
they perceive the marginal costs of public good provision to be higher than they in-
deed are because capital flees the country when the domestic tax is increased. Later
contributions to this literature go beyond this perfectly competitive case where gov-
ernments are price-takers on international markets. Wildasin (1988), e.g., models the
large-country case where governments are able to influence world market prices. Some
authors subsume the latter scenario under the term ‘strategic interaction’ (Brueckner,
2003) even though a Nash equilibrium per definition involves some kind of strategic
interaction, even in the competitive case. In the context of environmental policy, pol-
lution may spill over from one country to another such that pollution abatement can
be regarded as contribution to a transboundary or global public good. As transbound-
ary pollution can mostly be attributed to the use of mobile factors of production,
i.e., capital (technology) or fossil resources, welfare-maximizing governments may be
induced – similarly to the case of physical public good provision – to deviate from
standard textbook-type policies that prescribe internalizing the marginal damage from
own consumption or production on own utility.
The first two chapters of this dissertation are concerned with the political economy of
environmental policy in a national (Chapter 1) and international (Chapter 2) context.
In Chapter 1, the median voter model is employed to analyze ecotax packages and
their distributional effects on different generations, using the example of the German
ecotax legislation from 1999. Chapter 2 uses the Grossman and Helpman models of
lobby group influence (Grossman and Helpman, 1994, 1995a, 1995b) to analyze the
formation of international permit markets by non-cooperative governments. Chapters
3 and 4 analyze non-cooperative environmental policies when countries governed by
welfare-maximizing policy-makers compete for mobile factors of production and suf-
fer from transboundary pollution. The analysis in Chapter 3 explores decentralized
policy-making with mobile capital under the assumptions of perfect complementar-
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ity respectively perfect substitutability between capital and emissions in the presence
of utility and production externalities. While Chapter 3 is cast in a static partial
equilibrium framework, Chapter 4 introduces a second factor of production (resources
respectively energy) which is given in finite supply. This chapter is concerned with
the interjurisdictional and intertemporal effects of decentralized demand-side climate
policies but neglects pollution externalities on production like in Chapter 3.
In the following, I will give a brief overview of the lines of argument developed in each
chapter. All chapters are based on stand-alone papers and can be read separately.
The respective appendices can be found at the end of each chapter. In Chapters 1
– 3, which are based on co-authored papers, I have kept the pronoun ‘we’ (as in the
published and working paper versions) to clarify that their basis is joint work.
Chapter 1: Intergenerational Aspects of Ecotax Reforms – an Application
to Germany
In the first Chapter which is based on joint work with Kerstin Roeder (Habla and
Roeder, 2013), a model of overlapping generations and majority voting is developed
to analyze an ecotax reform that consists of the tax rate and the budgetary rule. The
ecotax revenue can be recycled through a lump-sum transfer or a reduction in pension
contributions. In this bi-dimensional policy space, voting cycles may occur which
is why we resort to the notion of a ‘structure-induced equilibrium’ (Kramer, 1972;
Shepsle, 1979). For this, we assume two institutions, namely ministries, which have
been assigned the power to determine policies in their domain and base their proposals
on the median voter’s preferences over the issue at stake. In particular, the ministry
of the environment proposes a green tax rate for a given share of revenue devoted to
the pension scheme, while the ministry of finance suggests a share of ecotax revenue
devoted to the pension scheme for a given environmental tax rate. These proposals can
be thought of as the best responses (reaction functions) of the respective ministries.
Their intersection describes the structure-induced equilibrium of the voting game. Our
theoretical results as well as the calibration of our model to the German economy show
that the median voter’s preferred tax rate may exceed the efficient rate. This holds
whenever income of the decisive voter is sufficiently high compared to average income,
as rich individuals benefit more from a reduction in pension contributions than they
are harmed by an increase in ecotaxes. This is due to the regressive nature of the
ecotax. The calibration confirms that the median voter prefers the earmarking of tax
revenue for reductions in pension contributions to the alternative lump-sum transfer.
This result is quite an accurate prediction of the situation in Germany where 90%
of the ecotax revenue are recycled via lowering pension contributions. Furthermore,
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aging of society as expected for Germany is found to lower the ecotax in the political
equilibrium below its optimal level for a constant income distribution.
Chapter 2: Political Influence on Non-cooperative International Climate
Policy
In contrast to the first chapter, the analysis in Chapter 2, which is joint work with Ralph
Winkler (Habla and Winkler, 2011; Habla and Winkler, 2013), is concerned with the
political economy of environmental policy in a multi-country setting. It potentially
embodies distortions due to lobbying and due to strategic interaction. In particular,
we analyze non-cooperative international climate policy in the form of permit markets
in a setting of political competition by national interest groups. In the first stage of
the model, the two countries under consideration decide whether to link their domestic
emission permit markets to an international market, which only forms if it is supported
by both countries. In the second stage, countries non-cooperatively decide on the
number of tradable emission allowances. In both stages, special interest groups try to
sway the government in their favor. We find that (i) both the choice of regime (national
vs. international permit markets) and the levels of domestic and global emissions
only depend on the aggregate levels of organized stakes in all countries and not on
their distribution among individual interest groups, and (ii) an increase in lobbying
influence by a particular lobby group may backfire by inducing a change towards the
lobby group’s less preferred regime. The intuition behind result (i) is that for the
determination of the emission levels in the Nash equilibrium with truthful contribution
schedules, only the sum of all lobby groups’ willingness-to-contribute to the incumbent
government matters. If the aggregate willingness-to-contribute does not depend on the
distribution of organized stakes as is the case in our model, the same policies will be
adopted across all distributions that entail the same national aggregates. Equilibrium
contributions, however, will in general differ across distributions. As the choice whether
to link national permit markets basically depends on the difference in social welfare
plus the lobbies groups’ aggregate gross utilities between the two regimes, the linking
decision is also independent of the distribution of stakes. The intuition for result (ii)
goes as follows. Although an increase in the strength of a particular lobby group induces
a direct effect in favor of this group’s preferred regime in the home country, there are
indirect effects due to the strategic interaction of governments on the international
level that may counteract the direct effect. In particular, the associated change in
equilibrium allowance choices under both regimes may induce one or both countries to
change its support away from the lobby group’s preferred regime.
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Chapter 3: Mobile Capital and Non-cooperative International Environmen-
tal Policy
In Chapter 3 which is joint work with Ralph Winkler, we structure the debate whether
and to what extent decentralized policies are efficient. To this end, we analyze the
interactions of mobile capital and non-cooperative international environmental policy
under different sets of assumptions. Modifying the model framework employed by
Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) and Eichner and Runkel (2012), we compare the cases
when capital and emissions are either perfect complements or perfect substitutes. Like
Eichner and Runkel, we allow for an endogenous choice of capital and emissions and
stick to the case of symmetric countries. In addition, we account for the possibility
that interjurisdictional spillovers do not only impact on the households’ utility but
may also negatively affect production by lowering the marginal productivity of capital.
In case of perfect complementarity between capital and emissions, we find that capital
taxes (which are equivalent to taxes on emissions) are inefficiently low in the symmetric
Nash equilibrium for a positive capital supply elasticity but set at a strictly positive
rate. Even though a unilateral increase of the capital tax lowers pollution and thus
increases capital demand in the tax-increasing country through its positive impact
on the marginal productivity of capital, the tax increase does not attract investment.
This is because investment cannot rise when pollution falls due to their complementary
relationship. If capital and emissions are perfect substitutes, they may be addressed
separately by policy-makers through a tax on capital and a tax on emissions. We show
that an increase in the emissions tax and a decrease in the capital tax have the same
quantitative effects on global capital use by firms as well as on global pollution. Thus,
capital and pollution depend only on the difference in emissions and capital taxes. In
the Nash equilibrium, governments may subsidize capital and/or emissions, depending
on the size of pollution impacts on production. In contrast to the model with perfect
complementarity, a unilateral marginal increase in the tax difference, caused by either
an increase of the emissions tax or a decrease in the capital tax, may indeed attract
capital and lower pollution at the same time. This holds for sufficiently strong pollution
impacts on production and incentivizes governments to set an inefficiently high tax
difference in equilibrium. We also show that a binding international agreement setting
the emissions tax equal to the social marginal damage from emissions eliminates all
incentives for capital tax competition.
Chapter 4: Non-Renewable Resource Extraction and Interjurisdictional
Competition across Space and Time
Chapter 4 extends the analysis of Chapter 3 in various ways. First, it introduces a
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finite stock of a non-renewable resource such as fossil oil, coal or gas which will be
fully extracted in equilibrium. Second, because of this additional production factor,
the model incorporates an intertemporal resource market in addition to the atemporal
capital market and is thus cast in a general equilibrium framework. In this two-period
model, I analyze non-cooperative demand-side tax policies when symmetric countries
compete for capital and resources (energy), both of which are mobile and provided by
perfectly competitive markets, while at the same time being concerned with environ-
mental damage from resource use. I find that unilateral increases in resource or capital
taxes lead to spatial as well as intertemporal leakage of resource use and thus pollution.
If the capital supply elasticity is positive, announcing an increase in future resource
taxes gives rise to the effect usually referred to as ”Green Paradox“ whereas rising
future capital taxes may either speed up or slow down resource extraction, depend-
ing on the degree of complementarity between capital and resources. For a negative
capital supply elasticity, these results may be reversed. The open-loop Nash equilib-
rium is found to entail inefficiently high resource use in the present (first period) since
in addition to the environmental externality, private income externalities arise which
go in the same direction. Furthermore, there is an economic rationale to use strictly
positive capital taxes under commitment even though there is no revenue requirement
by governments. The reason is that in general equilibrium an increase of the capital
tax from zero to a strictly positive value unambiguously lowers the world market in-
terest rate. This fall in the interest rate stimulates second-period resource demand
in all other countries by inducing a fall in the second-period resource price through
the Hotelling rule and by making capital use more attractive. Higher investment also
increases resource demand due to the assumed complementarity between capital and
resources. As a consequence, first-period resource use and thus pollution go down. I
will refer to this channel as the capital-tax-interest-rate channel. In a numerical ex-
ample, it is shown that this general equilibrium channel is the stronger, the easier it
is to substitute capital for resources. The intuition is that a capital tax then leads to
a sharper decrease in the interest rate because of the induced substitution and thus
causes a stronger increase in second-period resource use. If, by contrast, resources and
capital are strong complements, an additional capital tax is not able to significantly
lower aggregate first-period resource use. In this case, private income externalities are
relatively small compared to the environmental externality.
Chapter 1
Intergenerational Aspects of Ecotax
Reforms - an Application to
Germany
Intergenerational Aspects of Ecotax Reforms 9
1.1 Introduction
As part of the growing awareness of environmental problems such as climate change,
ecotax reforms have been carried out in many European countries over the course of
the last two decades. Beside the environmental benefit of internalizing the externality
caused by greenhouse gas emissions, environmental taxes may reap a second ‘dividend’:
the revenue generated by ecotaxes can be recycled as cuts in distortionary taxes such as
taxes on labor, entailing welfare gains for the whole economy. This idea, first recognized
by Tullock (1967), has given rise to the so-called ‘double dividend’ hypothesis (see
Bovenberg and Goulder, 2002, for an excellent survey).
Germany introduced an ecotax in five steps in yearly intervals between 1999 and 2003.
It is levied on transport and heating fuels, natural gas, electricity and, since a change in
the law in 2006, also on coal used for heating. A revenue of approximately e18 billion
is raised annually, 90% of which is recycled as reductions in pension contributions.1
Without this share, pension contributions would have to rise by 1.7 percentage points
in order to keep pension benefits at their current levels (see Bach, 2009). The ecotax
reform turned into a prominent campaign issue for the German parliamentary elections,
particularly in 1998 and 2002. Since then the slogan ‘Tanken für die Rente’ (refuel for
old-age pensions) has become a well-known idiom in the German public.2
In this paper, we ask how, under majority voting, ecotax reforms interact with institu-
tional settings which are already in place and – at least in the short run – unchangeable.
Linking ecotaxes to existing systems alters the political equilibrium, as voter coalitions
are affected differently by the proposed reform. We take the German policy as a start-
ing point where the size of the pension system is not open to debate, and where the
contributors, as compared to the retirees, benefit from the recycling of ecotax revenue.
In a similar manner, countries such as the UK, Sweden, Denmark or the Netherlands
have adopted ecotax reforms which take pressure from social security systems and the
general public budget by cutting social security or personal income taxes (see Bosquet,
2000, for details). We will argue that these ecotax reforms have similar effects when it
comes to their political acceptability among voters.
The IPCC (1995)’s highest estimate in the Second Assessment Report for the social
cost of carbon amounts to $150 per tonne of carbon, that is, approximately e30 per
1 The remainder is used for other purposes such as subsidies on renewable energy.
2 See, e.g., an article on Deutschlandradio in 2004: http://www.dradio.de/dlf/sendungen/hiwi/251994/
[Last accessed: 17 May 2014].
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tonne of carbon dioxide (CO2).3 While the price of around e6 per tonne of CO2 in the
European Union’s emissions trading scheme, as of January 2013, is generally considered
too low, the German ecotax on gasoline, for example, is equivalent to an exceptionally
high carbon price of e65 per tonne of CO2.4 Why is the price of CO2 implied by the
German ecotax so high? We argue that it can be explained by the incentives different
generations face under the proposed ecotax package when called to vote. The package
consists of the green tax rate and the budgetary rule according to which a fraction
of tax revenue is used to finance reductions in pension contributions. The remainder
is returned lump-sum. Lump-sum refunding of ecotax revenue, which is sometimes
referred to as ‘eco-bonus’, has been discussed by the Green Party in Germany and was,
for example, introduced in Switzerland in 2008 (see Ekins et al., 2008).5
Specifically, our model consists of two generations at each point in time – the young
and the old. The young work and contribute to the pension scheme whereas the old
are retired and enjoy pension benefits. Apart from age, agents differ in their income.
They have preferences over two categories of consumer goods – ‘non-dirty’ and ‘dirty’ –
and the total level of emissions in the atmosphere. A negative consumption externality
arises from the consumption of dirty goods such as fossil fuels which cause emissions.
All agents alive vote over the tax rate and the refunding rule in each period.
As is well known, the median voter theorem does not apply in multi-dimensional issue
spaces like ours if preferences are not single-peaked. We therefore resort to the notion
of a ‘structure-induced equilibrium’ (Kramer, 1972; Shepsle, 1979). It separates the
bi-dimensional policy space into single dimensions by assuming that institutions exist
which have been assigned the unique power to determine policies related to their field
of duties. In our model the ministry of the environment proposes a green tax rate
for a given share of revenue devoted to the pension scheme, while the ministry of
finance suggests a share of ecotax revenue devoted to the pension scheme for a given
environmental tax rate. These proposals can be thought of as the best responses
(reaction functions) of the respective ministries which are based on the median voter’s
preferences over the issue at stake. Their intersection describes the structure-induced
equilibrium of the voting game. In other words, the structure-induced equilibrium
3 One tonne of carbon has to be multiplied with 11/3 to get CO2 emissions (IPCC, 2006; p. 1.8).
4 The ecotax for one liter of gasoline amounts to approximately e0.15, see the website of the German
treasury: www.bundesfinanzministerium.de. One liter entails CO2 emissions of approximately 2.3
kg, yielding a price of e65 per tonne of CO2. A similar price per tonne of CO2 applies to diesel,
while natural gas is taxed at a lower rate of approximately e18, cf. Bach (2009).
5 The policy paper by the Green Party can be found here:
http://www.gruene-partei.de/cms/default/dokbin/226/226560.diskussionspapier zum
oekobonus.pdf.
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introduces issue-by-issue voting and retains the median voter approach in a multi-
dimensional space. It is also an adequate description of the political arena in Germany.
We compare the political outcome to the ecotax package chosen by a utilitarian social
planner and find that the adjusted ‘Pigouvian’ tax rate internalizes the full marginal
damage from the polluting good for all current and future generations, but also accounts
for efficiency losses caused by the distortionary nature of pension contributions. Even
more surprising, majority voting yields a green tax rate which can be lower or higher
than the optimal level. The intuition behind this result is as follows: although the
social planner internalizes more of the environmental damage due to environmental
concerns than individuals, high-income earners benefit more from lowering pension
contributions through higher ecotaxes than they are harmed by the tax increase through
consumption. This is because young individuals contribute to the pension scheme
proportionally to their incomes, while the ecotax rate is regressive. Therefore, if some
share of tax revenue is devoted to the pension scheme, the median voter’s preferred
environmental tax rate will be higher than the adjusted Pigouvian level whenever his
income is sufficiently high compared to average income. If, by contrast, all revenue is
recycled via lump-sum transfers, the green tax rate in the political equilibrium is more
likely to be below its efficient level.
In the calibration of our model to the German economy, we focus on the tax on gasoline
as motor fuel expenses constitute the largest share of household expenditure on energy
(see Bach, 2009). Our simulations illustrate that the median voter not only prefers all
ecotax revenue to cut pension contributions, but also that his income is indeed high
enough to raise the politically induced tax rate above its optimal level. Furthermore,
we find that a dramatic aging of the population as expected for Germany in the next
few decades will lead to lump-sum redistribution of green tax revenue and a politically
induced tax rate which is inefficiently low.
Our paper contributes to two strands of literature. On the one hand, it adds to the
literature on intergenerational aspects of environmental policy within an Overlapping
Generations (OLG) framework (see, e.g., Bovenberg and Heijdra, 1998 and 2002; Karp
and Rezai, 2011; or Chiroleu-Assouline and Fodha, 2006). Intergenerational conflicts
arise because of different distributional impacts of environmental taxes on the welfare
of current generations. This is particularly true for the German ecotax package which
is tied to the pension system. On the other hand, the paper contributes to the lit-
erature on the political economy of environmental taxation and the double dividend
hypothesis. This strand of literature has been developed mainly by Cremer, De Donder
and Gahvari in a series of papers. In Cremer et al. (2004), the authors study how a
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welfare-maximizing government should set the refund rule at the constitutional stage
when the ecotax rate is determined in the voting stage and when political competition
arises within and between parties. In another paper Cremer et al. (2007) examine the
predictions of three political economy models (the Downsian majority-voting approach,
the probabilistic-voting model and Roemer (2006)’s model of Party Unanimity Nash
Equilibria (PUNE)) with respect to environmental taxes without a refunding rule and
compare these predictions to an estimate of US energy taxes. The PUNE concept ap-
plied to environmental policy is explored in more detail in Cremer et al. (2008) where
the budgetary rule constitutes a further policy instrument. Aidt (2010) studies the im-
pact of industrial lobbying on a green tax package proposed by two competing parties
which care about lobby contributions and voters. In his model, the proceeds from the
ecotax can be recycled through income tax cuts, extra public spending or tax burden
compensation to polluters. Our paper combines both strands of literature in the con-
text of the German ecotax package, treating both the ecotax and the budgetary rule
as endogenous. It is, to our knowledge, the first to consider intergenerational aspects
of an ecotax package under majority voting.
1.2 The model
1.2.1 The economic environment
Consider an economy with two generations alive: the young (superscript ‘Y ’) and the
old (superscript ‘O’). Population grows at a constant rate n > 0 and the size of the
current old is normalized to one. It follows that in every period t for every young person
there are 1/(1 + n) old and the overall size of the population is given by 2 + n. The
young are in employment and inelastically supply one unit of labor and earn income
yi,t. Income is distributed over the support [y−, y+] ⊂ R+ according to the cumulative
distribution function F (yt). The distribution of income is assumed to have mean ȳt
and to be right-skewed, F (ȳt) > 0.5, implying that median income is below average
income. The old are retired and receive pension benefits. The pension scheme is pay-
as-you-go (PAYG), that is, the young pay a share bt of their labor income into the
pension scheme and the old get pension benefits B(yi,t−1) out of it. Note that in this
setup 1/(1 + n) represents the pensioner/contributor ratio. In Germany the pension
scheme is (partly) Bismarckian, i.e., pension benefits positively depend on the agent’s
prior income, ∂B(yi,t−1)/∂yi,t−1 > 0. There is no storage technology, so individuals do
not save and solely live off their pension benefits in old age. The economy produces two
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goods: a non-polluting (non-energy) numéraire good and a polluting (energy-related)
good d. The latter is taxed at a rate θt ∈ R. The consumer price of good d thus
amounts to qt = pt + θt. We assume that the producer price is equal to one, i.e.
pt = 1.6 Aggregate consumption of the polluting good is:
Dt = (1 + n)
∫ y+
y−
dYi,tdF (yt) +
∫ y+
y−
dOi,tdF (yt−1) . (1.1)
Variation in a single individual’s consumption of the dirty good dji,t (j = Y,O) does
not have an impact on overall consumption Dt as the mass of one individual is close to
zero. The polluting good causes emissions Et =
∑t
x=0 (1 − δ)
t−xDx which bring about
disutility h(Et), with h′ ≡ φ > 0 and h′′ = 0. The stock in period t is given by current
pollution and aggregate pollution from previous periods, reduced by the natural decay
and removal rate δ ∈ [0; 1] per period which we assume to be exogenous over time.
One can think of the polluting good as fossil fuels whose consumption generates CO2
and contributes to global warming. A decay rate equal to unity implies that pollution
does not accumulate in the atmosphere.
Consumers have Gorman-polar preferences. That is, indirect utilities of a young and
old individual-i read as follows:
vYi,t(qt, qt+1) = a(qt) + c(qt)I
Y
i,t − h(Et) + ρv
O
i,t+1(qt, qt+1) , (1.2)
vOi,t(qt) = a(qt) + c(qt)I
O
i,t − h(Et) , (1.3)
where ρ ≤ 1 is the utility discount factor and IYi,t and I
O
i,t are disposable incomes of
the two generations. The functions a(qt) and c(qt) are positive and satisfy: a′(qt) ≤ 0
and c′(qt) ≤ 0. Observe that for c′(qt) = 0, preferences are quasi-linear. Disposable
incomes of a young and an old agent are given by:
IYi,t = (1 − bt)yi,t + τt , (1.4)
IOi,t = B(yi,t−1) + τt , (1.5)
where τt denotes a lump-sum transfer or eco-bonus financed by taxation of the polluting
good. As pension benefits in PAYG systems are usually lower than pre-retirement
earnings, we assume that IYi,t ≥ I
O
i,t for yi ∈ (y
−, y+]. Furthermore, IYi,t = I
O
i,t for
yi = y− as the state provides social welfare assistance to everyone below the minimum
6 We carry out a partial equilibrium analysis which abstains from price and wage effects. Equiva-
lently, we could assume that the two goods are produced by a linear technology subject to constant
returns to scale in a competitive environment.
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subsistence level. By Roy’s identity, the demand for the polluting good (expressed as
a function of θt as pt = 1) is:7
dji (θt) = −
∂vji,t/∂qt
∂vji,t/∂I
j
i,t
= −
a′(qt) + c′(qt)I
j
i,t
c(qt)
, j = Y,O . (1.6)
Except in the limiting case of quasi-linear preferences, c′(qt) = 0, demand for the
energy-related good is increasing in individuals’ income. Nevertheless, expenditure
shares of polluting goods decrease at all income deciles as income increases (Poterba,
1991). This regressive nature of ecotaxes has also been verified for Germany by Bach
(2009).
1.2.2 The economic equilibrium
In an economic equilibrium, public budgets need to be balanced. Revenue from taxation
of the polluting good is given by θtD(θt). A share αt ∈ [0; 1] of this revenue and pension
contributions by the young have to finance pension benefits of the old. To account for
the distortionary nature of pension contributions, we assume that a fraction η < 1
of pension contributions is lost during the redistributive process (e.g., Galasso and
Profeta, 2007; Cremer et al., 2008). This deadweight loss is larger the less are pension
benefits earnings-related (e.g., Conde-Ruiz and Profeta, 2007).8 The budget constraint
of the pension scheme thus amounts to:
(1 + n)(1 − η)bt
∫ y+
y−
yi,tdF (yt) + αtθtD(θt) =
∫ y+
y−
B(yi,t−1)dF (yt−1) . (1.7)
Total pension entitlements of the current old in period t are fixed and, thus, the pension
contribution rate adjusts to satisfy the above budget constraint.9 Specifically, the
pension contribution rate which balances pension benefits and tax revenue can be
7 Note that this preference specification implicitly assumes that the consumer has some exogenous
income such as social welfare aid or assets so that his demand for the polluting good is positive
even if Iji,t = 0.
8 The deadweight loss η is related to the Marginal Cost of Public Funds (MCF) for the pension system
through η = 1 − c(qt)/MCF, that is, a higher MCF goes hand in hand with a higher deadweight
loss (see Kleven and Kreiner, 2006, p. 1960, for the definition of MCF). In the following, we will
therefore use the two expressions synonymously.
9 Since the pension scheme is PAYG, pension entitlements are determined by an implicit intergen-
erational contract, see, e.g., Hammond (1975; pp. 121-124).
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expressed as:
bt(θt, αt) =
B̄t − αtθtD(θt)
(1 + n)(1 − η)ȳt
, (1.8)
where B̄t ≡
∫ y+
y− B(yi,t−1)dF (yt−1). To see how a higher pollution tax rate affects the
pension contribution rate – given pension benefits B(yi,t−1) for all i are kept constant
– we have to determine the sign of the following derivative:10
∂bt(θt, αt)
∂θt
=
−αt
(
D(θt) + θtD′(θt)
)
(1 + n)(1 − η)ȳt
. (1.9)
The above expression is negative whenever
D(θt) + θtD
′(θt) = D(θt)(1 − εD,θ) > 0 , (1.10)
where εD,θ = −D′(θt)θt/D(θt) is the demand elasticity of the polluting good with
respect to the tax rate. In other words, whenever consumption of the polluting good
is inelastic, that is, smaller than one, the pension contribution rate decreases with the
green tax rate. The intuition behind it is straightforward. If a one percent increase in
the green tax rate leads to a decrease in the aggregate consumption of the dirty good
by less than one percent, a positive revenue from taxation is generated. This revenue
can be used to reduce the pension contribution rate while keeping pension benefits
constant. In the following, we will assume that εD,θ < 1.11
The share 1 − αt of revenue from environmental taxation is employed to finance the
lump-sum transfer τt to each individual – the young and the old. Thus, we have:
(1 − αt)θtD(θt) = (2 + n)τt ⇔ τt(θt, αt) =
1 − αt
2 + n
θtD(θt) . (1.11)
Inserting expressions (1.8) and (1.11) back into the indirect utility function of the
10 As the monthly pension contributions in Germany are shared equally between employer and em-
ployee, the benefits of a higher ecotax – if tax revenue is at least partly devoted to the pension
scheme – accrue to both. In our model, we assume that each agent is at the same time employee
and shareholder in the employer’s firm so that he fully and solely benefits from the reduction in
pension contributions. This is equivalent to assuming that the tax incidence falls on the employee.
11 Our assumption on εD,θ is confirmed by several studies which estimate long-run price elasticities
of energy demand, see e.g. Hunt and Manning (1989) or Small and Van Dender (2007). Estimates
range between 0.1 and 0.9 for different sources of energy.
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young yields their reduced indirect utility function:
V Yi,t (θt, αt) = a(qt) + c(qt)
[(
1 −
B̄t − αtθtD(θt)
(1 + n)(1 − η)ȳt
)
yi,t +
1 − αt
2 + n
θtD(θt)
]
− h(E(θt)) + ρV
O
i,t+1(θt) , (1.12)
where V Oi,t+1(θt) denotes indirect utility of a currently young person in old age which,
for δ < 1, depends on the current green tax rate through the stock of pollution in the
atmosphere. However, it is independent of the share of taxes devoted to the pension
scheme in period t as this share does not affect any future budgets.12 The old’s reduced
indirect utility function is given by:
V Oi,t (θt, αt) = a(qt) + c(qt)
(
B(yi,t−1) +
1 − αt
2 + n
θtD(θt)
)
− h(Et) . (1.13)
The above reduced indirect utility functions of an i-type young and old person can be
used to express their preferences for the green tax rate θt and the share of tax revenue
devoted to the pension scheme, αt, in an economic equilibrium. Both policy variables
are specified in the political process described in Section 1.4.
1.3 Social optimum
This section analyzes the optimal green tax rate and share of environmental taxes
devoted to the pension scheme chosen by a utilitarian social planner. It provides a
benchmark against which the properties of the political outcome can be assessed.
At time t, the social planner accounts for the welfare of all generations from t to
infinity, that is, for the current old plus all current and future young generations.13
Using equations (1.12) and (1.13), the welfare function can be written as a function of
12 Specifically, V Oi,t+1(θt) = a(qt+1) + c(qt+1)
(
B(yi,t) +
1−αt+1
2+n
θt+1D(θt+1)
)
− h(E(θt, θt+1)). Also
note that we employ a shortcut in our notation. Although the young’s utility depends on the tax
rate in t + 1 (and all past tax rates through the stock of emissions), we express it as a function of
time t policy variables only.
13 We do not distinguish between private discount rates used by one generation to discount their
remaining lifetime utility and the social discount rate at which the social planner trades off the
weighted lifetime utility of different generations. See Schneider et al. (2012) on intergenerational
trade-offs in models with an infinitely-lived agent and OLG models.
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the policy variables of time t:
Wt(θt, αt) =
∫ y+
y−
V Oi,t (θt, αt)dF (yt−1) + (1 + n)
∞∑
x=t
(
(1 + n)ρ
)x−t
∫ y+
y−
V Yi,x(θt, αt)dF (yx) .
(1.14)
Note that with a utilitarian welfare function and Gorman-polar preferences, redistribu-
tive considerations within and between generations do not matter – all agents have a
constant marginal utility of income equal to c(qt). We assume that the size of the
pension system is not open to debate. In other words, the social planner is tied to
an implicit contract among successive generations, in which today’s young agree on a
transfer to current retirees. The young generation, in turn, expects to be rewarded
with a corresponding transfer in their old age.
Differentiating equation (1.14) with respect to αt yields:
c(qt)
η
1 − η
θtD(θt) > 0 ⇒ α
∗
t = 1 . (1.15)
From a normative perspective it is, thus, optimal to devote all revenue generated by
environmental taxation to the pension scheme. The reason is that a reduction in the
pension contribution rate goes hand in hand with a lower deadweight loss compared
to a lump-sum redistribution of environmental tax revenue. This is equivalent to the
‘weak’ version of the double dividend hypothesis (see, e.g., Goulder, 1995). It states
that passing on tax revenue through cuts in distortionary taxes entails a welfare gain,
independent of environmental considerations.
Contrary to αt, the tax rate in period t continues to have an effect on all future
generations through consumption of the dirty good in that period and the associated
change in the stock of emissions for δ < 1. The first-order condition of (1.14) with
respect to θt is – after some rearrangements and using equation (1.6) – given by:14
−D(θt) +D(θt)(1 − εD,θ)
(
1 +
ηαt
1 − η
)
−
2 + n
1 − z
φD′(θt)
c(qt)
= 0 , (1.16)
where z ≡ ρ(1 + n)(1 − δ) and ρ(1 + n) < 1 for the infinite sum of marginal damages
to converge to a constant value. The first term captures aggregate marginal costs of
green taxes in terms of consumption in period t. The second term reflects the marginal
benefits of higher tax revenue. Revenue from environmental taxation is worth more
14 The second-order condition with respect to θt, SOC∗θ , is assumed to be strictly negative. For a
more detailed derivation of the social optimum and the second-order condition see the Appendix.
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the more is devoted to the pension scheme, as this reduces the existing deadweight loss
of pension contributions. The last expression mirrors the reduction in marginal social
costs inflicted on all currently living and future generations when overall consumption of
the polluting good declines due to a tax increase in period t.15 Note that ∂θ∗t /∂αt > 0,
that is, the socially efficient tax rate is higher the more tax revenue is devoted to the
pension scheme.
Rearranging equation (1.16) and considering that α∗t = 1, we have:
θ∗t =
(2 + n)(1 − η)φεD,θ
c(qt)(1 − z)(εD,θ − η)
, (1.17)
which for non-distortionary pension contributions, η = 0, and no stock pollution,
δ = 1, is the standard first-best Pigouvian tax rule: θ∗t = (2 + n)φ/c(qt). That is, the
optimal green tax rate θ∗t should be chosen to equal the marginal social damage of the
externality. In the second-best, i.e. η > 0, the optimal tax rate is additionally adjusted
by the marginal costs of public funds and the demand elasticity for the dirty good. As
intuition suggests, higher marginal costs of public funds in the pension scheme increase
the attractiveness of green taxes, whereas a higher demand elasticity of the polluting
good makes its taxation less appealing. In our OLG framework, an extra term shows
up for δ < 1 as compared to e.g. Cremer et al. (2008): the optimal green tax rate also
accounts for the present value of marginal damages inflicted on all current and future
generations, φ/(1 − z). For the green tax rate to be positive, we require εD,θ > η.16
1.4 Majority voting
In the following we analyze the majority voting process. In each period, the young and
old vote on the green tax rate θt and on the share of tax revenue devoted to the pension
scheme αt (repeated voting) and they do so sincerely. Agents’ preferences over the two
policy variables are aggregated through a political system of majoritarian voting. Each
individual has zero mass, so that no individual vote can change the outcome of the
election.
We examine structure-induced equilibria where agents vote simultaneously but sep-
arately on the issues at stake. This idea was developed independently by Kramer
15 Since φ is constant, the first-order condition is independent of all future emissions and hence all
future environmental tax rates.
16 We can assume that this condition holds as it is well-known in the literature that Bismarckian
pension schemes bring about a low η (e.g., Conde-Ruiz and Profeta, 2007).
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(1972) and Shepsle (1979).17 In particular, the political system is characterized by the
following institutional arrangement. An elected government perfectly represents the
preferences of the whole electorate – the young and old. The policy issues at stake
are assigned to perfectly representative ministries. The share of tax revenue devoted
to the pension scheme is determined by the ministry of finance, while the ministry
of the environment is accountable for the green tax rate. In particular, the ministry
of environment proposes an ecotax rate for a given share of revenue devoted to the
pension scheme. Likewise, the ministry of finance suggests a share of revenue devoted
to the pension scheme for a given environmental tax rate. Proposals are rooted in
the median voter’s preferences over the issue at stake, and can be thought of as the
best responses or reaction functions of the ministries. Their intersection characterizes
the structure-induced equilibrium of the voting game where policy proposals of the
ministries are mutual best responses to one another. The structure-induced equilib-
rium thus introduces issue-by-issue voting and retains the median voter approach in a
multi-dimensional issue space.
This institutional setting is a good description of the German political system where
we can observe the same chain of delegation: from voters to elected representatives;
from the legislative body (the parliament) to the executive branch, specifically to the
head of government (the Chancellor); from the Chancellor to the heads of different
executive departments who are – by the German constitution – given the right to
carry out their duties independently within the boundaries set by the Chancellor’s
political directive (principle of departmentalization, ‘Ressortprinzip’); and finally from
the cabinet ministers to civil servants (see, e.g., Schnapp, 2001; Strøm, 2000).
Section 1.4.1 specifies every voter’s ideal point over the share of tax revenue devoted
to the pension scheme for every given tax rate, αt(θt), followed by the derivation of the
preferred environmental tax rate for every given share devoted to the pension scheme,
θt(αt), in Section 1.4.2. At the end of each section, the median voter over αt and θt
is identified. Section 1.4.3 determines the structure-induced equilibrium of the voting
game.
17 Alternatively, our setting could be framed such that decisions are taken sequentially. The natural
first stage would then be the decision on the ecotax rate while the utilization of tax revenue would
be determined in the second stage. As will be shown later, the share of ecotax revenue devoted
to the pension scheme in the political equilibrium is independent of θt (it only depends on the
income of the median voter). Therefore, the outcome of the sequential game coincides with the
Kramer-Shepsle equilibrium we describe.
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1.4.1 The budgetary rule
The young. The young generation finds their preferred share of green tax revenue
devoted to the pension scheme by maximizing indirect utility, equation (1.12), with
respect to αt. Individual-i’s first-order condition amounts to:
c(qt)θtD(θt)
(
yi,t
(1 + n)(1 − η)ȳt
−
1
2 + n
)
R 0 . (1.18)
The above expression can be positive or negative. It is positive if the benefit due to
lower pension contributions (first term in brackets) exceeds the benefit of a lump-sum
transfer (second term). Since contributions into the pension scheme are proportional
to income, the advantage of lower pension contributions over the eco-bonus increases
with income. Assume, for example, that green taxes reduce the pension contribution
rate by 2 percentage points, then 2 percent of e1,000 are obviously less than 2 percent
of e2,000. The critical income ỹt below which a young individual prefers that all green
tax revenue is given back in a lump-sum way is defined by:
ỹt ≡
1 + n
2 + n
(1 − η)ȳt . (1.19)
For an individual with income ỹt, the return of a lump-sum redistribution, 1/(2 + n),
is just as high as the return of a reduction in pension benefits, ỹt/[(1 + n)(1 − η)ȳt].
The young’s preferred share of environmental taxes devoted to the pension scheme is
thus given by:
αYt (θt) = 0 if yi,t < ỹt ,
αYt (θt) = 1 if ỹt ≤ yi,t .
(1.20)
The old. Maximizing the old’s indirect utility function, equation (1.13), with respect
to αt, yields the following first-order condition:
− c(qt)
θtD(θt)
2 + n
< 0 ⇒ αOt (θt) = 0 . (1.21)
As the old do not benefit from a reduction in the pension contribution rate, they prefer
an eco-bonus – irrespective of the size of the green tax rate.
To sum up our findings in this section, we conclude with the following Lemma.
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Lemma 1.1 (Comparison of the old’s and young’s preferred budgetary rule)
Old individuals and young individuals with low income (yi,t < ỹt) prefer redistribution
of tax revenue via a lump-sum transfer whereas higher income earners (yi,t ≥ ỹt) vote
for a reduction of pension contributions.
Thus, although the weak double dividend would materialize if all tax revenue were
refunded through reductions in pensions contributions, as in the social optimum, old
individuals and young individuals with low income benefit more from lump-sum re-
placement of tax revenue and will therefore not support revenue recycling via the
pension scheme.
Voters can be ordered according to age and income. As long as n > 0, it follows that
there are always more working agents than retired individuals. This implies that the
median voter – the pivot in determining the political outcome of majority voting – is
a young type-i individual who divides the electorate in half. Specifically, the median
voter is determined through:
1 + (1 + n)F (yαM,t) =
2 + n
2
⇔ F (yαM,t) =
n
2(1 + n)
. (1.22)
From the above equation it can be easily verified that a lower population growth rate
goes hand in hand with a lower income of the median voter.
1.4.2 The green tax rate
The young. Young individuals find their preferred green tax rate θYi,t for a given αt by
maximizing their indirect utility function (1.12) with respect to θt. The corresponding
first-order condition can be written as:
− dYi (θt) +D(θt)(1 − εD,θ)
(
αtyi,t
(1 + n)(1 − η)ȳt
+
1 − αt
2 + n
)
− [1 + ρ(1 − δ)]
φD′(θt)
c(qt)
= 0 .
(1.23)
The first term in this equation reflects the individual’s direct costs of higher green
taxes. The second expression captures the marginal benefit of higher ecotax revenue:
the reduction in pension contributions and the higher lump-sum transfer. The third
term represents the reduction in the negative externality (for the lifetime of a young in-
dividual) due to lower overall pollution, as aggregate consumption of the polluting good
decreases with its taxation. The preferred green tax rate by a young individual-i bal-
ances these trade-offs. The second-order condition SOCYθ (specified in the Appendix)
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is assumed to be negative for preferences to be single-peaked.
To determine the median voter we need to know how the young’s preferred environ-
mental tax rate changes in income. With the help of the implicit function theorem, we
can establish the following result:
∂θYi,t
∂yi,t
=
c(qt)
SOCYθ
[
∂dYi (θt)
∂yi,t
−
αtD(θt)(1 − εD,θ)
(1 + n)(1 − η)ȳt
]
R 0 . (1.24)
If all ecotax revenue is given back lump-sum, i.e. αt = 0, the above equation is always
non-positive implying that higher income agents (weakly) prefer a lower ecotax rate.
Since consumption of the dirty good (weakly) increases with income, these agents are
(weakly) harmed more by green taxes. If, however, ecotax revenue is employed to
cut back pension contributions, the result may reverse, implying that higher income
individuals prefer higher tax rates. As explained earlier, the advantage of lower pension
contributions increases with income. So, whether lower or higher pollution is more
desirable for high-income earners does, in our model, not depend on heterogenous
preferences concerning the quality of the environment. All individuals are equally hit
by pollution. Instead, individuals with different incomes are affected differently by
ecotaxes and revenue recycling.18
The old. Old agents find their preferred green tax rate θOi,t by maximizing their indirect
utility function (1.13) with respect to θt. The corresponding first-order condition reads
as follows:
−dOi (θt) +
1 − αt
2 + n
D(θt)(1 − εD,θ) −
φD′(θt)
c(qt)
= 0 . (1.25)
As for the young, the first term reflects the direct costs of higher green taxes. The
second expression captures the benefit of green tax revenue if a positive share is given
back in a lump-sum fashion while the last term expresses the reduction in the negative
externality for the lifetime of an old agent. Again, the second-order condition SOCOθ
18 There was a maximum determination base (MDB) of e5.300 (e4.500) in the West (East) for
pension contributions in Germany in 2008. This implies that agents with monthly incomes higher
than the MDB no longer benefit proportionally to income from reductions in pension contributions.
Therefore, their preferred ecotax rate does not rise with income anymore as can be seen in equation
(1.23). Furthermore, agents with incomes above the MDB have higher disposable incomes which
cause them to consume more of the polluting good and tend to lower their desired tax rates (first
addend in equation (1.23)).
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is assumed to hold for preferences to be single-peaked (see the Appendix). We have
∂θOi,t
∂yi,t−1
=
c(qt)
SOCYθ
∂dOi (θt)
∂yi,t−1
≤ 0 , (1.26)
independently of the budgetary rule. All old individuals are equally (un)affected by
the refunding rule. Those with higher income (weakly) consume more of the dirty good
and thus have to pay more taxes in absolute terms (except for quasi-linearity). The
old’s preferred green tax rate thus (weakly) decreases with income.
We are now able to compare the preferred tax rates of the old and young generation
and can establish the following Lemma.
Lemma 1.2 (Comparison of the old’s and young’s preferred tax rates)
Evaluating the old’s first-order condition, equation (1.25), at the preferred green tax
rate of a young individual-i with the same labor income as the old one period earlier,
equation (1.23), yields:
∂V Oi,t (θt)
∂θt
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
θY
i,t
R 0 ⇔ dYi (θt) − d
O
i (θt) −
αtD(θt)(1 − εD,θ)yi,t
(1 + n)(1 − η)ȳt
+ ρ(1 − δ)
φD′(θt)
c(qt)
R 0 .
(1.27)
As IYi,t ≥ I
O
i,t for each individual-i with the same labor income in their working lives,
an old individual absolutely consumes (weakly) less of the dirty good, dYi (θt) ≥ d
O
i (θt),
than a young individual of type-i and thus prefers a higher tax rate. For quasi-linear
preferences, this effect drops out. Two other effects may, however, make the young
generation prefer a higher green tax rate compared to the old generation. First, the
young benefit – for a positive αt – from the reduction in the pension contribution rate
(and the more so the more they earn), whereas pension benefits of the old generation are
unaffected by the green tax. Second, the young generation is hit more by environmental
damage than the old, because they live longer and incur disutility from the stock of
pollution also in the second half of their lives. The latter effect is independent of
income. If these two effects are sufficiently strong, the young’s preferred tax rate will
exceed the old’s preferred tax rate.
For ∂θYi,t/∂yi,t ≥ 0 (holds for the case with no income effects), agents can be ordered
according to their age and income with respect to their preferences over the ecotax
rate, as illustrated in Figure 1.1 for the case of quasi-linear preferences. As long as
n > 0, it follows that there are always more working agents than retired individuals
and the median voter is again identified by equation (1.22). For ∂θYi,t/∂yi,t < 0, both
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Figure 1.1: Political Equilibrium for c′(qt) = 0 and αt > 0.
generations’ preferred ecotax rates decrease with income, and hence, there may be
two median voters – a young and an old individual – who prefer the same tax rate
(equation (1.27) equal to zero). The following Lemma summarizes the determination
of the median voter for both cases.
Lemma 1.3 (The median voter over the green tax rate)
For n > 0, the median voter’s preferred tax rate always solves the young’s first-order
condition, equation (1.23). Additionally,
(i) for ∂θYi,t/∂yi,t ≥ 0, the median voter’s income is determined by
1 + (1 + n)F (yM,t) =
2 + n
2
⇔ F (yM,t) =
n
2(1 + n)
, (1.28)
(ii) for ∂θYi,t/∂yi,t < 0, the median voter can also be both a young and an old agent
whose incomes are determined by
F (yM,t−1) + (1 + n)F (yM,t) =
2 + n
2
and (1.29)
dYM(θt) − d
O
M(θt) −
αtD(θt)(1 − εD,θ)yM,t
(1 + n)(1 − η)ȳt
+ ρ(1 − δ)
φD′(θt)
c(qt)
= 0 . (1.30)
If the ordering of preferences is such that F (y−) + (1 + n)F (yM,t) = (2 + n)/2 or
F (y+) + (1 + n)F (yM,t) = (2 + n)/2, the median voter is again solely determined
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by a young agent.19
For ∂θYi,t/∂yi,t ≥ 0, the median voter over both dimensions is the same, i.e., y
α
M,t = yM,t.
1.4.3 The political equilibrium
In the previous sections we identified the median voters for each policy dimension who
may or may not be identical. Their incomes are determined by equation (1.22) for the
budgetary rule and by Lemma 1.3 for the green tax rate. As argued above, the preferred
policies of the median voter(s) – θMt (αt) and α
M
t (θt) – can be interpreted as reaction
functions. Their intersection yields the structure-induced equilibrium (θeqt , α
eq
t ).
First, assume the median voter’s income is such that yM,t < ỹt implying α
eq
t = 0. The
green tax rate in the political equilibrium is then implicitly determined through:
− dYM(θt) +
D(θt)(1 − εD,θ)
2 + n
− [1 + ρ(1 − δ)]
φD′(θt)
c(qt)
= 0 . (1.31)
Evaluation of the social planner’s first-order condition with respect to θt, equation (1.16),
at equation (1.31) yields:
∂W(θt, αt = 1)
∂θt
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
θ
eq
t ,α
eq
t =0
R 0 ⇔
dYM(θt) − d̄(θt) +
D(θt)(1 − εD,θ)η
1 − η
−
φD′(θt)
c(qt)
z(z + n)
1 − z
R 0 . (1.32)
As dYM(θt) ≤ d̄(θt)
20 (holds with equality for quasi-linear preferences), the above equa-
tion is indeterminate in sign. While income effects drag the tax rate towards or beyond
the social optimum, the other two effects have the opposite impact. If all environmen-
tal taxes are given back in a lump-sum fashion, αeqt = 0, the green tax rate chosen
in the political process does not account for efficiency losses induced by the pension
scheme. The social planner, by contrast, takes into consideration that higher green
taxes reduce the deadweight loss caused by pension contributions. Furthermore, for
δ < 1 (⇔ z > 0), he takes the effect of today’s pollution on all future generations
into account and not only the future damage inflicted on the current young generation.
Equation (1.32) is thus strictly positive for quasi-linear preferences or a sufficiently
weak income effect, implying θ∗t > θ
eq
t .
19 To see this, refer to the Appendix.
20 This is due to the right-skewed income distribution. Note that average consumption d̄(θt) is given
by D(θt)/(2 + n).
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Now, assume ỹt ≤ yM,t implying α
eq
t = 1. The ecotax rate in the political equilibrium
is then implicitly given by:
− dYM(θt) +D(θt)(1 − εD,θ)
yM,t
(1 + n)(1 − η)ȳt
− [1 + ρ(1 − δ)]
φD′(θt)
c(qt)
= 0 . (1.33)
Again, we evaluate the social planner’s first-order condition with respect to θt at this
equation:
∂W(θt, αt = 1)
∂θt
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
θ
eq
t ,α
eq
t =1
R 0 ⇔ dYM(θt) − d̄(θt)
[
1 −
1 − εD,θ
1 − η
(
1 −
2 + n
1 + n
yM,t
ȳt
)]
−
1
1 + n
φD′(θt)
c(qt)
z(z + n)
1 − z
R 0 . (1.34)
The sign of the above equation is indeterminate, and the median voter’s preferred
green tax rate may well be close to or even above the tax rate chosen by the social
planner. We name the term in the first line ‘political economy effect’ and the one in
the second line ‘environmental sustainability effect’. Unless δ = 1, the latter effect is
always strictly positive as the social planner internalizes more of the environmental
damage accruing in the future while the first effect is ambiguous in sign. The political
economy effect may thus drag the tax rate chosen in the political equilibrium above
the optimal tax rate. To illustrate this, assume for a moment that δ = 1, implying that
emissions do not accumulate in the atmosphere and the second line drops out. Using
equation (1.19), we have:
θ∗t R θ
eq
t ⇔
1 − εD,θ
1 − η
(
1 −
2 + n
1 + n
yM,t
ȳt
)
R 1 −
dYM(θt)
d̄(θt)
. (1.35)
Importantly, the lower dYM(θt) is compared to d̄(θt), the more likely it is that the
politically determined tax rate lies above the socially optimal one. For quasi-linear
preferences, dYM(θt) = d̄(θt), we get:
θ∗t R θ
eq
t ⇔ 1 R
2 + n
1 + n
yM,t
ȳt
⇔ yM,t ⋚
ỹt
1 − η
. (1.36)
In this case, the median voter’s environmental tax rate lies above the adjusted Pigou-
vian tax rate whenever his income exceeds the critical income ỹt by the factor 1/(1−η).
The reasoning behind this result can best be understood by comparing the social
planner’s and median voter’s first-order conditions with respect to θt. For δ = 1
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and αt = 1, equations (1.16) and (1.23) reduce to:
D(θt)(1 − εD,θ)
1 − η
−
φD′(θt)
c(qt)
(2 + n) −d̄(θt)(2 + n) = 0 , (1.37)
D(θt)(1 − εD,θ)
1 − η
1
1 + n
yM,t
ȳt
−
φD′(θt)
c(qt)
−dYM(θt) = 0 . (1.38)
The first two terms in each equation represent the marginal benefits of a tax increase
due to revenue recycling through the pension system and due to the reduction of
environmental damages. The last terms illustrate the marginal costs of higher ecotaxes.
First, suppose there are no income effects, i.e. d̄(θt) = dYM(θt). As the median voter
does not take into account that all other individuals are also affected by changes in
the green tax rate, he underestimates both benefits and costs compared to the social
planner.21 While the underestimation of marginal costs raises the tax rate in the
political equilibrium, the underestimation of marginal benefits lowers the tax rate. A
graphical illustration is given in the Appendix. Higher income of the median voter
(compared to average income) thereby makes the latter effect less severe as can be seen
from the first term in the second line. Note that only the combined underestimation
of benefits and costs makes the overall effect ambiguous in sign. In other words,
although the median voter tends to vote for a higher green tax rate because he does
not consider that the costs of higher taxes are borne by all, an inefficiently high tax rate
can only prevail in the political equilibrium if marginal benefits are not underestimated
too much by the median voter. This happens whenever the median voter’s income is
sufficiently high compared to average income. The presence of income effects increases
the underestimation of individual marginal costs (compared to overall marginal costs)
and a higher than socially optimal green tax rate is more likely to emerge.
For δ < 1, the median voter still desires an inefficiently high tax rate according to
equation (1.34) if his income is high enough (compared to average income) so as to
outweigh the environmental sustainability effect. The following Proposition summa-
rizes our results for the outcome of the political process.
Proposition 1.1 (Political equilibrium as compared to social optimum)
The equilibrium share of taxes devoted to the pension scheme, αeqt , is
αeqt = 0 for y
α
M,t < ỹt ,
αeqt = 1 for y
α
M,t ≥ ỹt .
21 Note that yYM,t < (1 + n)ȳt for right-skewed income distributions.
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For n > 0, we can always identify a young individual who is the median voter. His
preferred tax rate may be lower or higher than (or equal to) the socially optimal tax
rate. Specifically,
(i) for no stock pollution, δ = 1, we find
θeqt R θ∗t for
1 − εD,θ
1 − η
(
1 − (1 − η)
yM,t
ỹt
)
⋚ 1 −
dYM(θt)
d̄(θt)
,
which for quasi-linear preferences, dYM(θt) = d̄(θt), reduces to
θeqt R θ∗t for yM,t R ỹt/(1 − η) .
(ii) For δ < 1, the equilibrium tax rate exceeds the first-best tax rate if the political
economy effect is negative and outweighs the environmental sustainability effect,
i.e. equation (1.34) is negative.
Our results are driven by demography, income distribution, the tax-price elasticity of
the polluting good as well as the parameters ρ, δ and η.22 Whether we can observe
an inefficiently high or low tax rate in reality is thus an empirical question which we
address in Section 1.6.
1.5 Demographic change
Demography plays an important role in our model. Not only does demography directly
affect the political equilibrium by determining the median voter, it also indirectly affects
the political outcome by changing individuals’ preferences. In this section, we analyze
the impact of a changing n on the desired tax rates of the median voter and the social
planner. As Germany is confronted with a dramatic population aging, we concentrate
on the effects of a decreasing but still positive n as also projected by the OECD for
Germany. The analysis is more complex than one could have anticipated. So, we
concentrate here on quasi-linear preferences and, at the end of this section, provide
some intuition how income effects influence our results.
Applying the implicit function theorem to equations (1.17), (1.23) and (1.25), we can
establish the following Lemma.
22 Importantly, whether the tax rate in the political equilibrium is inefficiently low or high does not
depend on the size of marginal damages, φ. Solving equations (1.17) for θ∗t and (1.31) or (1.33)
for θMt and subtracting one from the other, φ can be factored out. The marginal social damage
has only a level effect on the tax rates.
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Lemma 1.4 (Tax rates and demographic change)
With no income effects, the following conditions hold for the desired tax rates of young
and old individuals and the social planner:
∂θ∗t
∂n
=
φD′(θt)[1 + ρ(1 − δ)]/(1 − z)2
SOC∗θ
> 0 , (1.39)
∂θYi,t
∂n
=
φd′(θt)[1 + ρ(1 − δ)] +
αtc(qt)d(θt)(1 − εD,θ)yi,t
(1 + n)2(1 − η)ȳt
SOCYθ
R 0 , (1.40)
∂θOi,t
∂n
=
φd′(θt)
SOCOθ
> 0 . (1.41)
Obviously, a lower population growth rate decreases the optimal ecotax, as less envi-
ronmental damage needs to be internalized. A similar reasoning applies to the old’s and
young’s preferred tax rates. With a lower n, both desire a lower ecotax because of lower
overall pollution. If, however, at least some tax revenue is used to cut pension contri-
butions, i.e. αt > 0, a second effect shows up in equation (1.40) which makes a young
type-i’s reaction to a decrease in n ambiguous in sign. To see the intuition behind this
effect, we differentiate equation (1.9) with respect to n: ∂2b(θt, αt)/∂θt∂n > 0. That
is, for given pension benefits, a lower n makes tax increases more effective in reducing
pension contributions and increases the attractiveness of higher ecotaxes.23 Hence for
αt > 0, depending on the relative strength of the effects at work, the young’s preferred
ecotax rate may rise or fall in response to a change in n, as indicated by the diagonal
arrows in Figure 1.2.
Having characterized how the different generations react to a change in n with respect
to their desired tax rate, we also need to take into account that the decisive voter
changes when n marginally changes. Suppose that αeqt = 0 at the beginning. If n
decreases, we obtain by Lemma 1.4 that the politically induced tax rate decreases as
well, given that the median voter’s income remains unchanged. However, a decrease
in the population growth rate also increases the share of the old. Hence, the median
voter shifts to a young agent of lower income.24 This median voter effect has – for
23 To keep the pension scheme solvent over the long term, the so-called demographic ‘sustainability
factor’ was introduced in 2005. In determining pension benefits, the German pension formula now
takes into account the number of pensioners relative to the number of contributors. Specifically,
population aging not only affects the young in that it increases pension contributions, but also
reduces pension benefits of the current old. Introducing the demographic sustainability factor in
our analysis would thereby reduce the attractiveness of higher ecotaxes due to population aging
for the young in society.
24 Note that we assume that the income distribution is not affected by a marginal change in n.
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Figure 1.2: Demographic change for c′(qt) = 0 and αt > 0.
quasi-linear preferences – no impact since for αeqt = 0 all young agents prefer the same
tax rate (see equation (1.24)). If the initial equilibrium is given by αeqt = 1, Lemma
1.4 predicts an ambiguous effect of the median voter’s desired tax rate to a change in
n, given that his income stays the same. But, again, the median voter changes to an
individual with lower income (indicated by the horizontal arrow in Figure 1.2) who for
αeqt = 1 prefers a lower ecotax rate. In sum, the equilibrium tax rate may either rise
or fall.25
In addition to the effects described above, we need to think of how possible income
effects change the political outcome in an aging society. Assuming that the income
distribution remains the same and pension benefits remain constant, the now lower
mass of young individuals needs to pay higher pension contributions. This, along with
the in any case lower sum of incomes in the economy, leads to lower consumption of the
polluting good. As a consequence the new median voter now consumes less, that is,
dYM(θt) falls, and he desires a higher tax rate than before. As d̄(θt) also falls, we cannot
say whether the wedge between the socially optimal and the politically determined
tax rate becomes larger or smaller (see the first two addends in equations (1.32) and
(1.34)).
Whether and how demographic change, as expected for Germany, shifts the political
equilibrium will be explored in the following section.
25 Additionally, the threshold income ỹt becomes smaller as ∂ỹt/∂n = (1 − η)ȳt/(2 + n)2 > 0 and the
median voter with respect to the budgetary rule also shifts to an individual with lower income.
Thus population aging has an ambiguous effect on the choice of αeqt .
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1.6 A calibration of the model
In this section, we calibrate our model to the German economy, focusing on the ecotax
on gasoline, as transport-related expenses represent the largest share of households’
energy expenditure. We inspect whether the refund rule observed in reality can be
predicted by our model and make some tentative statements on whether the German
ecotax rate exceeds or falls short of the adjusted Pigouvian tax. To this end, we cali-
brate the model parameters (reasonable estimates of which are found in the literature)
such that the tax rate in the political equilibrium matches the actual German ecotax,
and then determine the social optimum. Computations are undertaken for the year
2008 (for reasons of data availability) and for a pensioner/contributor ratio that is pro-
jected for the year 2028. Household data on a monthly basis for the distribution of gross
labor income, for disposable incomes and motor fuel expenditure are taken from the
EVS (Sample Survey of Income and Expenditure) from the Federal Statistical Office
in Germany. Data on population size are obtained from the OECD database.
To compute n, we divide the number of retired individuals above the age of 65 (which is
16,624,000 people), by the number of working individuals between the age of 20 and 64
(49,715,000 people). Consequently, the pensioner/contributor ratio is 1/(1 + n)=0.33
and n equals 1.99. For the year 2008, the Federal Statistical Office reports an average
gasoline price of e1.40 per liter. Deducting the ecotax of e0.15, we get a producer
price of e1.25 that includes all pre-reform taxes. Normalizing the producer price to
unity yields 0.8 liters, which are equivalent to 0.00184 tonnes of CO2.26 The ecotax
per 0.8 liters then amounts to θeq2008=e0.12.
We estimate equation (1.6) on the basis of our data, using disposable incomes and
expenditure on transport fuels of all households:
dji (θ2008) = 22.164 + 0.0254I
j
i,2008 . (1.42)
Following Cremer et al. (2007, 2008) that c(qt) ≡ 1 − βqt = 1 − β(1 + 0.12), we
have with the above equation: −c′(q2008)/c(q2008) = β/(1 − 1.12β) = 0.0254. Solving
for β and inserting back yields c(q2008) = 0.9723. Furthermore, average income and
average expenditure on transport-related fuels over all households are ȳ2008=e2056 and
d̄(θ2008)=e98.
Kleven and Kreiner (2003) estimate the marginal costs of public funds for Germany
and report a lower bound of 1.55 for a proportional tax reform. For our modelling
26 The conversion factor from liters to tonnes of CO2 can be found in footnote 4.
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framework, this implies an η of 0.37.27
The critical income below which the young want all ecotax revenue to be given back in
a lump-sum fashion is: ỹ2008 = (1+1.99)/(2+1.99)(1−0.37)e2056=e971 (see equation
(1.19)). By equation (1.22), we have F (yM,2008)=0.33 which yields yM,2008=e1091 so
that it is indeed optimal for the median voter to vote for earmarking the ecotax revenue
as reductions in pension contributions.
The parameter values εD,θ, δ and ρ are based on estimates in the literature. As a
starting point for the demand elasticity, we take the average long-run price elasticity for
gasoline from Espey (1996), εD,θ = 0.58. To provide some sensitivity analysis, we report
our results for εD,θ = 0.58 ± 0.15.28 It is a more difficult endeavor to find estimates
for the uptake of anthropogenic CO2 by biological and abiological sinks, let alone to
squeeze them into a single parameter.29 The uptake capacity is reservoir-specific and
depends on the state of the system, i.e., on the initial level and the additional flux of
CO2 released into the atmosphere, and hence varies over time. Nevertheless, the IPCC
(2007) states in the “Executive Summary” of Chapter 7 on the carbon cycle: “About
half of a CO2 pulse to the atmosphere is removed over a timescale of 30 years; a further
30% is removed within a few centuries; and the remaining 20% will typically stay in
the atmosphere for many thousands of years.” As one period in our model corresponds
to 45 years, we take the IPCC’s estimate as a lower bound and vary δ from 0.5 to 1.
Finally, we are restricted by the condition ρ(1 + n) < 1, that is, ρ < 0.33 for the n we
employ. Using a discount rate of 3% per year as in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), we
find ρ = 0.264 < 0.33.30
In order to determine the median voter over the tax rate, we need to check on the basis
of our data whether the young’s ecotax rate is increasing or decreasing in gross labor
income, equation (1.24). Within the range of our parameter estimates from above, this
equation is always strictly positive for αeq2008 = 1. By the first part of Lemma 1.3, the
median voter is identical to the one with respect to the budgetary rule.31
27 Since pension benefits in Germany are to a large extent earnings-related, the deadweight loss
associated with the pension system is known to be smaller than for general income taxes. Thus,
we see the lowest estimate of their analysis as an appropriate value for the calibration of our model.
28 Note that we require η < εD,θ from our theoretical model.
29 The long term abiological sinks are dissolution in the oceans and chemical neutralization by reaction
with carbonates and basic igneous rocks, see Archer et al. (1997).
30 Nordhaus (2007) argues that information on intertemporal preferences can be inferred from obser-
vations of investment decisions on capital markets and, therefore, a positive discount rate can be
employed. Note that in our model, the discount rate is equal to the rate of pure time preference
since the growth rate of per capita GDP is equal to zero.
31 As indicated by footnote 18, agents with incomes above the MDB actually prefer lower ecotaxes
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εD,θ 0.43 0.58 0.73
δ: 0.5 e0.04 e0.01 e0.00
0.6 e0.05 e0.02 e0.01
0.7 e0.05 e0.03 e0.02
0.8 e0.06 e0.03 e0.03
0.9 e0.06 e0.04 e0.04
1.0 e0.07 e0.04 e0.04
Table 1.1: θeqt − θ
∗
t for the year 2008.
As estimates for the marginal social damage from CO2 emissions vary enormously, we
infer for different values of δ and εD,θ the corresponding φ’s so as to match the politically
determined tax rate to the actual German ecotax. Converting these values into e per
tonne of CO2, we find that they are within the range of e1.26 to e8.28. For the given
θeq2008, they are the higher the more CO2 is removed from the atmosphere and the higher
the price elasticity of demand. Not surprisingly, we find a low social marginal damage
for all parameter constellations. This is because a tax of approximately e0.50 per liter
had been levied on mineral oil prior to the ecotax reform. The total tax on gasoline
(excluding the VAT which comes on top) hence amounts to e0.65 (equals e285 per
tonne of CO2). The pre-reform tax on gasoline had already internalized a huge part of
the external effect.
We are now able to calculate θ∗2008 according to equation (1.17). Table 1.1 shows the
difference between the politically determined and Pigouvian tax rate, θeq2008 − θ
∗
2008, for
different parameter constellations.
Our simulations illustrate that the tax rate chosen by the median voter is at least as high
as the socially optimal tax for all parameter constellations considered. The difference
rises with δ since a higher CO2 uptake rate (less CO2 remains in the atmosphere) causes
the social planner to internalize less damage accruing in the future which the median
voter does anyway not take into account. However, the redistributive motive of the
median voter under the equilibrium budgetary rule prevails and drags the desired tax
rate even more above the socially optimal one. In addition, the spread between the
two tax rates rises the more inelastic the price elasticity of demand. The intuition is
that the more inelastic demand is, the less consumers can evade the tax burden. The
than predicted by our model. However, the ordering of preferred ecotaxes and thus the determina-
tion of the median voter are unaffected. This is because we use disposable incomes which already
include this peculiarity of the German pension scheme.
Intergenerational Aspects of Ecotax Reforms 34
social planner takes this into account and chooses a lower tax rate in order not to strain
the currently living generations too much. So, for lower elasticities, the fiscal effects
of redistributing ecotax revenue through the pension system dominate. Depending
on the underlying parameter constellations, the politically determined tax rate may
exceed the adjusted Pigouvian one by up to e0.07, i.e., by more than 100%.32
To illustrate numerically the role of demographic change in our model, assume that
n decreases from 1.99 to 1, or equivalently the pensioner/contributor ratio worsens
from 0.33 to 0.5, as projected by the OECD for the year 2028 approximately. As
we cannot reasonably speculate about technologies and income distributions in 2028,
we keep everything else constant at 2008 levels. The first effect of this change in n
is that now the median voter prefers an eco-bonus to the alternative cut in pension
contributions since ỹ2028=e864 and F (yM,2028) = 0.25, implying yM,2028=e769. This
makes an inefficiently high tax rate in the political equilibrium less likely. For simplicity,
we focus on δ = 0.5 and εD,θ = 0.58, corresponding to φ=e0.0094 per 0.8 liters or e5.11
per tonne of CO2. The Pigouvian tax rate then amounts to e0.07 which is lower than
previously (see Table 1.1). Since αeq2028 = 0, equation (1.24) is negative. We order
young and old individuals according to their desired tax rates. This yields a tax rate
in the political equilibrium of e0.04 which now falls short of the social optimum. It is
only one third of the German tax rate after the 1998-2003 reform.33
1.7 Discussion
The previous sections have shown that inefficiently high or close to efficient tax rates
are more likely to prevail under majority voting if some share of tax revenue is devoted
to the pension scheme. As Proposition 1.1 states, this is more likely the more income
the median voter has at his disposal. The second instrument, the budgetary rule, opens
the possibility to ‘buy’ political support for a higher ecotax from young voters. This
possibility is limited if all generations benefit alike from the refund rule. In Cremer
et al. (2004), the constitutional planner is able to implement the efficient tax rate in
the voting stage by choosing an appropriate refund rule in the first stage which is not
subject to voting.34 Our positive analysis of both instruments suggests that the refund
32 Note that to get tax rates per liter, we need to divide all numbers in Table 1.1 by 0.8.
33 Also all other parameter constellations in Table 1.1 lead to inefficiently low tax rates in the political
equilibrium.
34 If we allowed a constitutional planner to set the refund rule in the first stage, taking into account
the distortions from voting over the tax rate in the second stage, he would equate θ∗t with θ
eq
t and
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rule is – under certain conditions – able to reduce the overall distortion in the economy.
Along these lines, the double dividend argument has politico-economic implications
because it may go along with more support for higher ecotaxes.35 A similar argument
is given by Aidt (2010) who finds in a probabilistic voting model with lobbying that the
endogenous choice of the refund rule may render higher ecotax rates politically more
acceptable.
The key to our results is the redistribution of ecotax revenue to young voters who are –
for positive population growth – decisive in the political process. They support higher
ecotaxes, inter alia, because they benefit from reductions in pension contributions, but
they would similarly gain from reductions in personal income or other social security
taxes which are levied proportionally or overproportionally to income. Such policies
favor young working individuals – the more so the more progressive these systems
are – while the old generation is largely unaffected. As already mentioned in the
introduction, ecotax reforms of this kind were carried out in Sweden, Denmark, the
Netherlands and the UK. In our theoretical model, the pension contribution rate can
more generally be interpreted as a personal income tax rate, and instead of holding
pension benefits constant, total government spending could be kept fixed. An increase
in the ecotax then again proves more advantageous for young individuals, in particular
high-income earners, than for retirees if not all ecotax revenue is distributed back
lump-sum. Therefore, our model can well be applied – with only minor modifications
– to other European countries and provides some evidence that distributing revenue
generated by environmental regulation to young agents is a strategy to secure political
support for higher ecotaxes.36
Since generations are dynastically linked and since today’s consumption of the dirty
good also affects the offspring of each generation alive today, that is, its children,
children’s children and so on, a more adequate representation of preferences may be to
incorporate intergenerational altruism (see, e.g., Barro, 1974). Then, today’s old would
not only derive utility from their own consumption but also from all future generations’
utility levels. Assuming that the income-type is passed on to the next generation, how
would such intergenerational altruism change the political equilibrium? First, note
solve for αt. As can be easily verified, whether efficiency can be achieved depends on the income
distribution and the parameter values ρ, δ, n, η. Note that αt must lie in the interval [0; 1].
35 Empirical and experimental studies examining public support for taxation have mainly focused
on transport-related taxes, see, e.g., Schuitema and Steg (2008), or Sælen and Kallbekken (2011).
For a study on tax aversion and revenue recycling in the lab see Kallbekken et al. (2011).
36 Comparably high tax rates on mineral oil in the afore-mentioned countries can be seen as indication
of this hypothesis, see the OECD/EEA database on instruments used for environmental policy and
natural resources management.
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that the indirect utility of the old then also depends on the income of the young.
Their preferred green tax rate may then still fall (under lump-sum redistribution)
or rise (under redistribution through the pension scheme) in their children’s income.
High-income families may thus for αeqt = 1 vote for higher green taxes as compared
to low-income families. They may also prefer earmarking of ecotax revenue to the
pension scheme instead of lump-sum transfers. But, more importantly, the current old
and young generations internalize the externality of their dirty good consumption on all
future generations. This increases the preferred green tax rate of both generations and
thus also of the median voter. Nevertheless, the intragenerational externality remains
and if altruism is only one-sided, the young do not internalize the impact of their dirty
good consumption on their parents’ utility. In other words, the political equilibrium is
probably still different from the social optimum, but compared to no altruism it yields
a higher green tax rate and, for given parameter constellations, it becomes more likely
that ecotax revenue is earmarked to the pension scheme.37
Our theoretical model comprises two periods for each generation, implying that all
young agents are of the same age. In reality, however, a young individual approach-
ing pension age may anticipate the effects of his vote on his welfare in old age and
therefore vote differently compared to a young agent who has just entered working life,
particularly if the next elections do not come up soon. Sinn and Übelmesser (2003)
find that, in Germany, the median voter is approximately of age 48 around 2009 and
of age 53 around 2030. Breaking down the lifetime of each generation in our model
by introducing different age cohorts, this aging of the median voter would reduce the
attractiveness of higher green taxes in the political equilibrium.
A simplifying assumption in many regards is the linear damage function in our model.
It renders the problem analytically tractable in the first place, because it separates the
decisions on the tax rates in different periods. Therefore, no expectations with respect
to future tax rates have to be made. Although previous related studies assume convex
damage costs, they solely concentrate on one period and thus do not take account of
the accumulation of emissions in the atmosphere. In our model, constant marginal
damages are the only viable solution in the calibration, as otherwise we would have to
project the future emissions path. To our knowledge, no country-specific estimate of
the damage function is available. Yet, it is widely believed that this function is convex.
Not incorporating this feature leads to an underestimation of the adjusted Pigouvian
37 To avoid double-counting, the altruistic component should not enter the welfare function which
implies that the social optimum remains unaffected by altruistic preferences (see, e.g., Hammond,
1987).
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tax rate, as the social planner would take into account that the damage from emissions
today would rise in the future with higher levels of CO2 in the atmosphere. He would
then want to lower emissions today via a higher tax rate. By contrast, the median
voter’s chosen tax rate would not differ significantly. He only observes two points on
the damage function – today and in his old age. In this case, a linear specification that
connects these two points is a good enough approximation.
1.8 Concluding remarks
We have analyzed the political determination of the German ecotax package theoreti-
cally and numerically. In the OLG model we employ, voters have different preferences
with respect to the ecotax reform due to income and, more importantly, due to age.
We found that old individuals are more likely to prefer lower tax rates than young
individuals with the same income, as they do not benefit from a reduction in pension
contributions and do not suffer from environmental damage in the future. Furthermore,
both old individuals and young low-income earners vote for full lump-sum redistribu-
tion of tax revenue. High-income earners, however, benefit more from a reduction
of pension contributions than from lump-sum transfers, because consumption of the
externality-generating good rises less than proportionally with income while pension
contributions are proportional to income.
For a positive population growth, the median voter over both dimensions was found
to be of the young generation. The environmental tax rate in the political equilibrium
can be higher or lower than the efficient tax rate (or incidentally coincide with it),
depending mainly on demography and income distribution. Whereas the social planner
would choose a share of tax revenue devoted to the pension scheme equal to unity so
as to reduce the deadweight loss from pension contributions, this share was shown to
be either zero or unity in the political equilibrium.
The calibration of the model gave a taste of the situation in Germany. First, it is indeed
optimal for the median voter to choose a reduction of pension contributions rather than
a lump-sum transfer. Second, for reasonable parameter values, the German ecotax lies
above its optimal level, the more so the more CO2 is degraded and removed in the
atmosphere within the lifetime of one generation, and the more inelastic the demand
of the dirty good. Further demographic change in Germany towards a ‘gerontocracy’
lowers the politically induced tax rate below its optimal level because the median voter
no longer disposes of sufficiently high income in the future.
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1.9 Appendix
Derivation of Social Optimum
We can rewrite equation (1.14) by splitting up the last term into the utility of the
currently young and the sum of utilities of all future (young) generations:
Wt(θt, αt) =
∫ y+
y−
V Oi,t (θt, αt)dF (yt−1)
+ (1 + n)
[
∫ y+
y−
V Yi,t (θt, αt)dF (yt) +
∞∑
x=t+1
(
(1 + n)ρ
)x−t
∫ y+
y−
V Yi,x(θt)dF (yx)
]
,
where the utilities of all future generations do not depend on αt. This implies that
for these generations only marginal damages from emissions remain in the first-order
condition below. Taking the derivative with respect to the tax rate, we then have:
∂Wt(.)
∂θt
= (2 + n)a′(qt) + c
′(qt)
(
ĪOt + (1 + n)Ī
Y
t
)
+ c(qt)D(θt)(1 − εD,θ)
1 − η(1 − αt)
1 − η
− (2 + n)φD′(θt) − zφD
′(θt) − (1 + n)[1 + ρ(1 − δ)]φD
′(θt)
∞∑
x=t+1
zx−t = 0 ,
where ĪOt = B̄t+τt and Ī
Y
t = (1−bt)ȳt+(1+n)τt. Dividing by c(qt), using equation (1.6),
carrying out an index transformation and assuming that ρ(1 + n) < 1 as
∑∞
t=0[ρ(1 +
n)]t = 1/[1 − ρ(1 + n)] only converges for the argument being less than unity, yields
equation (1.16) in the text.
The second-order condition with respect to the tax rate is as follows:
SOC∗θ =(2 + n)a
′′(qt) + c
′′(qt)
(
ĪOt + (1 + n)Ī
Y
t
)
+ 2c′(qt)D(θt)(1 − εD,θ)A
+ 2c(qt)D
′(θt)A+
(
c(qt)θtA−
2 + n
1 − z
φ
)
D′′(θt) , (1.A.1)
where A ≡
1 − η(1 − αt)
1 − η
> 0.
Single-Peakedness
The second-order conditions of equations (1.23) and (1.25) are given by
SOCYθ =a
′′(qt) + c
′′(qt)I
Y
i,t + 2c
′(qt)D(θt)(1 − εD,θ)Ω + 2c(qt)D
′(θt)Ω (1.A.2)
+ (c(qt)θtΩ − [1 + ρ(1 − δ)]φ)D
′′(θt) ,
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SOCOθ =a
′′(qt) + c
′′(qt)I
O
i,t + 2c
′(qt)
1 − αt
2 + n
D(θt)(1 − εD,θ)
+ 2c(qt)D
′(θt)
1 − αt
2 + n
+
(
c(qt)θt
1 − αt
2 + n
− φ
)
D′′(θt) , (1.A.3)
where Ω ≡
αtyi,t
(1 + n)(1 − η)ȳt
+
1 − αt
2 + n
> 0.
Illustration of Lemma 1.3
Even if ∂θYi,t/∂yi,t < 0, there is only one young median voter in the following two cases.
The dashed ellipses in Figure 1.3 illustrate a mass of young individuals that exceeds (2+
n)/2. In Figure 1.3(a), the median voter is then determined by F (y−)+(1+n)F (yM,t) =
(2+n)/2 with F (y−) = 0 whereas he is determined by F (y+)+(1+n)F (yM,t) = (2+n)/2
with F (y+) = 1 in Figure 1.3(b).
θYi,t, θ
O
i,t θ
Y
i,t, θ
O
i,t
yi,t yi,t
old oldyoung young
yM,t yM,t
θYi,t(αt)
θYi,t(αt)
θOi,t(αt)
θOi,t(αt)
θMt (αt)
θMt (αt)
B(yi,t−1) B(yi,t−1)
(a) (b)
Figure 1.3: Determination of the median voter.
Comparison of θ∗t and θ
eq
t for y
α
M,t ≥ ỹt
Consider equations (1.37) and (1.38). Compared to the social planner, the median
voter underestimates both the marginal costs (MC) and the marginal benefits (MB)
of higher ecotaxes. Figure 1.4 illustrates. Specifically, the MC and MB for the social
planner (indicated by a superscript ∗) and the median voter (superscript M) are given
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by:
MC∗ ≡ (2 + n)d̄(θt) > d
Y
M(θt) ≡ MC
M ,
MB∗ ≡
D(θt)(1 − εD,θ)
1 − η
− (2 + n)
φD′(θt)
c(qt)
≥
D(θt)(1 − εD,θ)
1 − η
yM,t
ȳt
1
1 + n
−
φD′(θt)
c(qt)
≡ MBM .
Both MC and MB decrease in θt and, additionally,
∣
∣
∣
∂MC
∂θt
∣
∣
∣ <
∣
∣
∣
∂MB
∂θt
∣
∣
∣ by the SOCs (equa-
tions (1.A.1) and (1.A.3)). That is, the (negative) slope of marginal benefits is steeper
than for marginal costs which ensures a maximum.
θt
MC,MB
MC∗
MB∗
θ∗t θ
eq
t
MCM
MBM
Figure 1.4: Comparison of θeqt and θ
∗
t for α
eq
t = 1.
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2.1 Introduction
When analyzing international (environmental) policy, we often consider individual
countries to be represented by a single benevolent decision maker, e.g. a government,
acting in the best interest of the country as a whole. In this paper, we depart from this
idealized abstraction by assuming that each country’s decision maker is vulnerable to
the influence of national political competition. As a consequence, international policy
is governed by two forces: (i) the influence of political competition on a national level
and (ii) the interplay of national governments on the international policy arena.
By political competition we mean that incumbent politicians not only maximize the
welfare of the general electorate (national social welfare) but are also susceptible to the
influence of lobby groups which try to sway them in their favor by providing campaign
contributions, information or simply bribes. This may give them an advantage over
their challengers at the next election and hence increases their likelihood of reelection.
Deviating from the socially optimal policy, however, leads to an alienation of voters
and decreases this likelihood. Policy-makers thus face a trade-off between securing
political support by interest groups and maximizing national social welfare.
On the international level, the particular environmental policy we consider is the non-
cooperative formation of an international emission permit market (Helm, 2003). Our
choice for non-cooperative climate policies is twofold. On the one hand, the interna-
tional negotiations for a successor of the Kyoto Protocol in Durban in 2012 have shown
how difficult it is to achieve international cooperation. As a consequence, alternatives
such as linking already established regional emissions trading systems have been dis-
cussed (Flachsland et al., 2009).1 On the other hand, Carbone et al. (2009) have
recently shown that even non-cooperative climate policies exhibit substantial potential
for greenhouse gas reductions.
We analyze the political economy of international climate policy in a two-country setup
with legislative lobbying in each country. In a first stage governments decide whether
to link domestic emission permit markets to an international market. An international
permit market is formed if and only if both countries agree to it. In the second stage
governments decide about the amounts of emission permits which are issued to the
domestic firms. In both stages governments are lobbied by domestic pressure groups
which try to sway the government policy in their favor. Governments are susceptible
to the interests of lobby groups, as they maximize a weighted sum of national social
1 In fact, Australia plans to join the European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme by 2015.
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welfare and lobby contributions. Trading of permits – within or between countries
depending on the regime choice of the first stage – takes place in the third stage.
We find that, as long as all lobby groups exhibit strictly positive contribution schedules
in the second stage, both the choice of regime in the first stage and the amounts of
emission permits issued in the second stage only depend on the aggregate levels of
organized stakes in both countries. In particular, they are independent of the number
of interest groups and the distribution of stakes among them.
In addition, we find that an increase in the influence of a particular interest group
may result in a policy change which is counter to the interests of the respective lobby.
The intuition behind this result is that a change in the political environment has two
effects. The direct effect induces the home government to be more in favor of this
lobby group’s preferred regime. In addition, there is an indirect effect, as a change in
the political environment changes the equilibrium emission allowance choices in both
regimes and in both countries. Although the change in equilibrium allowances is in
both regimes and both countries in the direction which is preferred by the lobby group
whose influence rises, it may induce a change towards the lobby group’s less preferred
regime. If the increasing influence of the lobby group induces a change to this group’s
less preferred regime, the lobby group may be worse off than before. In this respect,
our analysis suggests that national political influence by lobby groups has important
ramifications for the political feasibility of linking national permit markets.
Our paper contributes to several strands of literature. It builds on the literature on
non-cooperative international permit markets, developed by Helm (2003), Carbone,
Helm and Rutherford (2009) and Helm and Pichler (2011). While these papers as-
sume benevolent national governments, we introduce a political economy framework.
Therefore, we draw on the literature on special interest groups, the “common agency”
approach, originally developed by Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and extended by
Grossman and Helpman in various seminal contributions (Grossman and Helpman,
1994, 1995a,b). In particular, we combine a binary regime choice and a continuous
emission allowance choice, both of which are prone to lobbying by special interest
groups.
Another closely related strand of literature examines the political economy of tradable
emission permits and, in particular, the question whether permits should be auctioned
or grandfathered in the presence of lobbying (Lai, 2007, 2008). While Lai’s analysis
is confined to the national level, we analyze how political competition on the national
level influences international policies. In our analysis we do not consider lobbying
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influences on permit issuance, but rather assume an exogenously given redistribution
regime of emission permit revenues.
Our paper is also closely related to the so called “strategic delegation” literature, which
offers a complementary view on national political competition. In these models the
principal, i.e. the median voter, elects a politician who then bargains with a foreign
politician over an issue at stake. Taking these negotiations into account, the median
voter may actually vote for a politician with different preferences than her own in order
to manipulate the threat point in the international negotiations in her favor.2 Strategic
delegation in the context of environmental policy has been analyzed by Siqueira (2003)
and Buchholz et al. (2005) who both find a bias towards politicians who are less green
than the median voter. By electing a more conservative politician, the home country
commits itself to a lower tax on pollution, shifting the burden of a cleaner environment
to the foreign country. Taking into account emissions leakage through shifts in produc-
tion, Roelfsema (2007) finds that median voters may delegate to politicians who put
more weight on environmental damage than themselves, whenever their preferences for
the environment are sufficiently strong compared to firms’ profits. In a more general
set-up, Harstad (2010) studies the incentives to delegate to more conservative or more
progressive politicians. While delegation to the former increases the bargaining posi-
tion, the latter are more likely to be included in majority coalitions and hence increase
the political power of their jurisdiction. The direction of delegation then depends on
the design of the political system.
2.2 The model
We consider two countries, indexed by i = 1, 2 and −i = {1, 2} \ i.3 In each country
i, emissions ei imply country-specific benefits Bi(ei) from the productive activities of
a representative firm with Bi(0) = 0, B′i > 0 and B
′′
i < 0 for all i = 1, 2. Global
2 There are fundamental differences between the common agency approach and the strategic dele-
gation literature. Whereas the common agency set-up assumes an incumbent government which is
swayed by interest groups to implement policies in their favor, the strategic delegation literature
models the election of a politician, where the median voter takes into account that she might be
better off by electing a politician who does not represent her own preferences because of strategic
interactions of the elected politicians with other policy-makers. Thus, the common agency and
the strategic delegation model represent complementary perspectives on the political process of
modern democracies. In addition, although both approaches analyze principal-agent relationships,
the common agency approach differs from strategic delegation in that it includes competition by
the principals with their rivals for political influence. A median voter, however, never faces any
competition by other voters and hence is not required to engage in rent-seeking.
3 All our results can be generalized to n countries in a straightforward manner.
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emissions, E = e1 + e2, cause strictly increasing and convex country-specific damages
Di(E) with Di(0) = 0 and D′i > 0, D
′′
i ≥ 0 for all E > 0 and i = 1, 2.
2.2.1 Non-cooperative international climate policy
Countries set up perfectly competitive domestic emission permit markets in which each
country i non-cooperatively decides on the amount of emission permits ωi issued to its
representative domestic firm. As firms in all countries i need (at least) emission permits
amounting to emissions ei, global emissions are given by the sum of emission permits
issued, E = ω1 +ω2. Countries may agree upon linking the domestic permit markets to
an international permit market, which we will refer to as the “choice of regime”. Then
permits issued from both countries are traded on a perfectly competitive international
permit market at price p.
Environmental policy imposes an additional cost to the representative firms reducing
the gross (of transfers) profits, but it generates revenues which can be redistributed
in different ways. Denoting the type of regime by R = {I,D} (International if an
international emission permit market is formed and Domestic otherwise), gross profits
πRi of the representative firm and emission permit revenues T
R
i are given by:
πRi (ω1, ω2) = Bi(e
R
i ) − p
ReRi , T
R
i (ω1, ω2) = p
Rωi . (2.1)
We give special attention to two prominent redistribution schemes: (i) the emission
permit revenues are redistributed to the representative firms, and (ii) revenues benefit
the general public via a lump-sum transfer.4
Social welfare in country i is given by the gross profits of the representative firm, the
environmental damage and the permit market revenues:
WRi (ω1, ω2) = π
R
i (ω1, ω2)−Di(E)+T
R
i (ω1, ω2) = Bi(e
R
i )−Di(E)+p
R
[
ωi − e
R
i
]
. (2.2)
2.2.2 Political actors
Each country i is represented by a government deciding on its environmental policy.
Governments face two consecutive decisions, which we model as a sequential game: (i) a
binary decision whether the respective country wants to participate in an international
4 These two cases correspond to the most common issuance and redistribution schemes: (i) per-
mits are freely allocated to firms and (ii) emission permits are auctioned and the revenues are
redistributed to the general public.
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emission permit market and (ii) the choice of the level of issued permits contingent
on whether an international permit market is formed. Governments in each country
care about national social welfare but are also vulnerable to lobbying contributions of
special interest groups.
There are Mi interest groups in country i, which exhibit different stakes in the elements
of the social welfare function Wi. The degree to which interest group j is a stakeholder
of the representative domestic firm is defined as 0 ≤ βij ≤ 1. The share 0 ≤ δij ≤ 1
characterizes the extent to which lobby group j in country i suffers from damages
caused by emissions. The interest groups’ stakes in the revenues from permit issuance
are denoted by 0 ≤ ρij ≤ 1. Thus, the gross utility of lobby group j in country i reads:
URij (ω1, ω2) = βijπ
R
i (ω1, ω2) − δijDi(E) + ρijT
R
i (ω1, ω2) . (2.3)
Redistributing the emission permit revenues to the representative domestic firm implies
ρij = βij for all j = 1, . . . ,Mi. For simplicity, we assume that transferring permit
revenues to the general public corresponds to ρij = δij for all j = 1, . . . ,Mi.5 The
national aggregates bi =
∑Mi
j=1 βij, di =
∑Mi
j=1 δij and ri =
∑Mi
j=1 ρij denote the share of
firms’ profits, environmental damages and emission permit revenues in country i which
are under the control of organized special interest groups.6
Organized interest groups in country i offer contributions to the local government in
order to sway chosen policies in their favor. As we model the two policy decisions the
governments face as a sequential game, they may offer contributions for each of the
policy decisions separately. Lobby groups are assumed to maximize the total payoff
of their members, which is the organized stakes in national social welfare URij that the
lobby group j in country i represents minus lobbying contributions in the first and
second stage:
URij (ω1, ω2) −
[
C1,Rij + C
2,R
ij (ω1, ω2)
]
, (2.4)
where C1,Rij and C
2,R
ij are the lobbying contributions of lobby group j in country i in the
first and second stage, respectively, contingent on the implemented regime and, in case
of stage-two lobbying contributions, depending on the governments’ policy choices.
Governments in both countries are assumed to care about the weighted sum of national
5 This does not hold whenever permit revenues are returned lump-sum but damages are asymetrically
distributed. We thank one of the referees for pointing this out.
6 We only consider the implications of an exogenously given redistribution scheme, as described
by the exogenously given parameters ρij . Although a model set-up is conceivable in which gov-
ernments also decide about the terms of revenue redistribution, this is beyond the scope of this
paper.
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social welfare and lobbying contributions:
GRi (ω1, ω2) = W
R
i (ω1, ω2) + θi
Mi∑
j=1
[
C1,Rij + C
2,R
ij (ω1, ω2)
]
, (2.5)
where θi is the relative weight the government in country i attaches to lobbying con-
tributions compared to domestic social welfare WRi . As pointed out by Grossman and
Helpman (1994), there is a close connection between the common agency approach
employed here and the political support approach pioneered by Stigler (1971). In the
latter framework an incumbent government seeks to maximize its chances of reelec-
tion by maximizing its political support of the different interest groups among the
electorate. As a consequence, the government’s utility function has as arguments the
welfare that different interest groups derive depending on the chosen policy plus the
deadweight loss these policies impose on the society as a whole, while contributions
of interest groups do not directly enter the government’s welfare. As we shall see, the
common agency approach bridges the gap between interest groups’ welfare and contri-
butions, as in equilibrium – and at least in case of truthful contribution schedules – the
marginal contributions offered to the government by all interest groups represent the
change in the interest groups’ welfare due to a marginal change in the governments’
chosen policy.7
Who are the special interest groups that are strongly affected by national and inter-
national climate policies, and therefore have an interest to offer contributions? The
enaction process of the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) has shown that in
particular the electricity producers and large energy intensive industries – such as re-
fining, iron, steel, aluminium, pulp and paper, and cement – are represented by influ-
ential interest groups and had a significant impact on the final design of the EU-ETS
(Markussen and Svendsen, 2005). Obviously, these interest groups oppose stringent
caps for greenhouse gas emissions or, if they cannot avert them, lobby for free issuance
of permits. In favor of stricter emission caps are national and international environ-
mental NGOs. In addition, these interest groups often would like to see the revenues for
emission permits being earmarked for environmental projects such as fostering renew-
7 Besides trading money for influence in the form of campaign contributions or direct compensations
like in our model, the dissemination of information is the second important channel of influence
for interest groups in pursuing their political goals. In the public choice literature, these different
channels have either been modeled through contests for policy rents (such as rent-seeking contests,
menu and other auctions and bargaining), through the transmission of strategic information (such
as persuasion, signaling, screening and search) or a combination of both. An excellent survey on
modeling rent-seeking contests is Nitzan (1994), while Grossman and Helpman (2001) and Winden
(2003) survey the literature on special interest groups.
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able energies, etc. On the consumers’ side, automobile associations have established a
reputation to fiercely oppose any policies that increase the costs of driving, for example,
environmental taxes on driving fuels.
2.2.3 Structure of the game
We model the consecutive decisions on the choice of regime and the issuance of emission
permits as a non-cooperative sequential game. In the first stage, governments of both
countries simultaneously decide whether to link the domestic emission permit markets
to an international emission permit market. An international permit market is set
up if and only if both countries consent to it. In the second stage, the governments
simultaneously decide on the amount of emission permits issued to the domestic firms.
In the third stage, emission permits are traded.
In our model setup, two separate non-cooperative games take place in the first two
stages: On the one hand, organized interest groups act non-cooperatively in choosing
their contribution schedules to influence the respective government’s policy. On the
other hand, countries decide non-cooperatively on international environmental policy.
As a consequence, each of the two model stages comprises a lobbying game in each
country (Grossman and Helpman, 1994, 1995a), which gives rise to several consecutive
sub-stages:8
(i) Regime choice:
a) First, all organized lobby groups j in both countries simultaneously offer a
contribution contingent on their preferred type of regime.
b) Second, governments in both countries simultaneously decide on whether
to participate in an international permit market. An international permit
market is formed if and only if both countries consent to it.
c) Third, lobby groups pay contributions contingent on the established regime.
(ii) Emission allowance choices:
a) First, knowing the regime type established in the first stage, all organized
lobby groups j in both countries simultaneously offer a contribution schedule
contingent on the policy choice of the local government for a given decision
of the other government.
8 In line with Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995a), we assume that lobby groups offer contributions
only to the local government.
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b) Second, governments in both countries simultaneously decide on the amount
of emission permits they issue to the domestic firms.
c) Third, lobby groups pay contributions contingent on policy choice.
(iii) Permit trade:
Depending on the regime established in the first stage, emission permits are
traded on national or international permit markets.
Finally, we impose the following assumptions on the benefit functions Bi and the
lobbying parameters θi, ri and bi:
Assumption 2.1 (Sufficient conditions for SOCs to hold)
For the remainder of the paper, we assume
(i) The benefit functions of both countries are almost quadratic: B′′′i (ei) ≈ 0, i = 1, 2.
(ii) The following condition holds for the lobbying parameters in both countries:
ri >
1
2
bi −
1
2θi
, i = 1, 2 .
These assumptions are sufficient (but not necessary) conditions for all second-order
conditions throughout the paper to hold. By almost quadratic, we mean that B′′′i (ei)
is so small that it is irrelevant for determining the sign of all expressions in which it
appears. The second condition states that the aggregate organized stakes ri in the
permit revenues must not be too small compared to the aggregate organized stakes
in the profits of the organized firm. Obviously, the condition is always satisfied if
ri = bi, i.e. if the permit market revenues are redistributed to the stakeholders of the
representative firm.
2.3 The third stage: Permit market equilibrium
We solve the game by backward induction, starting with the third stage. In case of
national emission permit markets, the market clearing condition implies that ωi = ei
for both countries i = 1, 2. Profit maximization of the representative firm implies that
the equilibrium permit price equals marginal benefits:
pi(ωi) = B
′
i(ei) , i = 1, 2 . (2.6)
In case of an international permit market, there is only one permit market price imply-
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ing that in equilibrium the marginal benefits of all participating countries are equal:
p(E) = B′1
(
e1(E)
)
= B′2
(
e2(E)
)
. (2.7)
In addition, the market clearing condition
ω1 + ω2 = B
′−1
1
(
p(E)
)
+B′−12
(
p(E)
)
= e1(E) + e2(E) = E , (2.8)
implicitly determines the permit price p(E) in the market equilibrium as a function
of the total number of issued emission allowances E. Existence and uniqueness follow
directly from the assumed properties of the benefit functions Bi. From equation (2.7)
and ei(E) = B
′−1
i
(
p(E)
)
, it follows directly that:
p′(E) < 0 , e′i(E) ∈ [0, 1] . (2.9)
2.4 The second stage: Permit choices
In the second stage, the regime choice of the first stage is known to all lobby groups
and governments. Also the contributions C1,Rij paid in the first stage are sunk and do
not influence the governments’ and the lobby groups’ decisions. In the second stage,
governments in both countries set non-cooperatively the levels of emission permits,
while organized interest groups in each country sway the local government to choose
policies in their favor by offering contribution schedules.
As outlined in Section 2.2.3, the second stage splits into several sub-stages. First, all
lobby groups in all countries simultaneously offer contribution schedules C2,Rij (ω1, ω2)
to their governments, which specify the lobby contributions contingent on the policy
choices ωi and ω−i of the domestic and the foreign government. Then, the governments
in both countries simultaneously set the levels of emission permits ω1 and ω2 they
issue to the representative domestic firm. Finally, lobby groups in both countries pay
contributions according to the choice of emission permits to their governments.
We seek the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this non-cooperative game in the
second stage for truthful contribution schedules of all interest groups (Bernheim and
Whinston, 1986). A truthful contribution schedule offers for any change of the govern-
ment’s policy the corresponding change in the respective lobby group’s welfare, except
when the contribution would be negative.9 In this case, we require a zero contribution
9 This definition implies that a truthful contribution schedule follows the lobby group’s payoff func-
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instead:
C2,Rij (ω1, ω2) = max
[
0, URij (ω1, ω2) − Ū
R
ij
]
. (2.10)
This implies that the net of contributions utility ŪRij of all lobby groups is independent
of the chosen policy of the government. In fact, the restriction to truthful contribution
schedules boils the first sub-stage of the non-cooperative lobbying game in all countries
down to the simultaneous non-cooperative choice of the base utility levels ŪRij . For the
case of strictly positive contribution schedules, marginal contributions do not depend
on ŪRij and are given by ∂C
2,R
ij (ω1, ω2)/∂ωi = ∂U
R
ij (ω1, ω2)/∂ωi, which de facto solves
the first sub-stage in the second stage of the game.10 In the following, we restrict our
attention to strictly positive contribution schedules.
2.4.1 Domestic permit markets under lobby group pressure
We first assume that no international permit market has been formed in the first stage
of the game. Then, the government of country i sets the level of emission permits ωi
to maximize
GDi (ω1, ω2) = W
D
i (ω1, ω2) + θi
Mi∑
j=1
[
C1,Dij + C
2,D
ij (ω1, ω2)
]
, (2.11)
subject to (2.6), (2.10) and given the permit choice ω−i of the other country.
Assuming strictly positive contribution schedules for all lobby groups j in both coun-
tries, and recalling that ωi = ei and pi(ωi) = B′i(ei), the reaction function of government
i is implicitly given by
B′i(ei) =
1 + θidi
1 + θiri
D′i(E) +
θi(bi − ri)
1 + θiri
ωiB
′′
i (ei) , (2.12)
and there exists a unique Nash equilibrium of this second stage of the game.
tion minus a constant except for the non-negativity constraint.
10 Focusing on truthful contribution schedules may seem restrictive. However, Bernheim and Whin-
ston (1986) showed that lobby groups suffer no loss from playing truthful contribution schedules,
since each lobby group’s set of best-response strategies for any given contribution schedules of all
other lobby groups contains a truthful contribution schedule. Furthermore, in a game setting of
complete information truthful payment schedules constitute a simple device to achieve efficiency
without any player conceding his right to grab as much as she can for herself. For a detailed
discussion of truthful contribution schedules, see Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Dixit et al.
(1997).
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Proposition 2.1 (Unique Nash equilibrium on domestic permit markets)
For truthful and strictly positive contribution schedules of all lobby groups, there exists
a unique Nash equilibrium of the game in which all countries i = 1, 2 simultaneously
set emission permit levels ωi to maximize (2.11) subject to equation (2.6) and a given
permit level ω−i of the other country.
The proof of Proposition 2.1 is given in the Appendix.
Equation (2.12) implies that both domestic emission levels ei and total emissions E
only depend on the aggregate levels of organized stakes bi, di and ri in the three compo-
nents of social welfare in both countries and neither on the number nor the composition
of lobby groups, as long as all lobby groups exhibit strictly positive equilibrium con-
tribution schedules.
For the two redistribution schemes ri = bi and ri = di, the following corollary states
how domestic and global emissions in the Nash equilibrium react to a change of the
political environment:
Corollary 2.1 (Comparative statics of domestic permit markets)
For ri = bi and ri = di, the following conditions hold for the levels of national emissions
ei, e−i and global emissions E in the Nash equilibrium:
dei
dbi
> 0 ,
de−i
dbi
< 0 ,
dE
dbi
> 0 , (2.13a)
dei
ddi
< 0 ,
de−i
ddi
> 0 ,
dE
ddi
< 0 , (2.13b)
dei
dθi
R 0 ,
de−i
dθi
⋚ 0 ,
dE
dθi
R 0 ⇔ bi R di . (2.13c)
The proof of Corollary 2.1 is given in the Appendix.
Corollary 2.1 states that domestic emission levels ei of country i and also global emis-
sions E are higher the higher are the organized stakes in the benefits and the lower
are the organized stakes in the environmental damages in country i. An increase in
θi increases domestic emissions ei and total emissions E if and only if bi > di, i.e. if
the share of organized stakes is higher for benefits than for environmental damages.
Moreover, domestic emission levels are strategic substitutes. If country i increases
emission levels in response to a change in the political parameters bi, di and θi, country
−i decreases the emission level and vice versa. However, the direct effect outweighs
the indirect effect and the total emissions E follow the domestic emission level ei. The
signs of the comparative static analysis are identical for both redistribution schemes
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ri = bi and ri = di.
2.4.2 International permit markets under lobby group
pressure
If an international permit market is formed in the first stage, the government in country
i chooses ωi to maximize
GIi (ω1, ω2) = W
I
i (ω1, ω2) + θi
Mi∑
j=1
[
C1,Iij + C
2,I
ij (ω1, ω2)
]
, (2.14)
subject to equations (2.7), (2.8), (2.10) and given ω−i.
Again, considering only strictly positive truthful contribution schedules and taking into
account that p(E) = B′i
(
ei(E)
)
, the reaction function of country i is given by
p(E) + p′(E) [ωi − ei(E)] =
1 + θidi
1 + θiri
D′i(E) +
θi(bi − ri)
1 + θiri
p′(E)ei(E) , (2.15)
implying the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 2.2 (Unique Nash equilibrium on international permit markets)
For truthful and strictly positive contribution schedules of all lobby groups, there exists
a unique Nash equilibrium of the game in which both countries simultaneously set the
level of emission permits ωi to maximize (2.14) subject to equations (2.7), (2.8) and
given permit levels ω−i of the other country.
The proof of Proposition 2.2 is given in the Appendix.
Again, we observe from equation (2.15) that the allowance choices ωi and, thus, also
domestic and global emissions only depend on the national levels of organized stakes
bi, di and ri and neither on the number nor the composition of lobby groups, as long
as all lobby groups pay strictly positive contributions in equilibrium.
For the effects of a change in the political environment on the issuance of emission
permits, we find similar results as in the case of non-linked domestic permit markets.
On international permit markets, however, the permit choices of the two countries are
not necessarily strategic substitutes. Defining FOC−iωi ≡ ∂
2GI−i(ω1, ω2)/(∂ωi∂ω−i), we
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obtain:
FOC−iωi = p
′(E)
[
(1 + θ−ir−i) − (1 + θ−ib−i)e
′
−i(E)
]
− (1+θ−id−i)D
′′
−i(E)+O
(
p′′(E)
)
,
(2.16)
where O
(
p′′(E)
)
denotes terms which depend on p′′(E) and are approximately zero by
virtue of Assumption 2.1. If FOC−iωi > 0 then ωi and ω−i are strategic complements
implying that the government in country −i reacts by increasing emission permits ω−i
if ωi rises. This can only happen if b−i exceeds r−i and (1+θ−id−i)D′′−i(E) is sufficiently
small.
Corollary 2.2 (Comparative statics of international permit markets)
For ri = bi and ri = di, the following conditions hold for the levels of emission al-
lowances ωi, ω−i and global emissions E in the Nash equilibrium:
dωi
dbi
> 0 , sgn
(
dω−i
dbi
)
= sgn
(
FOC−iωi
)
sgn
(
dωi
dbi
)
,
dE
dbi
> 0 , (2.17a)
dωi
ddi
< 0 , sgn
(
dω−i
ddi
)
= sgn
(
FOC−iωi
)
sgn
(
dωi
ddi
)
,
dE
ddi
< 0 , (2.17b)
dωi
dθi
R 0 , sgn
(
dω−i
dθi
)
= sgn
(
FOC−iωi
)
sgn
(
dωi
dθi
)
,
dE
dθi
R 0 ⇔ bi R di .
(2.17c)
The proof of Corollary 2.2 is given in the Appendix.
Defining politically adjusted marginal damages
D̃′i(E) =
1 + θidi
1 + θiri
D′i(E) +
θi(bi − ri)
1 + θiri
p′(E)ei(E) , (2.18)
we can interpret the influence of lobbying in the second stage as leading to a distorted
perception of environmental damages by the government, depending on the redistribu-
tion scheme. Summing up the reaction functions (2.15) for both countries, we find that
the equilibrium permit price equals the average politically adjusted marginal damage:
p(E) =
1
2
[
D̃′i(E) + D̃
′
−i(E)
]
. (2.19)
Inserting this equation for the permit price back into the reaction function (2.15) yields
the straightforward generalization of Proposition 1 of Helm (2003):
ωi − ei(E) = −
1
p′(E)
{
1
2
[
D̃′i(E) + D̃
′
−i(E)
]
− D̃′i(E)
}
, (2.20)
Political Influence on Non-cooperative International Climate Policy 55
implying that the country with above average politically adjusted marginal damages
buys permits from the country with below average politically adjusted marginal dam-
ages. Thus, our analysis provides a new rationale for international permit trade: Even
economically identical countries can gain by trading on international permit markets if
politically adjusted marginal damages in both countries differ due to different political
environments.
2.4.3 Global emissions under domestic and international
permit markets
Similar to Proposition 2 of Helm (2003), we find that global emissions on an inter-
national permit market can be higher or lower compared to global emissions in case
of two non-linked domestic permit markets. We denote the Nash equilibrium in case
of domestic permit markets by ωDi = e
D
i , E
D, and by ωIi , E
I in case of an interna-
tional permit market. Introducing the abbreviations σi ≡ (1 + θidi)/(1 + θiri) and
κi ≡ θi(bi − ri)/(1 + θiri), and summing up the reaction functions (2.12) and (2.15)
over both countries, we obtain
B′i(e
D
i ) +B
′
−i(e
D
−i) − κip
′
i(ω
D
i )e
D
i − κ−ip
′
−i(ω
D
−i)e
D
−i (2.21a)
= σiD
′
i(E
D) + σ−iD
′
−i(E
D) ,
B′i
(
ei(E
I)
)
+B′−i
(
e−i(E
I)
)
− κip
′(EI)ei(E
I) − κ−ip
′(EI)e−i(E
I) (2.21b)
= σiD
′
i(E
I) + σ−iD
′
−i(E
I) .
Then, the following relationship between global emissions in the international and
domestic permit market regime follows directly from D̃′′i ≥ 0:
ED R EI ⇔ B′i(e
D
i ) +B
′
−i(e
D
−i) − κip
′
i(ω
D
i )e
D
i − κ−ip
′
−i(ω
D
−i)e
D
−i (2.22)
R B′i
(
ei(E
D)
)
+B′−i
(
e−i(E
D)
)
− p′(ED)
[
κiei(E
D) + κ−ie−i(E
D)
]
.
2.4.4 Equilibrium lobby contributions
Finally, we determine the equilibrium lobbying contributions in the second stage. In
the equilibrium of each regime R, the government must be indifferent with respect
to the participation of any individual lobby group in the lobbying game, as lobbies
want to contribute as little as possible and the government can never be worse off with
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lobbying than without (Grossman and Helpman, 1995a):
WRi (ω
R
1 , ω
R
2 ) + θi
Mi∑
j=1
C2,Rij (ω
R
1 , ω
R
2 ) = W
R
i (ω
−k
1 , ω
−k
2 ) + θi
Mi∑
j=1
j 6=k
C2,Rij (ω
−k
1 , ω
−k
2 ) , (2.23)
where ω−ki indicate equilibrium permit levels that would arise if lobby group k did
not offer any contributions. Then, the following proposition holds for the equilibrium
contributions of all lobbying groups.
Proposition 2.3 (Equilibrium contributions in the second stage)
For truthful and strictly positive contribution schedules of all lobby groups, the equilib-
rium contribution in regime R of lobby group k in country i yields:
C2,Rik (ω
R
1 , ω
R
2 ) =
1
θi
[
WRi (ω
−k
1 , ω
−k
2 ) −W
R
i (ω
R
1 , ω
R
2 )
]
+ (bi − βik)
[
Bi(e
−k
i ) −Bi(e
R
i )
]
− (di − δik)
[
Di(E
−k) −Di(E
R)
]
− (ri − ρik)
[
p−k(e−ki − ω
−k
i ) − p
R(eRi − ω
R
i )
]
.
(2.24)
The proof of Proposition 2.3 is given in the Appendix.
A particular lobby group k has to compensate the government twofold: First, it has to
recompense proportionally for the loss (gain) in domestic welfare attributable to the
change in issued permit levels due to the lobby’s influence. The proportionality factor
equals 1/θi since lobby contributions enter the government’s objective function with a
weight of θi. Second, lobbies have to compensate for the loss (gain) in contributions
from all other lobbies due to the change in the government’s policy choice resulting
from the lobby’s influence.
Proposition 2.3 yields an important insight. While the equilibrium levels of emission
permits only depend on the aggregate national strength bi, di and ri of lobbying groups,
the equilibrium contributions of individual lobby groups also depend on the absolute
number of lobby groups and their composition. It can also be shown that the aggregate
lobbying contributions the government in country i receives in the second stage depend,
in general, on the number and composition of pressure groups within each country.
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2.5 The first stage: To link or not to link
Having characterized the level of emission permits on domestic and international permit
markets depending on the political situation, we now move on to analyze the govern-
ments’ decision in the first stage. The decision process in the first stage is also prone
to be affected by lobbies, as interest groups either gain or lose depending on whether
an international permit market is formed. As a consequence, also the first stage splits
into several consecutive sub-stages: First, lobby groups in all countries simultaneously
offer contributions contingent on the established regime. As regime choice is binary,
lobbies offer a non-negative payment for their preferred regime (and zero for the other
regime). Second, governments simultaneously decide whether to form an international
permit market which only comes into existence if both countries consent to it. Finally,
lobby groups pay contributions.
2.5.1 Unilateral stances
The preferred regime of the government in country i is independent of the preferred
regime in country −i. Thus, regime choices of governments (unilateral stances in
the terminology of Grossman and Helpman, 1995a) are dominant strategies and the
lobbying games in both countries can be analyzed separately.
Governments choose the regime R to maximize their total payoff GRi , which is given by
the social welfare of country i and the weighted lobbying contributions in the first and
second stage. For establishing regime R, a lobby is willing to pay to the government at
most as much as it gains in the second stage by a change of regime from the alternative
regime R̄ to R, which is given by the difference in the lobby’s utilities between both
regimes net of lobbying contributions in the second stage:
∆UR,R̄ij ≡ U
R
ij (ω
R
1 , ω
R
2 ) − C
2,R
ij (ω
R
1 , ω
R
2 ) − U
R̄
ij (ω
R̄
1 , ω
R̄
2 ) + C
2,R̄
ij (ω
R̄
1 , ω
R̄
2 ) . (2.25)
Thus, lobby group j in country i supports regime R if and only if ∆UR,R̄ij > 0 which
also implies that ∆U R̄,Rij < 0. As contributions must be non-negative, the contribution
of lobby j supporting regime R is given by:
C1,Rij ∈ [0,∆U
R,R̄
ij ] , C
1,R̄
ij = 0 . (2.26)
First, we examine under which conditions no contributions of all lobby groups in the
first stage is a unilateral stance. Therefore, suppose that without lobbying in the first
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stage the government in country i supports regime R. Then, GRi0 > G
R̄
i0, where G
R
i0
denotes the government’s payoff without the lobbying contributions in the first stage
under regime R. Given that all other lobby groups in country i do not contribute, not
contributing itself is a best response for lobby group j if and only if
GRi0 −G
R̄
i0 > θi∆U
R̄,R
ij . (2.27)
If inequality (2.27) holds, then no single lobby group can profitably contribute enough
in the first stage to unilaterally sway the government to change its support from regime
R to regime R̄. Thus, no contributions from all lobby groups in the first stage is a
unilateral stance if and only if condition (2.27) holds simultaneously for all organized
lobby groups in country i. Grossman and Helpman (1995a) call this equilibrium an
unpressured unilateral stance.
Second, we examine the conditions under which there exists a unilateral stance with
positive lobbying contributions in the first stage, which Grossman and Helpman (1995a)
call a pressured unilateral stance. For a pressured stance the government must be
indifferent with respect to the choice of regime, i.e.,
GRi0 + θi
Mi∑
j=1
C1,Rij = G
R̄
i0 + θi
Mi∑
j=1
C1,R̄ij , (2.28)
as otherwise it would be possible for the lobby groups on the winning side to re-
duce their lobbying contributions and still having their preferred regime choice being
adopted. Moreover, lobby groups on the losing side would offer their total net gain in
case the government adopted their preferred choice. If this were not true, the losers
could sway the government in favor of their preferred regime choice by increasing their
contributions. Let SR (SR̄) be the set of lobbies which support regime R (R̄), i.e. for
all j ∈ SR (SR̄), ∆U
R,R̄
ij > (<) 0 holds. Then, a unilateral stance with positive lobbying
contributions in favor of regime R requires:
GRi0 + θi
∑
j∈SR
∆UR,R̄ij > G
R̄
i0 + θi
∑
j∈SR̄
∆U R̄,Rij . (2.29)
This condition states that the potential payoff the government is able to collect under
regime R must be higher than the potential payoff under the alternative regime. The
sum of actual contributions is determined by equation (2.28).
Note that condition (2.29) is necessary but not sufficient for a pressured stance in favor
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of regime R to exist. In addition we need that
GRi0 < G
R̄
i0 + θi
∑
j∈SR̄
∆U R̄,Rij ; (2.30)
otherwise, the supporters of regime R could refrain from positive lobbying contributions
and still have their preferred regime adopted, and we would be back to an unpressured
stance.
For a pressured unilateral stance only the sum of lobbying contributions of all winning
lobby groups is determined but not its distribution among individual lobby groups.
Thus, there exist, in general, a continuum of pressured unilateral stances, which differ
in individual contributions but coincide in the sum of contributions and the adopted
regime choice.
2.5.2 The choice of regime
Both an unpressured and a pressured unilateral stance may exist simultaneously. This
holds if condition (2.27) holds for one regime R = {D, I} and at the same time condi-
tions (2.29) and (2.30) hold for the same or the other regime. If, in addition,
GR̄i0 < G
R
i0 < G
R̄
i0 + θi
∑
j∈SR̄
∆U R̄,Rij , (2.31)
then both stances select the same regime R. Otherwise, there exists a pressured stance
in favor of regime R and an unpressured stance supporting regime R̄. As Grossman
and Helpman (1995a) pointed out, in the case of coexistence unpressured stances are
not coalition-proof, a notion introduced by Bernheim et al. (1987). Thus, allowing for
a minimum level of communication between the lobby groups eliminates unpressured
stances whenever there are also pressured stances. As a consequence, we assume that
the pressured stance prevails unless there exists only an unpressured stance. Then, the
following proposition holds:
Proposition 2.4 (Regime choice and distribution of organized stakes)
For truthful and strictly positive equilibrium contributions of all lobby groups in the
second stage, the choice of regime only depends on the aggregate organized stakes bi, di
and ri in both countries.
The proof is given in the Appendix.
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The intuition for this result is that the necessary condition (2.29) for the existence of a
pressured stance does not depend on the distribution of stakes as long as the national
aggregates are constant. This implies that whenever there exists a pressured stance,
the selected regime R only depends on the national aggregates of organized stakes.
However, for a pressured stance in favor of R to exist, also the necessary condition
(2.30) has to hold. In fact, this condition does, in general, depend on the distribution
of organized stakes βij, δij and ρij. But if condition (2.29) holds for regime R while
condition (2.30) is violated, then there exists an unpressured stance in favor of R. Of
course, there may be a pressured stance in favor of regime R and an unpressured stance
in favor of regime R̄. But assuming that pressured stances beat unpressured stances,
as discussed above, again regime R would be selected.
In summary, condition (2.29), which only depends on the aggregate organized stakes,
always holds for one of the two regimes and this regime is also the regime choice of
the government (or the government is indifferent between both regimes). However,
the distribution of organized stakes βij, δij and ρij among individual lobby groups
determines whether the selected regime is a pressured or unpressured stance. It also
influences the contributions in the first stage and, thus, the government payoffs and
the lobby groups’ net utilities.
2.5.3 International permit markets
Having established each country’s choice of regime, it is now straightforward to char-
acterize the conditions under which an international permit market is established. By
definition, an international permit market only forms if both countries consent to it, i.e.
if regime R = I is a unilateral stance in both countries. By virtue of equation (2.29)
and Proposition 2.4, a permit market is thus established if and only if the following
condition holds for both countries simultaneously:
∆Gi = W
I
i (ω
I
1 , ω
I
2)−W
D
i (ω
D
1 , ω
D
2 )+θi


Mi∑
j=1
U Iij(ω
I
1 , ω
I
2) −
Mi∑
j=1
UDij (ω
D
1 , ω
D
2 )

 > 0 . (2.32)
As already pointed out by Proposition 4 in Helm (2003), there are three possible cases:
(i) The international permit market regime may lead to lower total emissions and higher
payoffs for the governments of both countries. (ii) Even if total emissions were lower, an
international permit market may not be established because the government’s payoff in
one of the countries is lower compared to domestic permit markets. (iii) Although total
emissions were lower under domestic permit markets, both governments may consent
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to an international permit market because their payoffs are higher.
In the following, we analyze how the likelihood of establishing an international permit
market depends on the political parameters by differentiating equation (2.32) with
respect to θi, bi, di and ri. This likelihood is not only determined by the reaction of
the home country where the political change takes place but also by the reaction of
the other country to a change in its neighbor’s political environment, as the following
corollary states.
Corollary 2.3 (Comparative statics of regime choice)
For the condition for a unilateral stance in favor of an international permit market in
country i, it holds:11
d∆Gi
dxi
=
d(θibi)
dxi
∆πi −
d(θidi)
dxi
∆Di +
d(θiri)
dxi
∆Ti (2.33a)
+
d∆Gi
dωI−i
dωI−i
dxi
−
d∆Gi
dωD−i
dωD−i
dxi
,
d∆G−i
dxi
=
d∆G−i
dωIi
dωIi
dxi
−
d∆G−i
dωDi
dωDi
dxi
, (2.33b)
where x ∈ {θ, b, d, r} denotes one of the political parameters and ∆πi = πIi (ω
I
1 , ω
I
2) −
πDi (ω
D
1 , ω
D
2 ), ∆Di = Di(E
I)−Di(ED) and ∆Ti = T Ii (ω
I
1 , ω
I
2)−T
D
i (ω
D
1 , ω
D
2 ) gains/losses
of the respective stakes from international trade.
A marginal change in one of the political parameters in country i has a direct effect
on the condition for a unilateral stance in favor of an international permit market by
changing the weight which the payoff functions of the respective stakes receive (first
three terms in equation (2.33a)) which is confined to the home country. In addition,
indirect effects in both countries arise that change the equilibrium allowance choices
under both regimes. These effects may be of opposite sign compared to the direct effect,
and they can have the same or different signs in the two countries. As a consequence,
although the direct effect may go in favor of the regime with lower (higher) global
emissions, the marginal change in ∆Gi and/or ∆G−i may go towards the regime with
higher (lower) global emissions. If the indirect effects oppose the direct effect and are
sufficiently strong, we get the counterintuitive result of the following proposition.
Proposition 2.5 (Lobbying may backfire)
An increase in the influence of organized interest groups favoring higher (lower) global
emissions may actually result in a decrease (increase) of global emissions through a
11 Note that d∆Gi/dωRi = 0 due to the first-order conditions of the second stage.
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change in their home country’s and/or the foreign country’s unilateral stance.
The proof of Proposition 2.5 is given in the Appendix.
The intuition is as follows. Suppose the current regime is the regime with higher global
emissions. Suppose further that in country i organized interest groups in favor of higher
emissions gain influence in government i’s decision. This influence on government i
causes a direct effect in favor of the regime with higher global emissions. In addition,
global emissions in both regimes increase (but, in general, to different degrees), leading
to indirect effects in both countries. These may go in the opposite direction of the
direct effect, i.e. they may influence the governments in any of the two countries in
favor of the regime with lower global emissions, and may even outweigh the direct
effect. If the indirect effect is strong enough to change the regime choice in at least one
country, this may lead to a regime change to the regime with lower global emissions.
In this case, global emissions may be lower compared to the initial regime.
2.6 Discussion
Within our framework of legislative lobbying, we found that both the choice of regime
in the first stage and the amount of emission allowances issued in the second stage only
hinge on the aggregate organized stakes bi, di and ri of the different components of
social welfare within a country and not on their distribution among different interest
groups. However, our formal results hinge on several assumptions.
First, we considered Assumption 2.1 to hold. Interpreting the benefits from emissions
as the negative of the corresponding abatement costs, the empirical literature finds
that, at least with respect to climate change, abatement cost curves can be well ap-
proximated by quadratic functions (e.g., Klepper and Peterson 2006). When emission
permit revenues are redistributed to the firms – for example by grandfathering emis-
sion allowances, which is the most common practice so far – the second condition of
Assumption 2.1 is always satisfied.
Second, we assumed strictly positive lobbying contributions in the second stage of all
lobby groups. What would happen if we relaxed this assumption? Consider a lobby
group k in country i refraining from offering contributions in equilibrium. Then the
amount of emission allowances issued in equilibrium is determined by b̂i = bi − βik,
d̂i = di − δik and r̂i = ri − ρik instead of bi, di and ri. Thus, all our results still
hold for the adjusted aggregate stakes b̂i, d̂i and r̂i. However, according to Proposition
2.3, the contribution schedules offered by the lobby groups and, in general, also the
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sum of contributions the government receives depend on the distribution of aggregate
organized stakes among individual interest groups. As a consequence, both the choice
of regime and the choice of emission allowances are not immune to a redistribution of
given aggregate stakes bi, di and ri among different interest groups if this redistribution
alters the adjusted aggregate stakes b̂i, d̂i and r̂i.
It can be easily verified that all our model results would still hold if there were no
influence from special interest groups but governments maximized ĜRi = π̂
R
i − D̂i + T̂
R
i
with π̂Ri = (1 + θibi)π
R
i , D̂i = (1 + θidi)Di and T̂
R
i = (1 + θiri)T
R
i . Thus, the influence
of legislative lobbying can be interpreted as adjusting the incumbent governments’
perception of the three different components of social welfare.12 This has an important
consequence: All our results – in particular that the increase in influence of a special
interest group may result in a policy change which is counter to the interests of this
group – are not only restricted to the influence of legislative lobbying, but extend to all
influences that alter governments’ perceptions of firm profits, environmental damages
and transfers. For example, damage perception may change because of increasing
(or decreasing) environmental awareness of the voters and/or the government, or new
scientific intelligence on the harmfulness of emissions.
In particular, this challenges the conventional wisdom that higher environmental aware-
ness leads to lower global emissions and acts as a partial remedy to failures in the
international coordination of public goods problems (e.g. Franzen, 2003). Indeed, an
increase in environmental awareness in one country (which corresponds to an increase
in D̂i in our model framework) reduces global emissions in both regimes but may, at
the same time, induce a switch from the regime with lower to the regime with higher
global emissions. If the indirect outweighs the direct effect, then global emissions
increase with environmental awareness.
In this regard, our model extends the literature on counterintuitive effects of rising
environmentalism. In a coalition formation game, Endres (1997) and Endres and Fi-
nus (1998) find that increasing environmental awareness has a positive effect on the
reduction targets that are bargained within an international environmental agreement
but may also increase free-riding incentives and hence lead to higher stability require-
ments. Within a framework of international trade and environmental policy, Conconi
(2003) concludes that lobbies may reduce their efforts for a higher domestic pollution
12 In a strategic delegation framework, for example, median voters would elect governments with a
particular perception on the three components of social welfare that do not necessarily reflect their
own preferences. How the preferences of the elected governments and the median voters differ,
depends on the particular model set-up.
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tax if they are aware of the corresponding emissions leakage. In a similar setting, Aidt
(2005) shows that rising environmentalism is not able to prevent an increase in total
pollution, even if pollution is immobile, when green lobbies are sufficiently concerned
about pollution abroad.
2.7 Conclusion
We have analyzed the non-cooperative formation of an international emission permit
market in a setting of political competition by national interest groups. We find that
for both the continuous choice of emission allowances in the second stage and the binary
choice whether an international permit market is formed only the aggregate levels of
organized stakes in each country matter and not their distribution among individual
lobby groups. In addition, an increase in lobbying influence by a particular lobby group
may weaken the support for the interest group’s preferred regime in both countries,
thwarting the lobby group’s efforts.
Although we found that for given national levels of organized stakes the equilibrium
outcome is independent of the number and composition of individual special interest
groups, this does not hold for equilibrium contributions and payoffs. In fact, we pre-
sume that lobbies with the same interests exert a positive externality on each other.
Then, a higher fragmentation of such lobbies would effectively reduce equilibrium con-
tributions which the government is able to collect. However, the investigation of this
issue is left to future research.
Our analysis has focused on international climate policy by non-cooperative countries.
There are, however, some notable exceptions to the extreme case of non-cooperation,
one of them being the European Union which introduced a permit trading system
in 2005. Thus, another promising agenda for future research is the investigation of
cooperative international climate policies under political pressure from special interest
groups.
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2.8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1
(i) Existence: By virtue of Assumption 2.1, the maximization problem of country i is
strictly concave:
SOCi = (1 + θiri)B
′′
i (ei) − (1 + θidi)D
′′
i (E) − θi(bi − ri)B
′′
i (ei) − θi(bi − ri)ωiB
′′′
i (ei) < 0 .
(2.A.1)
Thus, for all countries i = 1, 2, the reaction function yields a unique best response for
any given choice ω−i of the other country. This guarantees the existence of a Nash
equilibrium.
(ii) Uniqueness: Solving the best response functions (2.12) for ei and summing up over
both countries yields the following equation for the aggregate emissions E:13
E =
2∑
i=1
B′−1i
(
1 + θidi
1 + θiri
D′i(E) +
θi(bi − ri)
(1 + θiri)
ωiB
′′
i (ei)
)
. (2.A.2)
As the left-hand side is strictly increasing and the right-hand side is strictly decreasing
in E, there exists a unique level of total emissions ED in the Nash equilibrium. Sub-
stituting back into the reaction functions yields the unique Nash equilibrium (ωD1 , ω
D
2 ).

Proof of Corollary 2.1
Introducing the abbreviation
Γi = [1 + θi(2ri − bi)]B
′′
i (ωi)SOC−i
− [1 + θ−i(2r−i − b−i)]B
′′
−i(ω−i)(1 + θidi)D
′′
i (E) > 0
by virtue of Assumption 2.1, and applying the implicit function theorem to the first-
order conditions FOCi, equation (2.12), for both countries, we derive:
dωi
dxi
= −
SOC−i
Γi
dFOCi
dxi
, (2.A.3a)
dω−i
dxi
= −
(1 + θ−id−i)D′′−i(E)
Γi
dFOCi
dxi
, (2.A.3b)
13 As all marginal benefit functions B′i are strictly and monotonically decreasing, the inverse functions
B′−1i exist and are also strictly and monotonically decreasing.
Political Influence on Non-cooperative International Climate Policy 66
dE
dxi
=
dωi
dθi
+
dω−i
dθi
= −
SOC−i + (1 + θ−id−i)D′′−i(E)
Γi
dFOCi
dxi
, (2.A.3c)
where x ∈ {θ, b, d} denotes one of the political parameters and the derivatives of the
first-order conditions, dFOCi/di, in the two cases ri = bi and ri = di are as follows:
dFOCri=bii
dθi
= biB
′
i(ei) − diD
′
i(E),
dFOCri=dii
dθi
= −
B′i(ei) −D
′
i(E)
θi
, (2.A.4a)
dFOCri=bii
dbi
= θiB
′
i(ei),
dFOCri=dii
dbi
= −θiωiB
′′
i (ωi) , (2.A.4b)
dFOCri=bii
ddi
= −θiD
′
i(E),
dFOCri=dii
ddi
= θi [B
′
i(ei) −D
′
i(E)] + θiωiB
′′
i (ωi) .
(2.A.4c)
For the signs of equations (2.A.4), we used the first-order conditions to find:
biB
′
i(ei) − diD
′
i(E) R 0 ⇔ B
′
i(ei) −D
′
i(E) ⋚ 0 ⇔ bi R di (2.A.5)
To determine the sign of dFOCri=dii /ddi, we re-wrote the first-order condition to yield:
θiωiB
′′
i (ωi) = θi
bi
di
ωiB
′′
i (ωi) −
[
1
di
+ θi
]
[B′i(ei) −D
′
i(E)] . (2.A.6)
Then, even if [B′i(ei) −D
′
i(E)] > 0, we have:
θiωiB
′′
i (ωi) < −θi [B
′
i(ei) −D
′
i(E)] ⇒
dFOCri=dii
ddi
< 0. (2.A.7)
Inserting equations (2.A.4) into equations (2.A.3) yields Corollary 2.1. 
Proof of Proposition 2.2
(i) Existence: By virtue of Assumption 2.1 and as e′i(E) ∈ [0, 1], the maximization
problem of country i is strictly concave:
SOCi = p
′(E){(2 + 2θiri − (1 + θibi)e
′
i(E)} − (1 + θidi)D
′′
i (E)
+ p′′(E)[(1 + θiri)ωi − (1 + θibi)ei(E)] < 0 .
(2.A.8)
Thus, for all countries i = 1, 2, the reaction function yields a unique best response for
any given choice ω−i of the other countries, which guarantees the existence of a Nash
equilibrium.
(ii) Uniqueness: Summing up the reaction function (2.15) over both countries yields
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the following condition, which holds in the Nash equilibrium:
2p(E) =
2∑
j=1
1 + θjdj
1 + θjrj
D′j(E) + p
′(E)
2∑
j=1
θj(bj − rj)e′j(E)
1 + θjrj
. (2.A.9)
The left-hand side is strictly decreasing in E, while the right-hand side is strictly
increasing in E as p′′(E) ≈ 0 by virtue of Assumption 2.1. Thus, there exists a unique
level of total emission allowances EI in the Nash equilibrium. Inserting EI back into
the reaction function (2.15) yields the unique equilibrium allowance choices (ωIi , ω
I
−i).

Proof of Corollary 2.2
Introducing the abbreviation
Λi = p
′(E) [(1 + θiri)SOC−i + (1 + θ−ir−i)SOCi] > 0 , (2.A.10)
and applying the implicit function theorem to the first-order conditions FOCi, equation
(2.15), for both countries, we derive:
dωi
dxi
= −
SOC−i
Λi
dFOCi
dxi
, (2.A.11a)
dω−i
dxi
=
FOC−iωi
Λi
dFOCi
dxi
, (2.A.11b)
dE
dxi
=
dωi
dxi
+
dω−i
dxi
=
FOC−iωi − SOC−i
Λi
dFOCi
dxi
, (2.A.11c)
where x ∈ {θ, b, d} denotes one of the political parameters and
FOC−iωi = p
′(E)
[
(1 + θ−ir−i) − (1 + θ−ib−i)e
′
−i(E)
]
− (1 + θ−id−i)D
′′
−i(E)
+ p′′(E) [(1 + θ−ir−i)ω−i − (1 + θ−ib−i)e−i(E)] R 0 ,
(2.A.12)
as indicated by equation (2.16).
The derivatives of the first-order conditions, dFOCi/di, in the two cases ri = bi and
ri = di are as follows:
dFOCri=bii
dθi
= bi {p(E) + p
′(E) [ωi − ei(E)]} − diD
′
i(E) ,
dFOCri=dii
dθi
= di [p(E) + p
′(E)ωi −D
′
i(E)] − bip
′(E)ei(E) , (2.A.13a)
dFOCri=bii
dbi
= θi{p(E) + p
′(E) [ωi − ei(E)]} ,
dFOCri=dii
dbi
= −θip
′(E)ei(E) , (2.A.13b)
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dFOCri=bii
ddi
= −θiD
′
i(E) ,
dFOCri=dii
ddi
= θi [p(E) + p
′(E)ωi −D
′
i(E)] . (2.A.13c)
For ri = bi, the signs of equations (2.A.13a) and (2.A.13b) can be found by re-writing
the first-order condition as follows:
(1 + θibi) {p(E) + p
′(E) [ωi − ei(E)]} = (1 + θidi)D
′
i(E) , (2.A.14)
which implies that {p(E) + p′(E) [ωi − ei(E)]} > 0. Furthermore:
p(E) + p′(E)
[
ωi − ei(E)
]
−D′i(E) ⋚ 0 ⇔ bi R di . (2.A.15)
Re-writing the first-order condition again yields:
−
1
θi
{p(E) + p′(E) [ωi − ei(E)] −D
′
i(E)} = bi {p(E) + p
′(E) [ωi − ei(E)]} − diD
′
i(E) .
(2.A.16)
Then, bi {p(E) + p′(E) [ωi − ei(E)]} − diD′i(E) R 0 ⇔ bi R di.
For ri = di, the signs of equations (2.A.13a) and (2.A.13c) can be found by re-writing
the first-order condition as follows:
(1 + θidi) [p(E) + p
′(E)ωi −D
′
i(E)] = (1 + θibi)p
′(E)ei(E) , (2.A.17)
which implies that [p(E) + p′(E)ωi −D′i(E)] < 0. Furthermore:
p(E) + p′(E)ωi −D
′
i(E) − p
′(E)ei(E) R 0 ⇔ bi ⋚ di . (2.A.18)
Re-writing the first-order condition again yields:
−
1
θi
[p(E) + p′(E)ωi −D
′
i(E) − p
′(E)ei(E)]
= di [p(E) + p
′(E)ωi −D
′
i(E)] − bip
′(E)ei(E) . (2.A.19)
Then, di [p(E) + p′(E)ωi −D′i(E)] − bip
′(E)ei(E) R 0 ⇔ bi ⋚ di.
Inserting equations (2.A.13) into equations (2.A.11) yields Corollary 2.2. 
Proof of Proposition 2.3
Assuming that C2,Rij > 0 for all j = 1, . . . ,Mi and both R, we can re-write equation
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(2.23) by virtue of condition (2.10) to yield:
WRi (ω
R
1 , ω
R
2 ) + θi
Mi∑
j=1
j 6=k
URij (ω
R
1 , ω
R
2 ) + θi
[
URik(ω
R
1 , ω
R
2 ) − Ū
R
ik
]
= WRi (ω
−k
1 , ω
−k
2 ) + θi
Mi∑
j=1
j 6=k
URij (ω
−k
1 , ω
−k
2 ) ,
(2.A.20)
Solving for ŪRik and inserting into condition (2.10), we obtain:
C2,Rik (ω
R
1 , ω
R
2 ) =
1
θi
[
WRi (ω
−k
1 , ω
−k
2 ) −W
R
i (ω
R
1 , ω
R
2 )
]
+
Mi∑
j=1
j 6=k
[
URij (ω
−k
1 , ω
−k
2 ) − U
R
ij (ω
R
1 , ω
R
2 )
]
.
(2.A.21)
Inserting the lobby’s utility function (2.3) yields equation (2.24). 
Proof of Proposition 2.4
Condition (2.29) is a necessary condition for a pressured stance. We can re-write this
condition to yield
GRi0 + θi
∑
j∈SR
∆UR,R̄ij > G
R̄
i0 + θi
∑
j∈SR̄
∆U R̄,Rij , (2.A.22a)
⇔ WRi + θi
Mi∑
j=1
C2,Rij + θi
∑
j∈SR
[
URij − C
2,R
ij − U
R̄
ij + C
2,R̄
ij
]
> W R̄i + θi
Mi∑
j=1
C2,R̄ij + θi
∑
j∈SR̄
[
U R̄ij − C
2,R̄
ij − U
R
ij + C
2,R
ij
]
(2.A.22b)
⇔ WRi + θi
Mi∑
j=1
C2,Rij + θi
Mi∑
j=1
[
URij − C
2,R
ij
]
> W R̄i + θi
Mi∑
j=1
C2,R̄ij + θi
Mi∑
j=1
[
U R̄ij − C
2,R̄
ij
]
(2.A.22c)
⇔ WRi + θi
Mi∑
j=1
URij > W
R̄
i + θi
Mi∑
j=1
U R̄ij . (2.A.22d)
Obviously, this condition does not depend on the distribution of organized stakes,
as welfare and the sum of the lobby groups’ (gross) utilities are determined by the
aggregate level of organized stakes bi, di and ri. This implies that whenever there exists
a pressured stance – no matter what the distribution of organized stakes among the
individual lobby groups – the pressured stance supports regime R. However, whether a
pressured stance exists or not may well depend on the distribution, as condition (2.30),
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which also has to hold for the existence of a pressured stance, is not immune to change
in the distribution of organized stakes. 
Proof of Proposition 2.5
To prove the proposition, we focus on ri = bi and introduce the special case of quadratic
benefit functions and linear environmental damages:
Bi(ei) =
1
φi
ei(1 −
1
2
ei) , B
′
i(ei) =
1
φi
(1 − ei) , B
′′
i (ei) = −
1
φi
, (2.A.23a)
Di(E) = ǫiE , D
′
i(E) = ǫi , D
′′
i (E) = 0 , (2.A.23b)
where φi > 0 denotes a country-specific benefit parameter, and ǫi > 0 is country-
specific but constant marginal damage. We define the following shortcuts for politically
adjusted marginal damages, average politically adjusted marginal damages and the
average benefit parameter:
ψi = D̃
′
i(E) =
1 + θidi
1 + θibi
ǫi , ψ̄ =
1
2
(ψi + ψ−i) , φ̄ =
1
2
(φi + φ−i) . (2.A.24)
Then, the national allowance choices and the global emissions in the two regimes are:
EI = 2 − φ̄(ψi + ψ−i) , E
D = 2 − (φiψi + φ−iψ−i) , (2.A.25a)
eIi = 1 − φiψ̄ , e
D
i = 1 − φiψi , (2.A.25b)
ωIi = 1 + φ−iψ̄ − 2φ̄ψi . (2.A.25c)
Global emissions are lower in case of linking the domestic permit market to an inter-
national permit market if the country with the higher φi exhibits the lower politically
adjusted marginal damages ψi:
EI R ED ⇔ φ−i(ψ−i − ψi) R φi(ψ−i − ψi) . (2.A.26)
Equation (2.32) can be written as:
∆Gi = (1 + θibi)
{
Bi
(
ei(E
I)
)
−Bi(e
D
i ) + p(E
I)
[
ωIi − ei(E
I)
]}
− (1 + θidi)
[
Di(E
I) −Di(E
D)
]
+ θi(ri − bi)
[
p(EI)ωIi − pi(ω
D
i )ω
D
i
]
> 0 ,
(2.A.27)
where the last term cancels out for ri = bi. Factoring out (1+θibi) before differentiating
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equation (2.A.27) and defining γi ≡ (1 + θidi)/(1 + θibi), we derive:
d∆Gi
dxi
=
d(1 + θibi)
dxi
∆Gi
1 + θibi
+ (1 + θibi)
[
ǫi
dγi
dxi
(ED − EI) − ǫi
dγi
dxi
1
2
φiψ̄
]
(2.A.28a)
=
d(1 + θibi)
dxi
∆Gi
1 + θibi
+ (1 + θibi)ǫi
dγi
dxi
[
(φ̄− φi)ψi + (φ̄− φ−i)ψ−i −
1
2
φiψ̄
]
,
d∆G−i
dxi
= (1 + θ−ib−i)ǫi
dγi
dxi
[
ωI−i − e
D
−i +
1
2
φ−iψ̄
]
(2.A.28b)
= (1 + θ−ib−i)ǫi
dγIi
dxi
[
φi(ψ̄ − ψ−i) +
1
2
φ−iψ̄
]
,
where x ∈ {θ, b, d, r} and
dγi
d bi
= −
θi(1 + θidi)
(1 + θibi)2
< 0 ,
dγi
d di
=
θi
1 + θibi
> 0 ,
dγi
d θi
=
di − bi
(1 + θibi)2
R 0 ⇔ di R bi .
(2.A.29)
Consider the situation of an established international permit market with ED > EI .
Now, assume, for example, that the green lobby in country i gains momentum (i.e.
di increases). Then, the first term in equation (2.A.28a) drops out. The direct effect
goes into the direction of the regime with lower emissions, which is the international
trade regime. However, the indirect effect of country i goes in favor of the domestic
regime and may even outweigh the direct effect. As a consequence, the government in
country i is less in favor of the international regime than before. Also the indirect effect
in country −i may induce the government of country −i to support the international
permit trading regime less than before. Thus, the gain in influence of the green lobby in
country i may cause the support for this regime to cease in one or both of the countries.
As a consequence, the regime changes to the other regime. As (by assumption) the
domestic trading regime exhibits higher global emissions than the international trading
regime, global emissions rise which is counter to the interests of the green lobby group.

Chapter 3
Mobile Capital and
Non-cooperative International
Environmental Policy
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3.1 Introduction
One of the key questions in the literature on fiscal federalism is whether and to what
extent decentralized policies are efficient. The same question features prominently in
the environmental economics literature, in particular, in the case of transnational and
global pollutants, such as sulfur dioxide or greenhouse gas emissions. Yet, there are
substantial differences between these two strands of the literature. While the fiscal
federalism literature focuses on the economic competition between individual juris-
dictions over mobile factors of production, the bulk of the theoretical environmental
literature is concerned with trading off the costs and benefits of emissions which cause
transnational or global pollution damages. At the intersections of these two literature
strands is the literature on “environmental dumping” which considers the competition
for mobile factors that give rise to interjurisdictional spillovers. So far, however, this
literature produced inconclusive results. While some papers find that decentralized
policy-making is efficient (e.g. Oates and Schwab, 1988; Ogawa and Wildasin, 2009),
others find that the resulting pollution levels are inefficiently high (e.g. Eichner and
Runkel, 2012) or may even be inefficiently low (e.g. Rauscher, 1991; Withagen and
Halsema, 2013).
In this paper, we structure this debate by analyzing the interactions of mobile capital
and non-cooperative international environmental policy under different sets of assump-
tions. We compare the cases when capital and emissions are either perfect complements
or perfect substitutes. Like Eichner and Runkel (2012), we allow for an endogenous
choice of capital and emissions and stick to the case of symmetric countries. In addi-
tion, we account for the possibility that interjurisdictional spillovers do not only impact
on the households’ utility but may also negatively affect production. This allows for
the important distinction between non-market (utility) and market (production) dam-
ages from pollution. We model the pollution externality on production as a negative
impact of higher pollution on the marginal productivity of capital.
In case of perfect complementarity between capital and emissions, capital taxes (which
are equivalent to taxes on emissions) are inefficiently low in the symmetric Nash equi-
librium for a positive capital supply elasticity but set at a strictly positive rate. Even
though a unilateral increase of the capital tax lowers pollution and thus increases cap-
ital demand in the tax-increasing country through its positive impact on the marginal
productivity of capital, the tax increase does not attract investment. This is because
investment cannot rise when pollution falls due to their complementary relationship.
If capital and emissions are perfect substitutes, they may be addressed separately
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by policy-makers through a tax on capital and a tax on emissions. We show that
an increase in the emissions tax and a decrease in the capital tax have the same
quantitative effects on global capital use by firms and global pollution. Thus, capital
and pollution depend only on the difference in emissions and capital taxes. In the
Nash equilibrium, governments may subsidize capital and/or emissions, depending on
the size of pollution impacts on production.
In contrast to the model with perfect complementarity, a unilateral marginal increase in
the tax difference, caused by either an increase of the emissions tax or a decrease in the
capital tax, may indeed attract capital and lower pollution at the same time. This holds
for sufficiently strong pollution impacts on production and incentivizes governments to
set an inefficiently high tax difference in equilibrium. We also show that a binding
international agreement setting the emissions tax rate equal to the social marginal
damage from emissions would eliminate all incentives for capital tax competition.
Our paper contributes to the literature on environmental policy and interjurisdictional
competition in the spirit of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986). In their pioneering article
Oates and Schwab (1988) show – in a setting of symmetric countries, perfect com-
plementarity between capital and emissions, and environmental externalities that do
not spill over to other jurisdictions – that decentralized policy-making is efficient if
internal efficiency within each jurisdiction is guaranteed (for example, by lump-sum
taxes). Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) extend this efficiency result to the case of inter-
jurisdictional spillovers and asymmetric countries. This surprising finding stems from
the fact that two externalities, a fiscal externality due to the tax competition incen-
tive of governments and the environmental externality, exactly offset each other in
equilibrium. It rests, however, on the strong assumption that global capital supply
is fixed, which implies that global emissions are exogenously given due to the perfect
complementarity between capital and emissions. Eichner and Runkel (2012), hence-
forth E&R, employ a similar model that keeps the complementarity assumption but
allows for endogenous capital supply. They show that the tax on capital is inefficiently
low in the decentralized equilibrium. The reason is that, although a unilateral increase
in the capital tax attracts capital, it also lowers global capital demand and leads to
a fall in the interest rate. For a positive capital supply elasticity, this implies lower
savings and, therefore, lower capital and emissions in all other countries. This effect
decreases the environmental externality compared to a regime with fixed capital supply
such that the environmental externality is not strong enough any more to offset the
distortion due to the fiscal externality. In this paper, we amend the model of E&R
by pollution externalities on production and also analyze a model variant with perfect
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substitutability between capital and emissions.
The paper is also related to Rauscher (1991, 1997b,a, 2000, 2005) who finds, using sim-
ilar models of decentralized environmental policy-making and mostly heterogeneous
countries, that capital mobility may aggravate transfrontier pollution problems when-
ever capital and emissions are somewhat complementary. Only with sufficiently strong
emission externalities on the marginal productivity of capital and a low degree of substi-
tutability may environmental standards become inefficiently strict (Rauscher 1997b,a).
In a world with identical countries, governments are found to internalize even less than
their own shares of the environmental externality (Rauscher 2005). In contrast to the
models employed by Rauscher, our model allows for endogenous capital supply.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we analyze a model
similar to E&R amended by pollution externalities on production. In Section 3.3, we
assume that capital and emissions are perfect substitutes. To be able to compare the
results with the previous section, we do this by changing the model as little as possible.
We discuss our results for two important special cases in Section 3.4. Finally, Section
3.5 concludes.
3.2 The model with production externalities
In a first step, we discuss a model where the main difference to the model employed by
E&R is that we allow for pollution externalities on production. We consider a model
of a global economy consisting of n ≥ 2 symmetric jurisdictions which can be thought
of as sovereign countries.
3.2.1 Firms, emissions and pollution
In each country, a representative firm produces an output good, the price of which we
normalize to one. Firms in all countries have access to the same production technology
F , which is increasing in the amount of a production factor ki (that we call ‘capital’)
with decreasing marginal returns (Fkk < 0 < Fk). Capital is traded on a global capital
market at the uniform price ρ.
Each unit of capital ki gives rise to emissions that increase the pollution level by α > 0
units in country i and by αβ (β ∈ [0, 1]) units in all other countries j 6= i. Thus, the
parameter β specifies the magnitude of transboundary emission spillovers. For β = 0
emissions only cause local pollution, i.e. their effect is confined to the country of origin,
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while for β = 1 emissions cause global pollution in the sense that all jurisdictions are
equally affected by an increase in ki. Thus, the pollution level ei in country i amounts
to:
ei = α
(
ki + β
∑
j 6=i
kj
)
. (3.1)
In contrast to E&R, we assume that pollution negatively affects production. In par-
ticular, the level of output is lower, the higher is the pollution level ei (Fe < 0).
Furthermore, the marginal productivity of capital (MPC) is weakly decreasing in ei,
i.e. Fke ≤ 0.1
Given that country i levies a unit source-based tax ti on capital and that the produced
consumption good is sold on a perfectly competitive global market, after-tax profits of
the representative firm in country i are given by:
πi = F (ki, ei) − (ρ+ ti)ki . (3.2)
Taking the pollution level ei as given, profit maximization of the representative firms
implies that after-tax returns to capital are equalized across countries:
Fk(ki, ei) − ti = ρ . (3.3)
3.2.2 Households
Each country is populated by a representative household endowed with k̄ units of
capital. Capital can either be directly consumed (x1i ) or provided to a global capital
market in amount si = k̄ − x1i . We assume that households own the representative
firm in their country of origin and the government re-distributes the revenues from the
capital tax via a lump-sum transfer:2
τi = tiki . (3.4)
1 Pollution damages that negatively impact on the marginal productivity of capital can be found,
among others, in Baumol and Bradford (1972), Rauscher (1997b,a), Copeland and Taylor (1999)
and Benarroch and Thille (2001). An alternative interpretation is that lower emission levels, i.e.
higher emission abatement, is a local public input to production. On public input competition see,
e.g., Noiset (1995), Keen and Marchand (1997), Sinn (1997), Matsumoto (1998), Bayindir-Upmann
(1998) and Dhillon et al. (2007).
2 If the government in country i wants to subsidize capital then τi becomes a lump-sum tax. In
particular, we abstract from taxing capital to provide local public goods. As we assume that the
government can raise a lump-sum tax, local public good provision is trivial.
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Then, the budget for the produced good x2i (which is equal to its consumption, as the
price of the good is normalized to one) is given by:
x2i = ρsi + πi + τi . (3.5)
The household receives utility from consuming x1i and x
2
i but is harmed by pollution
ei. The utility function is quasi-linear in consumption and additively separable in
consumption and pollution:3
Wi = U(x
1
i ) + x
2
i + V (ei) = U(k̄ − si) + ρsi + πi + τi + V (ei) , (3.6)
where U is monotonically increasing, V is monotonically decreasing and both functions
are concave.
The model allows for two different interpretations. First, x1i and x
2
i may be interpreted
as first and second stage consumption. In this case, we obtain an intertemporal model
in which si denotes savings that earn interest at a rate of ρ − 1. Second, the model
may be interpreted as a static model in which x1i and x
2
i denote the consumption of
two different commodities, where the first commodity can be either consumed or used
as an input in production. Then, si denotes the amount of the first commodity which
is sold to the firms at the price ρ. While E&R phrase their model in the spirit of the
former interpretation, we prefer the latter. In both cases the consumption good x1i
serves as a parsimonious way to endogenize capital supply.
Households choose capital supply si to maximize utility (3.6), taking firm profits and
the pollution level as given. From the necessary and sufficient condition for a household
maximum,
U ′(k̄ − si) − ρ = 0 , (3.7)
we obtain that a marginal increase in the price of capital ρ increases capital supply
and thus decreases consumption x1i :
∂si
∂ρ
= s′i = −
1
U ′′(k̄ − si)
> 0 . (3.8)
3 Quasi-linearity neglects any income effects and can be justified on the grounds that there is em-
pirical evidence that the substitution effect outweighs the income effect (see, for example, Boskin,
1978, or Gylfason, 1993).
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3.2.3 Global capital market
Capital is perfectly mobile across countries and traded on a global capital market. The
equilibrium condition is given by:
n∑
l=1
kl(ρ, tl) =
n∑
l=1
sl(ρ) . (3.9)
Equations (3.1), (3.3), (3.7) and (3.9) determine the price of capital ρ as well as the
equilibrium levels of capital and pollution in all countries as a function of the capital
tax rates in all countries. We obtain the comparative static results with respect to a
marginal change in country i’s tax rate by taking the total derivative of these equations.
For a symmetric equilibrium (ki = si = S), it holds (for the explicit derivations see the
Appendix):
dρ
dti
= −
1
n(1 − Φ − Γ)
< 0 , (3.10)
dki
dti
=
S ′
[
(n− 1) − n(Φ + Γ − βΓi)
]
n(1 − Φ − Γ)
[
Φ + (1 − β)Γi
] < 0 , (3.11a)
dkj
dti
= −
S ′(1 − nβΓi)
n(1 − Φ − Γ)
[
Φ + (1 − β)Γi
] > 0 , (3.11b)
dk
dti
=
dki
dti
+ (n− 1)
dkj
dti
= −
S ′
1 − Φ − Γ
< 0 , (3.11c)
where Φ = FkkS ′ < 0, Γi = αFkeS ′ < 0 and Γ = [1 + (n − 1)β]Γi < 0. The pollution
externality on production is thus represented by the terms Γi and Γ. Qualitatively,
these additional terms do not change the results compared to E&R for marginal changes
in the capital tax ti. A marginal increase in the capital tax ti decreases capital use
in the tax-increasing country and increases capital use in all other countries, yet the
global effect is negative. In the market equilibrium of the capital market, this reduction
in global capital use is supported by a decreasing price of capital.
Due to perfect complementarity, a marginal change in the capital tax ti also affects the
pollution levels in all countries:
dei
dti
=
αS ′
[
(1 − β)
(
n− 1 − nΓ
)
− nΦ
]
n(1 − Φ − Γ)
[
Φ + (1 − β)Γi
] < 0 , (3.12a)
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dej
dti
= −
αS ′
[
(1 − β) + nβΦ)
n(1 − Φ − Γ)
[
Φ + (1 − β)Γi
] R 0 , (3.12b)
de
dti
=
dei
dti
+ (n− 1)
dej
dti
=
−αS ′
[
1 + (n− 1)β
]
1 − Φ − Γ
< 0 . (3.12c)
As an increase in the capital tax in country i decreases domestic and global capital use,
the pollution levels in country i and in aggregate decline. The effect on the pollution
levels in all other countries j 6= i is ambiguous because of two opposing effects. On the
one hand, investment in these countries increases and, accordingly, local emissions and
pollution levels rise. On the other hand, the decline in emissions in the tax-increasing
country i reduces emission spillovers to country j. Which of the two effects prevails,
depends on the spillover parameter β. For a sufficiently high β, pollution levels in all
other countries j 6= i fall as well. The beneficial effect of a tax increase on the domestic
pollution level offsets even potential increases in pollution levels in other countries such
that aggregate pollution falls.
Like in E&R, a unilateral increase in the capital tax ti unambiguously repels capital
and lowers local pollution levels. Even though this decrease goes along with an increase
in domestic capital demand, ceteris paribus, due to the pollution externality on the
MPC, governments are not able to increase domestic investment by increasing capital
taxes. As we shall see in the following section, governments strike a balance between
the opposing effects on investment and local pollution by lowering capital taxes below
their efficient level.
3.2.4 Decentralized equilibrium
The governments in all countries i simultaneously choose a capital tax ti to maximize
the utility of its representative household (3.6) subject to (3.2), (3.3), (3.4), (3.8),
(3.10), (3.11a), (3.12a), taking the tax rates in all other countries as given. Assuming
that an interior symmetric Nash equilibrium exists, the symmetric equilibrium tax rate
reads:
t̂ = −α(Fe + Ve)
(n− 1)(1 − β) − n(Φ + Γ − βΓi)
(n− 1) − n(Φ + Γ − βΓi)
> 0 . (3.13)
The equilibrium capital tax rate t̂ is positive and a function of the environmental
damage imposed on own utility and own production.
The tax rate in the symmetric Nash equilibrium is, in general, inefficient. To see this,
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recall first that for symmetric countries efficiency requires for i 6= j:
∂Wi
∂ti
+ (n− 1)
∂Wj
∂ti
= 0 , ∀ i = 1, . . . , n , (3.14a)
which implies:
ti
∂k
∂ti
= −(Fe + Ve)
∂e
∂ti
. (3.14b)
For S ′ = 0, as in Ogawa and Wildasin (2009), ∂k/∂ti = ∂e/∂ti = 0 implying that
condition (3.14b) holds for all tax rates, including the tax rate in the symmetric Nash
equilibrium.
Second, for elastic capital supply, i.e. S ′ > 0, we obtain from condition (3.14b) by
using equations (3.11b) and (3.12b):
t⋆ = −α(Fe + Ve)[1 + (n− 1)β] , (3.15)
implying that the Pareto efficient tax rate equals the social marginal damage (SMD)
from emissions.
We cannot easily compare the tax rates in the symmetric Nash equilibrium and in the
Pareto optimum, as environmental damage depends on emissions and, in particular,
on the capital stock. Emissions and capital, in turn, differ in the Nash equilibrium
and in the Pareto optimum. To see that the tax rate in the Nash equilibrium is
inefficient, we analyze whether a marginal increase of the tax rate in the symmetric
Nash equilibrium constitutes a Pareto improvement. By construction, ∂Wi/∂ti = 0 in
the symmetric Nash equilibrium, thus a unilateral marginal tax increase is a Pareto
improvement if ∂Wj/∂ti > 0, i.e. if it raises the welfare in all other countries while it
leaves the welfare in the tax increasing country unchanged. If this is the case, then the
tax rate in the symmetric Nash equilibrium is inefficiently low. As in E&R, the policy
externalities from a unilateral tax increase can be decomposed into a private income
and an environmental externality:
∂Wj
∂ti
= t̂
dkj
dti
︸ ︷︷ ︸
IE>0
+ (Fe + Ve)
dej
dti
︸ ︷︷ ︸
EE
. (3.16)
The private income externality (IE) is unambiguously positive, indicating inefficiently
low tax rates whereas the environmental externality (EE) cannot be signed unambigu-
ously. Inserting the equilibrium tax rate t̂ from (3.13) and the comparative statics
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(3.11b) and (3.12b), we obtain:
∂Wj
∂ti
= −αβS ′(Fe + Ve)
n(1 − Φ − Γ)[Φ + (1 − β)Γi] + (n− 1)βΓi(1 − nβΓi)
(1 − Φ − Γ)[Φ + (1 − β)Γi][n− 1 − n(Φ + Γ − βΓi)]
> 0 .
(3.17)
This leads us to the following proposition that is in line with E&R and constitutes the
standard result in the tax competition literature (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986).
Proposition 3.1 (Inefficiently low tax rate under perfect complementarity)
In the E&R model amended by production externalities, the tax rate t̂ in the symmetric
Nash equilibrium is inefficiently low if S ′ > 0.
Thus, in case of perfect complementarity between capital and emissions, the pollution
externalities on production do not qualitatively change results. In any case, equilibrium
taxes on capital are inefficiently low. We shall see in the following section that pollution
externalities on production play a more important role if capital and emissions are
perfect substitutes.
3.3 The model with capital and emissions as
perfect substitutes
The model in the previous section assumes, like its predecessors in Oates and Schwab
(1988), Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) and E&R, that capital and emissions are perfect
complements. Exemplarily, we may think of electricity production in conventional coal-
or gas-fired power plants, where the relationship between resource input and emissions
is governed by the combustion process. From a macroeconomic perspective this rigid
relationship does not always hold. In fact, the opposite may be true if we consider,
for example, investments in renewable energies. To highlight the effects of perfect
complementarity, we now assume the opposite, i.e. capital and emissions are perfect
substitutes.
3.3.1 Assumptions
We achieve this in the most parsimonious way by assuming that not capital use in
the production of the second good but the consumption of the first good causes the
environmental externality:
ei = α
(
x1i + β
∑
j 6=i
x1j
)
. (3.18)
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That is, the higher is the consumption of the first good in country i, the higher are
domestic emissions which partly or fully spill over to other countries, but also the
less capital can be sold to firms. This indicates the substitutive relationship between
capital and emissions. Like in the previous model specification, emissions negatively
affect production and households’ utility.
As the pollution externality is now caused by the consumption of good x1i , the gov-
ernment in country i may levy an additional consumption (respectively emissions or
environmental) tax ǫi. Then the consumption of the second good is given by:
x2i = ρsi + πi + τi − ǫi(k̄ − si) , (3.19)
where
τi = tiki + ǫi(k̄ − si) (3.20)
denotes the lump-sum tax/transfer that balances the government’s budget. The house-
hold’s utility is given by:
Wi = U(k̄ − si) + ρsi + πi + τi − ǫi(k̄ − si) + V (ei) , (3.21)
and the first-order condition for the household’s maximum yields:
U ′(k̄ − si) − ρ− ǫi = 0 . (3.22)
Thus, a marginal increase in the consumption tax ǫi has the same effect on capital
supply as a marginal increase of the price of capital ρ:
∂si
∂ǫi
=
∂si
∂ρ
= s′i = −
1
U ′′(k̄ − si)
> 0 . (3.23)
3.3.2 Comparative statics
With capital supply in country i being a function of ρ and ǫi, the capital market
equilibrium is determined by the following condition:
n∑
l=1
kl(ρ, tl) =
n∑
l=1
sl(ρ, ǫl) . (3.24)
Using equations (3.3), (3.18) and (3.24) and assuming a symmetric equilibrium, we
obtain the comparative static results of marginal changes in country i’s tax rates ti
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(left-hand side) and ǫi (right-hand side), which are derived in detail in the Appendix:
dρ
dti
= −
1
n(1 − Φ + Γ)
,
dρ
dǫi
=
Φ − Γ
n(1 − Φ + Γ)
, (3.25)
dki
dti
=
S ′
[
(n− 1)(1 + Γ) − nΦ
]
nΦ(1 − Φ + Γ)
,
dki
dǫi
=
S ′
[
(n− 1)(1 − β)Γi(1 − Φ + Γ) + Φ
]
nΦ(1 − Φ + Γ)
,
(3.26a)
dkj
dti
= −
S ′(1 + Γ)
nΦ(1 − Φ + Γ)
,
dkj
dǫi
= −
S ′
[
(1 − β)Γi(1 − Φ + Γ) − Φ
]
nΦ(1 − Φ + Γ)
, (3.26b)
dk
dti
= −
S ′
1 − Φ + Γ
,
dk
dǫi
=
S ′
1 − Φ + Γ
, (3.26c)
dei
dti
=
αS ′
[
1 + (n− 1)β]
n(1 − Φ + Γ)
,
dei
dǫi
= −
αS ′
[
n+ (n− 1)(1 − β)(Γ − Φ)
]
n(1 − Φ + Γ)
, (3.27a)
dej
dti
=
αS ′
[
1 + (n− 1)β]
n(1 − Φ + Γ)
,
dej
dǫi
= −
αS ′
[
βn− (1 − β)(Γ − Φ)
]
n(1 − Φ + Γ)
, (3.27b)
de
dti
=
αS ′
[
1 + (n− 1)β]
1 − Φ + Γ
,
de
dǫi
= −
αS ′
[
1 + (n− 1)β]
1 − Φ + Γ
. (3.27c)
Compared to the case of perfect complementarity, Γ enters the denominator in all
equations with a positive sign instead of a negative one. The signs of all comparative
static results now depend on the environmental spillover parameter β and in particular
on the size of Γ and/or Γi and thus on the size of Fke. It is straightforward to see
that if there are no externalities from pollution on production, i.e. Fke = 0 and thus
Γ = Γi = 0, a marginal change in ti has the same effects as before on the capital
market related variables ρ, ki, kj and k but opposing effects on domestic and aggregate
pollution ei and e due to perfect substitutability.
For sufficiently small pollution impacts on the MPC, i.e. if Fke is not too negative
such that −Γ < 1 − Φ, these results still hold qualitatively. However, if the pollution
externality on production is sufficiently large, these results are reversed. A marginal
increase in ti then increases the equilibrium price of capital because the increase of
aggregate capital demand associated with the decrease in pollution due to Fke < 0
outweighs the direct negative effect of the tax increase on aggregate investment. For
the knife-edge case of −Γ = 1 − Φ, both effects exactly offset each other such that the
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price of capital and thus investment and pollution levels are insensitive to a marginal
change in ti.
A marginal increase in ǫi affects the price of capital via two channels. First, it changes
emissions directly by changing consumption of the externality-generating first good in
country i. This change is, on the one hand, associated with a ceteris paribus increase in
capital supply by country i and, thus, aggregate capital supply increases. On the other
hand, the decrease in emissions in country i due to an increase in ǫi also decreases the
pollution levels in all countries, which increases the demand for capital everywhere due
to the pollution externality on production (Fke < 0). Accordingly, also aggregate capital
demand increases. The effect on the price of capital is thus ambiguous. Second, there
is an indirect effect via the global capital market which is also ambiguous. The reason
is that, for instance, a marginal increase in the price of capital raises, ceteris paribus,
capital demand due to the pollution externality on production and thus counteracts
the dampening effect of an increase in ρ on investment. The combined effect of these
two channels on the price of capital is ambiguous, depending on the strength of the
pollution externality on production. In fact, ρ rises for −Φ < −Γ < 1 − Φ and falls
otherwise. Again, for −Γ = 1 − Φ, the price of capital and all other variables are
perfectly inelastic to marginal tax changes.
To gain a better understanding of the effects at work, we separate the different channels
through which the increase in ti or ǫi affects investment and pollution in the tax-
increasing country. For this purpose, we take the total derivative of equations (3.3)
and (3.18):
dki =
1
Fkk
(
dti + dρ− Fkedei
)
, (3.28a)
dei = −α


(
s′i + β
∑
j 6=i
s′j
)
dρ+ s′idǫi

 . (3.28b)
A unilateral increase in the capital tax has a direct negative effect on domestic in-
vestment (first term in brackets in equation (3.28a)), but also two ambiguous effects
through the associated impact on the price of capital and pollution (second and third
term). The impact on pollution, (3.28b), in turn, also works via the associated change
in ρ: a higher price of capital, for example, decreases consumption of the externality-
generating first good in all countries and thus domestic and foreign pollution levels.
Therefore, due to Fke < 0 the capital demand curve of the firm in the tax-increasing
country is shifted to the right, which, ceteris paribus, increases investment.
By contrast, a marginal change in ǫi entails – in addition to the indirect and ambiguous
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effect via the impact on ρ – a direct positive effect on domestic emissions since it makes
consumption x1i less attractive. However, there is no direct effect on investment, only
indirect and again ambiguous effects through the changes in ρ and ei.
A marginal increase in ti causes a capital flow into the tax-increasing country for
intermediate pollution impacts, i.e. 1 − Φ < −Γ < 1 − nΦ/(n − 1), while local
pollution falls for −Γ < 1 − Φ. For 1 − Φ < −Γ < 1 − Φ + Φ/[(n − 1)(1 − β)Γi],
domestic investment falls due to a marginal increase in ǫi, and local pollution rises
for 1 − Φ < −Γ < n/[(n − 1)(1 − β)] − Φ. Thus, for a sufficiently high pollution
externality on the MPC, domestic investment can indeed be increased while pollution
falls by either marginally increasing ǫi or decreasing ti. This stands in contrast to the
model with perfect substitutability where domestic investment and pollution always
moved in the same direction for marginal tax increases.
We also observe that a marginal increase in ti has the same quantitative effect on the
global capital stock and the global pollution level as a marginal increase in ǫi, but the
opposite sign (equations (3.26c) and (3.27c)). In this sense, these two instruments are
perfect substitutes when it comes to their impact on aggregate variables. This has an
important implication, as the following proposition states.
Proposition 3.2 (Equilibrium pollution levels and investment)
For given tax rates in all other countries, the equilibrium levels of pollution and capital
only depend on the difference ǫi − ti.
The proof is given in the Appendix.
3.3.3 Decentralized equilibrium
As a benchmark to which we compare the symmetric Nash equilibrium, we determine
Pareto-optimal policies. It turns out that the efficient outcome – given that S ′ > 0
– only fixes the difference between the two taxes, which again has to equal the SMD
from emissions:
(ǫ− t)⋆ = −α(Fe + Ve) [1 + (n− 1)β] . (3.29)
Given the result of Proposition 3.2, this additional degree of freedom is not surprising.
A global social planner may either tax consumption of the externality-generating good
or subsidize the substitute, capital, or impose any convex combination of the two.
In the decentralized economy, the governments in all countries i simultaneously choose
tax rates ti and ǫi to maximize the utility of their representative household (3.21)
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subject to (3.2), (3.3), (3.20), (3.23), (3.25), (3.26a) and (3.27a) and taking the tax
rates in all other countries as given. Assuming that a symmetric Nash equilibrium with
an interior solution exists, the first-order conditions yield:
ǫi = −α(Fe + Ve)
1 + (1 − β)(Γ − Φ)
1 − Φ + Γ − βΓi
, (3.30a)
ti = − {ǫi + α(Fe + Ve)[1 + (n− 1)β]}
Φ
(n− 1)(1 + Γ) − nΦ
(3.30b)
= −α(Fe + Ve)
βΦ
1 − Φ + Γ − βΓi
. (3.30c)
Either of the two tax rates may be positive or negative, yet a negative capital tax and
a positive consumption tax are more likely to prevail.
From equation (3.30b) we observe that the equilibrium capital tax rate depends on the
level of the environmental tax rate. If, for example, the environmental tax rate were,
for whatever reason, exogenously fixed to the SMD from emissions, the equilibrium
capital tax rate would be zero. This observation has an important implication.
Proposition 3.3 (Efficiency through global environmental agreement)
A global environmental agreement setting the emission tax ǫi in all countries equal to the
SMD from emissions removes all capital tax competition incentives of the governments
if internal efficiency is granted.
Thus, if all countries were to agree on a binding global environmental agreement that
sets the consumption tax rate to the SMD from emissions, efficiency would prevail.
This is a reassuring result, as most of the literature on international environmental
agreements neglects capital mobility. Proposition 3.3 states that capital mobility can
indeed be neglected if the environmental externality is fully internalized by an emission
tax. However, this result crucially hinges on the assumption that lump-sum taxes are
available to ensure the efficient provision of local public goods. If governments need to
rely on the taxation of mobile tax bases for this purpose, additional distortions arise.
According to Proposition 3.2, equilibrium pollution and capital are determined by
the difference between the environmental and the capital tax ǫi − ti. Assuming that
an interior symmetric Nash equilibrium exists, this difference in the symmetric Nash
equilibrium is given by:
(ǫ̂− t) = −α(Fe + V e)
1 − Φ + Γ − βΓ
1 − Φ + Γ − βΓi
. (3.31)
In the extreme case, this tax difference may be even negative in the symmetric Nash
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equilibrium although it is, according to (3.29), positive in the Pareto optimum.
As in the previous section, we note that Pareto efficiency requires:
∂Wi
∂ti
+ (n− 1)
∂Wj
∂ti
= 0 ⇔ ti
dk
dti
+ (Fe + Ve)
de
dti
= nǫiS
′ dρ
dti
, (3.32a)
∂Wi
∂ǫi
+ (n− 1)
∂Wj
∂ǫi
= 0 ⇔ ti
dk
dǫi
+ (Fe + Ve)
de
dǫi
= ǫiS
′
[
1 + n
dρ
dǫi
]
. (3.32b)
Again, both conditions hold for all tax rates whenever S ′ = 0. The policy externalities
for a unilateral tax increase now read:
∂Wj
∂ti
= tj
dkj
dti
− ǫjS
′ dρ
dti
+ (Fe + Ve)
dej
dti
, (3.33)
∂Wj
∂ǫi
= tj
dkj
dǫi
− ǫjS
′ dρ
dǫi
︸ ︷︷ ︸
IE
+ (Fe + Ve)
dej
dǫi
︸ ︷︷ ︸
EE
. (3.34)
As before, there are private income and environmental externalities where the second
term in both equations is associated with the change in tax revenues from the consump-
tion of good x1j . In contrast to the case of perfect complementarity, all externalities are
ambiguous in sign. Recall that for −Γ = 1 − Φ, ρ, kj and ej are insensitive to marginal
tax changes. In other words, if this condition holds, all externalities equal zero and
decentralized policy-making is also efficient. Otherwise, inserting the equilibrium tax
rates and the comparative statics into (3.33) and (3.34) yields:
∂Wj
∂ǫi
= −
∂Wj
∂ti
= −
αβ(Fe + Ve)S ′
1 − Φ + Γ − βΓi
, (3.35)
implying that a marginal increase in ǫi or a marginal decrease in ti have the same effect
on welfare in country j. Since pollution and capital depend only on the difference ǫi−ti,
the tax difference in the Nash equilibrium is set inefficiently high if equation (3.35) is
negative. This is the case when pollution impacts on production are sufficiently large,
i.e. −Γi > (1 − Φ)/[1 + β(n− 2)]. Otherwise, the tax difference is set inefficiently low.
Therefore, we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 3.4 (Efficiency/Inefficiency under perfect substitutability)
When capital and emissions are perfect substitutes, the symmetric Nash equilibrium is
efficient if the knife-edge condition −Γ = 1 − Φ holds or if S ′ = 0. Otherwise, an
inefficiently high (low) tax difference ǫi − ti prevails in the Nash equilibrium if pollution
impacts on the MPC are sufficiently strong (weak).
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In the Nash equilibrium, governments need to strike a balance between increasing
private income and lowering pollution impacts in the home country. In addition, they
may need to trade off capital outflows and domestic emissions reductions due to perfect
substitutability. This trade-off becomes more complex, the higher are pollution impacts
on the MPC. But for higher pollution impacts, countries are more likely to benefit
from inefficiently high environmental regulation in terms of domestic investment and
pollution.
Proposition 3.4 is consistent with the results obtained by Rauscher (1997b) in a similar
setting but with exogenous capital supply. He also finds the possibility of inefficiently
high or low pollution levels, depending on the size of the production externality and
the elasticity of substitution between capital and emissions when both are inputs to
production and can, therefore, be separately addressed by policy-makers. Inefficiently
high environmental regulation prevails if capital is attracted rather than repelled by
a marginal increase in environmental regulation. This occurs whenever the marginal
benefit from this increase in terms of a higher MPC outweighs the cost associated with
stricter environmental regulation.
3.4 Discussion
Having characterized the symmetric Nash equilibria in the cases where emissions and
capital are perfect complements and substitutes, we discuss the results for two impor-
tant special cases.
3.4.1 No environmental spillovers
If pollution stems purely from local emissions, i.e. β = 0, no environmental externality
is imposed on other countries. In this case the symmetric Nash equilibrium in both
cases (perfect complementarity/substitutability) is efficient. In case of perfect comple-
mentarity the capital tax and, in case of perfect substitutability, the difference between
the consumption and the capital tax equal the SMD from emissions which is equal to
−α(Fe + Ve). For the case of perfect substitutability the two taxes in the symmetric
Nash equilibrium read:
ti = 0 , ǫi = −α(Fe + Ve) . (3.36)
The optimal environmental tax rate in each country thus exactly internalizes the exter-
nality imposed on its own household and its own firm. Together with the zero tax rate
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on capital, this implies efficiency of decentralized policy-making and resembles the re-
sult by Oates and Schwab (1988), amended by production externalities. The intuition
is that a positive or negative capital tax rate would cause an additional distortion of
the capital market by changing the price of capital and, thus, the capital-consumption
decision of all households. This, in turn, would lead to a change in the pollution level
in country i, as well as in all other countries, even though pollution itself does not spill
over to other countries. If the consumption tax rate fully internalizes the externality
from emissions, the use of an additional instrument is not in the best interest of all
countries (at least if internal efficiency is guaranteed, as we assumed throughout the
paper).
3.4.2 No production externalities
If there are no production externalities, i.e. Fe = 0, Fke = 0 and, thus, Γ = Γi = 0, the
case of perfect complementarity is essentially identical to the model discussed in E&R.
In case of perfect substitutability, we obtain:
t̂S = −αVe
βΦ
1 − Φ
< 0 , (3.37a)
ǫ̂S = −αVe
1 − (1 − β)Φ
1 − Φ
> 0 , (3.37b)
(ǫ̂− t)S = −αVe < −αVe[1 + (n− 1)β] = (ǫ− t)
⋆ . (3.37c)
The consumption tax in the symmetric Nash equilibrium is now unambiguously positive
while capital is subsidized. If we interpret the production technology as renewable
energy generation, we may refer to this capital subsidy as a ‘green subsidy’.4 Together,
the two instruments only internalize the externality imposed on own utility, while the
efficient tax-subsidy combination is 1 + (n − 1)β-times higher. As a consequence,
pollution levels are inefficiently high in the Nash equilibrium. This case illustrates
that inefficiently low pollution levels may only prevail in equilibrium if pollution exerts
a negative externality on production, providing governments with the incentive to
attract capital by lowering emissions below their efficient level. Notably, although the
consumption tax rate falls and the capital subsidy rises with a marginal increase in
the degree of environmental spillover (∂ǫ̂S/∂β < 0, ∂t̂S/∂β < 0), the overall degree of
internalization does not change with β (∂(ǫ̂− t)S/∂β = 0). This is in contrast to the
4 Eichner and Runkel (2014) find in a different model set-up that governments have indeed an
incentive to subsidize investment in green energy production under capital mobility.
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case of perfect complementarity, where the tax rate is given by:
t̂C = −αVe
(n− 1)(1 − β) − nΦ
(n− 1) − nΦ
. (3.38)
Furthermore, the tax rate under perfect complementarity internalizes less of the envi-
ronmental externality than the tax-subsidy combination in the case of perfect substi-
tutability:
t̂C < (ǫ̂− t)S . (3.39)
Thus, the model assuming perfect substitutability is more optimistic with respect to ef-
ficiency for the whole range of environmental spillovers β > 0, even without considering
a production externality.
3.5 Conclusion
We analyzed the interaction between mobile capital and non-cooperative environmental
policy in two simple model frameworks, where capital and emissions were either perfect
complements or perfect substitutes. We found that tax rates in the symmetric Nash
equilibrium are always inefficiently low in the case of perfect complementarity but
may be inefficiently high in case of perfect substitutability if pollution externalities on
production are sufficiently high. Accounting for pollution externalities on production
may crucially alter results: inefficiently high tax rates in equilibrium are only possible
if these externalities are sufficiently strong.
Furthermore, we found that governments always tax capital use by firms at a strictly
positive rate in case of perfect complementarity. By contrast, they may have an incen-
tive to subsidize emissions and/or capital use by firms in case of perfect substitutability.
If countries could agree to tax emissions in the latter case at the social marginal damage
from emissions, this would remove all further capital tax competition by governments,
assuming that internal efficiency is guaranteed.
Multiple avenues for further research are conceivable. Our extensions of the model by
E&R with respect to the substitutability between emissions and capital, and pollution
externalities on production are of the simplest perceivable form. We only analyze the
situation of perfect complementarity and perfect substitutability neglecting all degrees
of substitution in between. In addition, we only consider perfectly mobile capital. It
would also be interesting to see how our results change for various degrees of capital
mobility.
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3.6 Appendix
Derivation of comparative statics with production
externalities
Totally differentiating equations (3.1) and (3.3) for all i = 1, . . . , n, and totally differ-
entiating (3.9) in a symmetric equilibrium yields:
dei = α
(
dki + β
∑
j 6=i
dkj
)
, (3.A.1)
dki =
1
Fkk
(
dti + dρ− Fkedei
)
, (3.A.2)
n∑
l=1
dkl = nS
′dρ . (3.A.3)
After inserting (3.A.1) into (3.A.2), using
∑
j 6=i dkj = nS
′dρ − dki from (3.A.3), we
obtain:
dki =
1
Fkk + α(1 − β)Fke
(
dti + [1 − αβFkenS
′] dρ
)
. (3.A.4)
For unilateral increases in ti, plugging (3.A.4) for all l = 1, . . . , n into (3.A.3) and set-
ting dtj = 0 for all j 6= i yields equation (3.10). Inserting the latter equation back into
(3.A.2) implies equations (3.11a)–(3.11c) which can again be used to obtain (3.12a)–
(3.12c). 2
Derivation of comparative statics for perfect substitutability
Totally differentiating equations (3.3) and (3.18) for all i = 1, . . . , n, using dx1i =
−s′i(dρ+ dǫi), and totally differentiating (3.24) in a symmetric equilibrium yields:
dki =
1
Fkk
(
dti + dρ− Fkedei
)
, (3.A.5)
dei = −α


(
s′i + β
∑
j 6=i
s′j
)
dρ+ s′idǫi + β
∑
j 6=i
s′jdǫj

 , (3.A.6)
n∑
l=1
dkl = nS
′dρ+
n∑
l=1
S ′dǫl . (3.A.7)
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After inserting (3.A.6) into (3.A.5), we obtain:
dki =
1
Fkk

dti + {1 + αFke
(
s′i + β
∑
j 6=i
s′j
)
}dρ+ αFke{s
′
idǫi + β
∑
j 6=i
s′jdǫj}

 . (3.A.8)
Plugging this equation into (3.A.7) for all l = 1, . . . , n and setting dtj = 0 for all j 6= i
and dǫl = 0 for all l yields the equation to the left of (3.25). Similarly, setting dtl = 0
for all l and dǫj = 0 for all j 6= i yields the equation to the right of (3.25). Inserting
these equations back into (3.A.6) and (3.A.5) implies equations (3.26a)–(3.26c) and
(3.27a)–(3.27c). 2
Proof of Proposition 3.2
We know that the global capital stock is – for given taxes/subsidies in all other countries
– a function of ǫi and ti. Totally differentiating k = F (ǫi, ti) yields:
dk =
∂F
∂ǫi
dǫi +
∂F
∂ti
dti . (3.A.9)
We also know from equation (3.26c) that
∂k
∂ǫi



dti=0
= −
∂k
∂ti



dǫi=0
. (3.A.10)
From these two equations follows immediately:
∂F
∂ǫi
= −
∂F
∂ti
⇔
∂F
∂ǫi
+
∂F
∂ti
= 0 , (3.A.11)
which is a partial differential equation.
Let F (ǫi, 0) = G(ǫi) for ti = 0. If G(ǫi) exists and is differentiable, then it follows from
the calculus of partial differential equations:
F (ǫi, ti) = G(ǫi − ti). (3.A.12)
That is, capital and emissions only depend on the difference ǫi −ti. The same reasoning
applies to the level of global pollution e. 2
Chapter 4
Non-renewable Resource Extraction
and Interjurisdictional Competition
across Space and Time
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4.1 Introduction
Globalization has brought about considerable increases in international trade flows of
man-made and natural capital. While the overall integration of financial markets and
capital mobility are likely not much higher than one hundred years ago (Sachs and
Warner, 1995), the trade of natural, non-renewable resources has not only increased
significantly in magnitude but also relative to their production in the last few decades.
For instance, the share of oil production traded internationally increased from 58% in
2000 to 65% in 2010 (BP, 2011).
Both capital and non-renewable resources such as fossil fuels are, in general, not con-
sumed directly but serve as inputs to production. As such, they chase the highest
returns internationally, and governments have an incentive to influence the allocation
of capital and resources in their favor. Such strategic considerations between gov-
ernments are reflected in the design of national tax systems. Evidence of this ongoing
competition are declining statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rates in most regions of
the world. For example, the average CIT rate in EU countries fell from 35.5% to 24.2%
between 1997 and 2007 (KPMG, 2007). Similar but less pronounced trends have been
observed in resource-rich countries in Sub-Saharan Africa where average rates dropped
from 40% in 1980 to 35.4% in 2005 (Keen and Mansour, 2008). Competition for fos-
sil resources cannot be measured as directly and is masked by an increasing public
awareness of the adverse environmental effects associated with their use. However,
some indication for such competition is that energy use by energy-intensive industries
is subject to tax exemptions and various kinds of subsidization in many countries (GSI,
2010).
This paper analyzes the interaction between globalized capital and resource markets
and the strategic interaction between jurisdictions in attracting mobile factors of pro-
duction when an environmental externality caused by resource use needs to be internal-
ized. Particular emphasis is devoted to the role that factor mobility and the elasticity
of substitution between capital and resources play with respect to the efficiency of
decentralized policy-making. Specifically, I consider jurisdictions, say countries, which
non-cooperatively maximize their residents’ lifetime utility by choosing from a set of
environmental taxes on resource (energy) use and a source-based tax on capital invest-
ment. Competitive markets allocate capital and resources across countries and across
periods. All taxes are levied on the demand-side, and resources which are assumed to
be in finite supply can be extracted in the first or second period. First-period resource
use causes transboundary pollution.
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To focus on strategic interactions, I stick with the common approach in the tax compe-
tition literature in assuming symmetry between jurisdictions and examining symmetric
equilibria (e.g. Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986). As pointed out by Schwerhoff and
Edenhofer (2013), symmetry eliminates some potentially beneficial effects of capital
mobility, in particular any gains from capital trade (and resource trade as in this pa-
per). Furthermore, there exist huge differences in the endowment with fossil oil and
gas across countries. These differences, however, are less pronounced when it comes
to coal. Therefore, symmetry may be a good starting point for analyzing strategic
behaviour by welfare-maximizing governments.
I find that unilateral increases in resource or capital taxes cause intratemporal leakage
of resource use and thus pollution but also intertemporal leakage. For a positive capital
supply elasticity, rising future resource taxes induce higher resource extraction in the
present whereas rising future capital taxes may either speed up or slow down extraction,
depending on the degree of complementarity between capital and resources. If capital
and resources can be easily substituted, a marginal increase in the future capital tax
leads to a reallocation of production inputs towards the resource in the future and thus
decreases resource use in the present. A negative capital supply elasticity may reverse
these market reactions.
The open-loop Nash equilibrium is found to entail inefficiently high resource use in
the present. In addition to the usual free-riding incentives by governments due to the
environmental externality, private income externalities arise because capital tax and re-
source tax bases abroad are affected. These externalities unambiguously aggravate the
transfrontier pollution problem. If resource taxes are unavailable, future capital taxes
tend to be more positive (negative) the lower (higher) is the degree of complementarity
between the two production factors. If only resource taxes are at the governments’
disposal, decentralized policy-making leads to falling resource taxes over time. with a
strictly positive tax in the present and a strictly negative tax in the future.
Whenever capital and resource taxes are available, it is beneficial for governments to
use a strictly positive capital tax rate in the future even though no revenue requirements
are assumed in the model. The reason is that in general equilibrium an increase of the
capital tax from zero to a strictly positive value unambiguously lowers the world market
interest rate. This fall in the interest rate stimulates second-period resource demand
in all other countries by inducing a fall in the second-period resource price through the
Hotelling rule and by making capital use by firms more attractive. Higher investment
also increases resource demand due to the assumed complementarity between capital
and resources. As a consequence, first-period resource use and thus pollution go down.
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I will refer to this channel as the capital-tax-interest-rate channel.
In a numerical example, it is shown that this general equilibrium channel is the stronger,
the easier it is to substitute capital for resources. The intuition is that a capital tax
then leads to a sharper decrease in the interest rate because of the induced substitution
and thus causes a stronger increase in second-period resource use. If, by contrast,
resources and capital are strong complements, an additional capital tax is not able to
significantly lower aggregate first-period resource use. In this case, however, the private
income externalities are small compared to the environmental externality.
4.2 Related literature
This paper bridges the gap between two strands of the literature: the resource eco-
nomics literature which analyzes the intertemporal allocation of non-renewable re-
sources, and the literature on tax competition which is concerned with the static al-
location of production factors and the efficiency of decentralized policy-making in the
presence of interjurisdictional spillovers.
It adds to the literature on environmental policy and interjurisdictional competition
by introducing a finite stock of resources and allowing for different degrees of comple-
mentarity between capital and resources in a general equilibrium framework. One of
the first contributions to this strand of literature is Oates and Schwab (1988) who find
efficiency of decentralized policy-making when there are no environmental spillovers
across jurisdictions and first-best tax instruments are available. Ogawa and Wildasin
(2009) confirm this result for the case when capital (which is assumed in fixed supply)
and emissions are perfect complements and pollution is transboundary. Eichner and
Runkel (2012) endogenize capital supply and thus emissions in the same framework
and conclude that the Nash equilibrium brings about inefficiently low capital taxes.
While the focus of the latter paper is on the role of the capital supply elasticity, the
present paper is concerned with the role of the elasticity of substitution between capital
and resources in production. Withagen and Halsema (2013) also set up a tax compe-
tition framework but reverse the timing of decisions such that households decide upon
savings, anticipating government policies. They find a potential race to the top in
environmental regulation. Rauscher employs similar but static models of interjurisdic-
tional factor mobility. In the case of symmetric countries and externalities on utility
only, capital mobility is found to aggravate transfrontier pollution problems (Rauscher,
2000, 2005) which may also be true in a setting with asymmetric countries (Rauscher,
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1991). By contrast, environmental regulation may be inefficiently strict if emission
externalities affect capital productivity (Rauscher, 1997a, 1997b).
The present paper also contributes to the resource economics literature which has
mostly focused on single-country models or comparative static exercises in multi-
country models, largely neglecting strategic interaction. Svensson (1984), Marion and
Svensson (1984), Elbers and Withagen (1984) and van Wijnbergen (1985) study the
welfare effects of oil price increases, of tariffs and subsidies on oil imports and of capital
income taxes in models of international trade in the absence of any pollution external-
ities. Aarrestad (1978) and Farzin (1999) examine the joint determination of optimal
savings and resource extraction in a model with an exogenous interest rate and no factor
mobility. The rare general equilibrium treatments in this literature include Chiarella
(1980), Elbers and Withagen (1984), Hillman and Long (1985), Golosov et al. (2014)
and van der Meijden et al. (2014). Recently, a new strand has emerged – the litera-
ture on the so-called “Green Paradox”, a term coined by Sinn (2008), with the idea
originating in Sinclair (1992, 1994). It studies the effects of taxes on the equilibrium
extraction path of a non-renewable resource. Particularly, it states that a greening of
future tax policies will induce resource owners to speed up extraction in the present.
Further related papers are Eichner and Pethig (2011, 2013) who analyze unilaterally
imposed emissions caps in models with two periods and two or three countries but
neither include capital as a production input nor an endogenous extraction decision by
resource firms. Burniaux and Oliveira Martins (2012) develop a two-region, two-goods
general equilibrium framework with international trade and capital mobility to explore
carbon leakage from unilaterally imposed policies.
The papers mentioned above miss out at least one of the following features which are all
included in my model: (1) Non-renewable resources are in finite supply. (2) Their use
causes environmental externalities. (3) The economy is not a single unit. Decentralized
policy-making involves strategic interactions. (4) Capital and resources are mobile. (5)
The interaction of different factor markets requires treatment in a general equilibrium
framework.
4.3 The model
I consider an economy consisting of n ≥ 2 symmetric jurisdictions which can be thought
of as sovereign countries. The time horizon of the model comprises two periods. For
simplicity, I shall sometimes refer to period 1 as ‘the present’ or ‘today’ and period 2
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as ’the future‘ or ’tomorrow‘.
Governments are the strategic agents in this model and play a Nash game, taking the
actions of all non-strategic followers, i.e. households and firms, into account. House-
holds and resource extraction firms maximize intertemporally whereas production firms
face a static profit maximization problem.
4.3.1 Production firms
In each country i, a representative firm produces an output good in each period t =
1, 2 which is taken as the numéraire. Firms in all countries have access to the same
production technology F (kit, r
i
t) where k
i
t denotes capital input and r
i
t the non-renewable
resource input in period t. Production is increasing in both inputs with decreasing
marginal returns (Fkk < 0 < Fk, Frr < 0 < Fr). The cross-partial derivative is assumed
to be positive, Fkr > 0. The higher Fkr, the more complementary (or ‘cooperative’ in
the terminology of Svensson, 1984) are capital and resources in production. I further
assume that production exhibits decreasing returns to scale in capital and resources,
implying strictly positive profits.1
Installed production capacity results from previous capital investment and is thus fixed
in the short run. In other words, the first-period stock of capital k̄ employed in each
country is immobile. The production function in this period can then simply be written
as F (k̄, ri1) ≡ f(r
i
1). Second-period capital is rented on a global capital market at the
uniform rate ρ while resources are purchased on a global resource market at price pt in
period t.2
Given that country i levies a unit source-based tax κi on capital3 and a period-specific
(environmental) tax tit on resource use, after-tax profits of the representative firm in
country i are:
πi1 = f(r
i
1) − (p1 + t
i
1)r
i
1 , (4.1)
πi2 = F (k
i, ri2) − (ρ+ κ
i)ki − (p2 + t
i
2)r
i
2 . (4.2)
1 An alternative interpretation is that the production function is linearly homogenous in capital,
resources and labor as, for example, in Hassler and Krusell (2012). If labor is fixed because of
constant population size, deducting capital and resource costs from profits yields labor income.
2 Transport costs of resource trade are assumed to be zero.
3 The capital tax in this model is equivalent to a tax on investment, irrespective of whether invest-
ment stems from domestic or foreign sources. In the symmetric equilibrium that I focus on, the
capital tax is also equivalent to a tax on savings.
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Profit maximization implies that after-tax returns to both factors are equalized across
countries in all periods:
fr(r
i
1) − t
i
1 = p1 , (4.3)
Fr(k
i, ri2) − t
i
2 = p2 , (4.4)
Fk(k
i, ri2) − κi = ρ . (4.5)
4.3.2 Resource extraction firms
In each country, there exists a limited, identical and homogenous stock of non-renewable
resources, say coal, oil and gas, which can be extracted at zero cost. The resource stock
located in country i, Qi, is managed and fully exploited by a representative resource
extraction firm which supplies to a competitive world market qi1 units of the resource
in the present and the remainder, qi2 = Q
i − qi1, in the future. Profits in period t are
given by:
Πit = ptq
i
t . (4.6)
Maximizing the present value of profits subject to the resource constraint and taking
world market prices as given, implies that the price of the resource rises with the
interest rate:
p2 = p1(1 + ρ) . (4.7)
This equation is the well-known Hotelling’s rule which keeps resource extraction firms
in all countries indifferent between extracting today and tomorrow (Hotelling, 1931).
Thus, on a competitive resource market, resource demand alone determines the equilib-
rium quantities supplied as long as equation (4.7) holds.4 How much of the aggregate
resource stock Q =
∑n
l=1 Q
l is extracted in the first period depends on the point of
intersection of the aggregate first-period inverse (resource) demand schedule and the
aggregate second-period inverse demand schedule, the latter discounted by 1 + ρ. Im-
portantly, this implies that the equilibrium quantity supplied by each of the n resource
firms in period one is, in principle, undetermined. Only in aggregate supply must meet
demand,
∑n
l=1 q
l
1 =
∑n
l=1 r
l
1 but there is a continuum of supplied quantities that satisfy
this equality. Such asymmetric extraction across countries implies differing resource
incomes and thus savings si from first-period income. In a symmetric equilibrium, as
analyzed later on, players use the same strategy, i.e., the same tax rates. Identical tax
4 As shown by Stiglitz (1976), monopoly pricing yields the same result as competitive markets if
resource demand elasticities are the same across periods.
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rates, however, can only be a best response if extraction occurs symmetrically such
that qit = r
i
t and s
i = ki.5
4.3.3 Households
Each country is populated by a representative household who owns both the produc-
tion and the resource extraction firm in her country of origin and thus receives the
corresponding profits πit and Π
i
t. Any positive revenues from taxing production inputs
are returned lump-sum to consumers in each period:
τ i1 = t
i
1r
i
1 , (4.8)
τ i2 = t
i
2r
i
2 + κ
iki , (4.9)
where τ it is the sign-unconstrained lump-sum transfer in period t. The assumption on
lump-sum transfers implies that no further distortions such as from the provision of
physical public goods arise in the model.
First- and second-period consumption, ci1 and c
i
2, then read:
ci1 = π
i
1 + Π
i
1 + τ
i
1 − s
i , (4.10)
ci2 = π
i
2 + Π
i
2 + τ
i
2 + (1 + ρ)s
i . (4.11)
The household receives utility from first- and second-period consumption, but is harmed
by pollution from global resource use r1 =
∑n
l=1 r
l
1 in the first period, D(r1). One can
think of greenhouse gas emissions from burning fossil fuels in production.6 Welfare of
the representative household in country i reads:
W i = U(ci1) −D(r1) + ǫc
i
2 , (4.12)
where ǫ ≤ 1 is the discount factor. U is assumed to be concave and twice differentiable
5 Extraction paths that are symmetric across countries even in asymmetric equilibria could be ob-
tained by introducing convex (flow- or stock-dependent) extraction costs. Then, the wells with
the least cost would be exploited first. If extraction costs are identical for all countries, all wells
would be depleted equally fast.
6 I neglect damages in the second period for two reasons. First, the focus of this paper is on how
the equilibrium extraction path is influenced by environmental and fiscal policy. Therefore, I am
interested in the speed of extraction which is equivalent to first-period extraction. Second, the
natural decay and removal rate of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere is relatively small. If
resources are fully extracted like in this model, the damage in the second period is a function of
Q and thus a constant.
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while pollution damages are assumed to be weakly convex (U ′′ < 0 < U ′, D′ > 0,
D′′ ≥ 0). The quasi-linear specification of the utility function rules out income effects
on first-period consumption. This can be justified by empirical evidence that the
substitution effect of a marginal change in the interest rate outweighs the income effect
(see, for example, Boskin, 1978, or Gylfason, 1993).
Households choose savings si to maximize utility (4.12) subject to budget constraints
(4.10) and (4.11), taking firm profits, lump-sum transfers and damages as given. From
the necessary and sufficient condition for a household maximum (Euler equation),
U ′(ci1) − ǫ(1 + ρ) = 0 , (4.13)
we obtain for marginal increases in the interest rate ρ and in first-period income πi1,
Πi1 or τ
i
1:
∂si
∂ρ
= −
ǫ
U ′′(ci1)
> 0 , (4.14)
∂si
∂πi1
=
∂si
∂Πi1
=
∂si
∂τ i1
= 1 . (4.15)
Equation (4.14) implies a positive capital supply elasticity (∂si/∂ρ)ρ/si > 0, and (4.15)
states that any increase in profits or the lump-sum transfer in the first period, start-
ing from an equilibrium, increases only second-period consumption via the associated
increase in savings and leaves first-period consumption unaffected.
4.4 Global capital and resource market equilibria
4.4.1 Capital market
Capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile between countries and traded on a global
capital market. As first-period capital is assumed to be immobile, a capital market
comes into existence in the second period. The equilibrium interest rate ρ is found
by equating capital demand by production firms as described by equation (4.5) and
capital supply by households:
n∑
l=1
kl =
n∑
l=1
sl . (4.16)
This equation determines ρ as a function of the resource prices p1 and p2 and all tax
rates in all countries.
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4.4.2 Resource market
In contrast to the capital market, the resource market needs not only to equate de-
mand and supply across countries but also across periods. One necessary condition
for resource markets to clear is Hotelling’s rule, equation (4.7). The second necessary
condition is:
n∑
l=1
rl1 +
n∑
l=1
rl2 = Q . (4.17)
The resource endowment in each country is fixed such that the right-hand side of
equation (4.17) is a constant. The resource demand functions on the left-hand side
are implicitly given by equations (4.3) and (4.4). Hotelling’s rule and equation (4.17)
jointly determine the equilibrium world market prices p1 and p2 as functions of the
interest rate ρ and the tax rates in all countries.
The equilibrium levels of capital and resources used in production are determined by the
first-order conditions of profit maximization, (4.3)–(4.5), Hotelling’s rule (4.7), equation
(4.13) and the market-clearing conditions (4.16) and (4.17), and can be expressed as
functions of the tax rates in all countries.
4.4.3 Comparative statics
To obtain the comparative statics of unilateral marginal tax increases, we totally dif-
ferentiate equations (4.3)–(4.5) for all i = 1, . . . , n and (4.7) and insert them into the
differentiated conditions (4.16) and (4.17), using (4.14) and (4.15). The comparative
statics with respect to second-period tax rates can be regarded as announcement ef-
fects. Starting from a symmetric equilibrium where ki = si = s holds, we arrive at the
following results (derived in the Appendix).
4.4.3.1 Resource taxes
For unilateral marginal increases in the resource taxes ti1 (left-hand side) and t
i
2 (right-
hand side of the following equations), it holds:
∂ρ
∂ti1
= −
(1 + ρ)(Fkr − frFkk)
n∆
> 0 ,
∂ρ
∂ti2
=
Fkr − frFkk
n∆
< 0 , (4.18a)
∂p1
∂ti1
=
p1Fkr − Φ − Θ
n∆
< 0 ,
∂p1
∂ti2
=
frrΩ
n∆
< 0 , (4.18b)
∂p2
∂ti1
= −
(1 + ρ)(Φ − frFkr)
n∆
< 0 ,
∂p2
∂ti2
=
Φ − frFkr − ∆
n∆
< 0 , (4.18c)
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where Γ = FkkFrr − (Fkr)2 > 0, Φ = Frr − ∂s/∂ρΓ < 0, Ω = ∂s/∂ρFkk − 1 < 0,
Θ = fr(p1Fkk − Fkr) < 0 and ∆ = Φ − p1Fkr − (1 + ρ)frrΩ + Θ < 0.7
Marginal increases in any of the two tax rates lower the world market prices for re-
sources in both periods and also impact on the interest rate. Even with a purely
substitutive production technology, Fkr = 0, the interest rate is affected since a change
in resource use in the first period and the associated change in production goes along
with a change in savings and thus alters the capital stock in the second period. A
second effect on ρ via the capital demand-side arises from the assumed complementar-
ity and goes in the same direction as the capital supply effect: the change in resource
use induced by the tax increase changes capital demand through its impact on the
marginal product of capital.
For resource use and pollution, we obtain:
∂ri1
∂ti1
=
(n− 1)∆ − (1 + ρ)frrΩ
nfrr∆
< 0 ,
∂ri1
∂ti2
=
Ω
n∆
> 0 , (4.19a)
∂rj1
∂ti1
=
p1Fkr − Φ − Θ
nfrr∆
> 0 ,
∂rj1
∂ti2
=
Ω
n∆
> 0 , (4.19b)
∂r1
∂ti1
= −
(1 + ρ)Ω
∆
< 0 ,
∂r1
∂ti2
=
Ω
∆
> 0 , (4.19c)
∂ri2
∂ti1
=
(1 + ρ)Ω
n∆
> 0 ,
∂ri2
∂ti2
=
(n− 1)Fkk∆ − ΓΩ
nΓ∆
< 0 , (4.19d)
∂rj2
∂ti1
=
(1 + ρ)Ω
n∆
> 0 ,
∂rj2
∂ti2
= −
Fkk∆ + ΓΩ
nΓ∆
> 0 , (4.19e)
∂r2
∂ti1
=
(1 + ρ)Ω
∆
> 0 ,
∂r2
∂ti2
= −
Ω
∆
< 0 , (4.19f)
where rt =
∑n
l=1 r
l
t = r
i
t + (n − 1)r
j
t denotes the total amount of resources used in
production in period t.
Unilateral increases in period-t resource taxes have unambiguous and intuitive effects
on resource use, as also predicted by partial equilibrium models. A marginal increase in
the period-t tax in country i lowers resource use in this country and increases resource
use in all other countries in period t via a decline in pt. We thus have intratemporal
leakage between countries which is imperfect in the sense that unilateral efforts to
reduce resource use are not completely offset by reactions of market participants in
7 For production functions with constant returns to scale, Γ equals zero; with decreasing returns
to scale, Γ > 0. Note that later on pure profits, i.e., decreasing returns to scale in capital and
resources are needed. Otherwise, zero second-period tax rates may result, see equations (4.33) and
(4.37).
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other countries. As in partial equilibrium (where ρ is fixed), a fall in pt goes along
with a fall in the resource price in the other period to facilitate higher resource use in
that period and achieve an equilibrium on the resource market. This intertemporal
leakage effect hits all countries alike. Changes in pollution from aggregate resource use
r1 exhibit the same sign as the effects on first-period resource use in the tax-increasing
country. Furthermore, a marginal increase in the second-period tax leads to the effect
generally known as the Green Paradox (Sinclair, 1992; Sinn, 2008).
Denoting the total stock of capital in the second period by k =
∑n
l=1 k
l = ki +(n−1)kj,
we further derive:
∂ki
∂ti1
=
(1 + ρ)
[
fr −
∂s
∂ρ
Fkr
]
n∆
R 0 ,
∂ki
∂ti2
=
Fkr[
∂s
∂ρ
Γ − (n− 1)∆] − frΓ
nΓ∆
R 0 , (4.20a)
∂kj
∂ti1
=
(1 + ρ)
[
fr −
∂s
∂ρ
Fkr
]
n∆
R 0 ,
∂kj
∂ti2
=
Fkr[
∂s
∂ρ
Γ + ∆] − frΓ
nΓ∆
> 0 , (4.20b)
∂k
∂ti1
=
(1 + ρ)
[
fr −
∂s
∂ρ
Fkr
]
∆
R 0 ,
∂k
∂ti2
=
∂s
∂ρ
Fkr − fr
∆
R 0 . (4.20c)
For a purely substitutive relationship, Fkr = 0, the change in capital use is driven by
the change in savings due to the intertemporal reallocation of resource use. A marginal
change in tit lowers domestic and aggregate resource use in period t but increases
resource use in the other period. If it increases, e.g., first-period resource use, more
output is produced and the associated increase in profits translates one-to-one into
higher savings and thus higher capital use in the second period. With complementarity,
capital use is also affected by the change in resource use following marginal tax changes.
For our example from above, declining second-period resource use goes along with
decreasing capital demand and (as we will also see in Section 4.5.3) an interest rate
that is decreasing by more than under perfect substitutability. This effect counteracts
the first effect of increased savings, and it is unclear which effect prevails in equilibrium.
Only for an increase in ti2 does investment in all countries j 6= i unambiguously rise.
4.4.3.2 Capital tax
A marginal increase in the capital tax κi yields the following effects on world market
prices:
∂ρ
∂κi
= −
(1 + ρ)frr + Frr − frFkr
n∆
< 0 , (4.21a)
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∂p1
∂κi
=
frr[p1 −
∂s
∂ρ
Fkr]
n∆
R 0 , (4.21b)
∂p2
∂κi
= −
p1(Frr − frFkr) + (1 + ρ)frr
∂s
∂ρ
Fkr
n∆
< 0 . (4.21c)
As expected, a marginal increase in κi depresses the interest rate. The second-period
price for the resource falls while the effect on the first-period resource price is ambiguous
in sign, depending on the term p1 − ∂s/∂ρFkr.
Concerning changes in investment, we find:
∂ki
∂κi
=
(n− 1)Frr∆ −
∂s
∂ρ
Γ[(1 + ρ)frr + Frr] + p1frΓ
nΓ∆
< 0 , (4.22a)
∂kj
∂κi
=
Fkr[p1Frr + (1 + ρ)frr
∂s
∂ρ
Fkr] − Frr[(1 + ρ)frr + Frr] + p1frΓ
nΓ∆
> 0 , (4.22b)
∂k
∂κi
=
p1fr −
∂s
∂ρ
[(1 + ρ)frr + Frr]
∆
< 0 . (4.22c)
A marginal increase in κi lowers investment in the tax-increasing country but increases
investment in all other countries due to the declining interest rate and the declining
resource price p2. Aggregate investment falls.
Furthermore, we have:
∂ri1
∂κi
=
p1 −
∂s
∂ρ
Fkr
n∆
R 0 , (4.23a)
∂rj1
∂κi
=
p1 −
∂s
∂ρ
Fkr
n∆
R 0 , (4.23b)
∂r1
∂κi
=
p1 −
∂s
∂ρ
Fkr
∆
R 0 , (4.23c)
∂ri2
∂κi
= −
(n− 1)Fkr∆ + Γ[p1 −
∂s
∂ρ
Fkr]
nΓ∆
R 0 , (4.23d)
∂rj2
∂κi
=
Fkr∆ − Γ[p1 −
∂s
∂ρ
Fkr]
nΓ∆
> 0 , (4.23e)
∂r2
∂κi
= −
p1 −
∂s
∂ρ
Fkr
∆
R 0 . (4.23f)
The signs of most of the equations above depend on the sign of the term p1 −∂s/∂ρFkr.
Assume for the moment a purely substitutive technology, i.e., Fkr = 0. Then, all effects
have a unique sign: as capital becomes more expensive for firms in country i due to
the marginal tax increase, they will substitute away from capital into more resource
use. The accompanying fall in the second-period resource price and the decrease in the
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interest rate stimulate resource use in all other countries in that period. A symmetric
decline in resource use and pollution in the first period results, going along with an
increase in p1. A unilaterally imposed increase in future capital taxes thus slows down
resource extraction whenever capital and resources are perfect substitutes.
For Fkr > 0, the sign of p1 − ∂s/∂ρFkr is determined by the complex interplay in
general equilibrium and difficult to qualify analytically since the degree of complemen-
tarity between capital and resources as measured by Fkr also plays a role in pinning
down p1. As will be shown in the simulations in Section 4.5.3, a sufficiently high degree
of complementarity, i.e., a sufficiently high value of Fkr, causes this term to be negative
and leads to lower second-period resource use in the tax-increasing country. The intu-
ition is that a unilateral increase in the capital tax also puts a burden on the resource
input whenever complementarity is sufficiently high. Although resource demand in
all other countries is spurred by a decline in p2 and ρ, the direct effect outweighs the
indirect effects in all other countries such that global resource use in the future falls.
A marginal increase in one country’s future capital tax then speeds up global resource
extraction and increases pollution, accompanied by a decrease in p1.
Similar effects can be observed for a sufficiently high capital supply elasticity as mea-
sured by ∂s/∂ρ (and for Fkr strictly positive). A higher ∂s/∂ρ implies that savings
respond more sharply as a consequence of the decrease in ρ associated with the increase
in κi. With less capital supply and investment in the second period, also resource use
in the second period decreases and first-period resource use and pollution go up.
Summing up the comparative statics results, we can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1 (Unilateral tax policies)
Unilateral marginal increases in
• future capital taxes may speed up or slow down first-period extraction, depending
on the degree of complementarity between capital and resources in production and
the size of the capital supply elasticity;
• period-t resource taxes shift resource use towards other countries but depress ag-
gregate resource use in period t (less than 100% intratemporal leakage) and thus
increase global resource use in the other period.
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4.5 Pareto-optimal policies and strategic
interactions
In this section, I first derive the benchmark case of Pareto-optimal policies and then
assess the efficiency properties of the Nash equilibrium under different scenarios.
4.5.1 Pareto-optimal policies
Pareto-optimal policies are found by maximizing lifetime utility W i, equation (4.12),
s.t. W j = W̄ j, ∀j 6= i, by choosing κi, ti1 and t
i
2. Further constraints are the budget
constraints of each household, (4.10) and (4.11), where firm profits and lump-sum
transfers (both of which are exogenous from the perspective of households) are replaced
by (4.1) and (4.2) respectively (4.8) and (4.9). Furthermore, the conditions of utility
maximization, (4.13)–(4.15), profit maximization, (4.3)–(4.7), and the market reactions
as described by (4.18a)–(4.23f) are considered. Focusing on the symmetric solution with
si = ki = s and qit = r
i
t, the first-order conditions for country i read:
8
(1 + ρ)ti1
∂r1
∂ti1
+ ti2
∂r2
∂ti1
+ κi
∂k
∂ti1
−
nD′(r1)
ǫ
∂r1
∂ti1
= 0 , (4.24)
(1 + ρ)ti1
∂r1
∂ti2
+ ti2
∂r2
∂ti2
+ κi
∂k
∂ti2
−
nD′(r1)
ǫ
∂r1
∂ti2
= 0 , (4.25)
(1 + ρ)ti1
∂r1
∂κi
+ ti2
∂r2
∂κi
+ κi
∂k
∂κi
−
nD′(r1)
ǫ
∂r1
∂κi
= 0 . (4.26)
Rearranging these conditions and denoting κi = κ∗, ti1 = t
∗
1 and t
i
2 = t
∗
2 yields the
following Pareto-optimal tax rates:
κ∗ = 0 , (4.27)
t∗1 −
t∗2
1 + ρ
=
nD′(r1)
U ′(ci1)
=
nD′(r1)
ǫ(1 + ρ)
. (4.28)
The Pareto-optimal capital tax rate κ∗ equals zero. The social marginal environmental
8 Note again that the resource quantities supplied by each country are, in principle, undetermined
as argued in Section 4.3.2 (only in symmetric equilibrium, we have qit = r
i
t). This also implies
that the derivatives of the supplied quantities with respect to the tax rates  = κi, ti1, ti2 are
zero for any time period t: ∂qit/∂ = 0. With symmetric extraction costs, we would have:
∂qit/∂ = (1/n)∂rt/∂, implying that any tax-induced change in aggregate resource demand is
met by equal changes in supply by all resource firms. Both approaches lead to the same first-order
conditions in the Pareto-optimum as well as in the decentralized equilibria.
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damage (SMD) nD′(r1) from aggregate resource use in the first period, expressed in
units of the first-period consumption good, is fully internalized through the use of
resource taxes. There is one degree of freedom in setting Pareto-optimal resource
taxes t∗1 and t
∗
2. Either one of the two tax rates is set to zero and a positive first-
period/negative second-period resource tax is implemented, or a convex combination
of both instruments that satisfies equation (4.28) is used. In any case, the tax profile
is falling over time, with a weakly positive tax in the first and a weakly negative tax
in the second period.9 The intuition is that it is not the static value of the tax rate
in one period that matters for the internalization of the external effect but rather
its development over time. Only a falling tax schedule is able to incentivize firms to
postpone extraction relative to a laissez-faire scenario without taxes.
4.5.2 Dezentralized equilibrium
We can now proceed to characterize the equilibrium of the Nash game. I assume that
governments can fully commit to the vector of tax rates which implies that they do
not deviate from their announced policies in the second period.
The benevolent government in each country non-cooperatively maximizes its resident’s
lifetime utility by choosing κi, ti1 and t
i
2, taking the policies of all other countries as
given. To this end, it takes the household’s budget constraint into account, equations
(4.10) and (4.11), replacing firm profits by (4.1) and (4.2) and lump-sum transfers by
(4.8) and (4.9). It also considers the conditions of utility maximization, (4.13)–(4.15),
profit maximization, (4.3)–(4.7), and the market reactions (4.18a)–(4.18c), (4.19a),
(4.19d), (4.20a), (4.21a)–(4.21c), (4.22a), (4.23a) and (4.23d). Assuming that a sym-
metric equilibrium with an interior solution exists, it is described by the following
first-order conditions:
(1 + ρ)ti1
∂ri1
∂ti1
+ ti2
∂ri2
∂ti1
+ κi
∂ki
∂ti1
−
D′(r1)
ǫ
∂r1
∂ti1
= 0 , (4.29)
(1 + ρ)ti1
∂ri1
∂ti2
+ ti2
∂ri2
∂ti2
+ κi
∂ki
∂ti2
−
D′(r1)
ǫ
∂r1
∂ti2
= 0 , (4.30)
(1 + ρ)ti1
∂ri1
∂κi
+ ti2
∂ri2
∂κi
+ κi
∂ki
∂κi
−
D′(r1)
ǫ
∂r1
∂κi
= 0 . (4.31)
Each government trades off the marginal benefits with the marginal costs of tax
changes. These changes affect environmental damage by altering aggregate resource
9 Pareto-optimal resource tax rates that decline over time have also been found in one-country
models, see, e.g., Golosov et al. (2014) and Sinclair (1992, 1994).
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use in the first period, and tax revenues by altering the tax bases. Compared to equa-
tions (4.24)–(4.26), we observe that governments do not take into account the effects
of their policies on aggregate variables and aggregate pollution damages. To gain some
understanding of the governments’ strategic behaviour, I will first discuss the Nash
equilibrium with resource taxes only, then the equilibrium with a capital tax only, and
finally describe the equilibrium with all instruments available.
4.5.2.1 Nash equilibrium with resource taxes only
If the government has only resource taxes at its disposal, equation (4.31) drops out, and
the optimal tax rates in the symmetric Nash equilibrium in country i can be obtained
by rearranging conditions (4.29) and (4.30) for κi = 0:
ti1 = −
nD′(r1)
ǫ
frrFkkΩ
(n− 1)Fkk∆ − Ω [Γ + (1 + ρ)frrFkk]
> 0 , (4.32)
ti2 =
nD′(r1)
ǫ
ΓΩ
(n− 1)Fkk∆ − Ω [Γ + (1 + ρ)frrFkk]
< 0 . (4.33)
A marginal increase in ti1 and a decrease in t
i
2 have the same qualitative effects on
domestic welfare, see equations (4.29)–(4.30). They lower domestic and aggregate
resource use in the first period, thereby reducing environmental damage and increasing
resource tax revenue in the second period. The associated marginal cost is the loss
of resource tax revenue in the first period. Although the resource tax profile in the
Nash equilibrium is falling like in the efficient solution, the degree of freedom in setting
this tax-subsidy combination vanishes. Now a strictly positive tax in the first and a
strictly negative tax rate in the second period prevail. Furthermore, for given taxes
in all other countries, aggregate resource use in the first period depends only on the
difference ti1 − t
i
2/(1 +ρ). This is established in the following lemma the proof of which
can be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 4.1 (Aggregate resource use and pollution)
For given tax policies in all other countries, aggregate resource use and pollution are
determined by the difference ti1 − t
i
2/(1 + ρ).
Using Lemma 4.1 and equations (4.32) and (4.33), it is straightforward to prove the
following proposition.
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Proposition 4.2 (Inefficiency of (ti
1
, ti
2
)-Nash equilibrium)
The Nash equilibrium with resource taxes only is inefficient as
ti1 −
ti2
1 + ρ
= −
nD′(r1)
ǫ(1 + ρ)
Ω [Γ + (1 + ρ)frrFkk]
(n− 1)Fkk∆ − Ω [Γ + (1 + ρ)frrFkk]
6= SMD . (4.34)
It can easily be shown that the second fraction in this equation is smaller than one
in absolute value. Therefore, we may suspect that the Nash equilibrium entails ineffi-
ciently high first-period resource use. However, the interest rate and marginal damages
depend on the equilibrium levels of capital and resources used in production. As these
differ for Pareto-optimal and Nash equilibrium policies, we cannot simply compare the
Pareto-optimal tax-subsidy combination with the tax-subsidy combination in the Nash
equilibrium. Instead, we examine the policy externalities, i.e., the effects of marginal
tax increases in country i on welfare in country j 6= i, starting from the symmetric
Nash equilibrium. A positive (negative) externality implies that the tax rate in the
Nash equilibrium is set inefficiently low. For  = t1, t2, we obtain:
∂W j
∂i
= −D′(r1)
∂r1
∂i
+ ǫ(1 + ρ)tj1
∂rj1
∂i
+ ǫtj2
∂rj2
∂i
. (4.35)
Inserting the Nash equilibrium tax rates and the comparative statics results into (4.35),
it can be shown that a marginal increase in ti1 exerts a positive environmental external-
ity on country j which points to an inefficiently low equilibrium tax rate. Additionally,
two private income externalities arise that change the tax bases in country j due to
resource mobility.10 They have different signs but are strictly positive in aggregate,
indicating again inefficiently low first-period tax rates in the Nash equilibrium. A
marginal increase in ti2 (the subsidy becomes smaller), by contrast, induces a negative
environmental externality and private income externalities that are in aggregate also
negative. This implies that the tax rate has been set inefficiently high, i.e., the subsidy
is inefficiently low. Furthermore, we can establish the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2 (Policy externalities of ti
1
and ti
2
)
A marginal increase in ti1 has the opposite effect in present value terms of a marginal
10 As tax revenues are recycled lump-sum to consumers, I refer to these externalities as ‘private
income’ externalities as in Eichner and Runkel (2012). Introducing a physical public good into
this model would not change any of the results derived here but the ‘private income‘ externalities
could then be called ‘fiscal’.
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increase in ti2:
∂W j
∂ti2
= −
1
1 + ρ
∂W j
∂ti1
= −
nD′(r1)FkkΩ
(n− 1)Fkk∆ − Ω[Γ + (1 + ρ)frrFkk]
< 0 . (4.36)
All externalities are related to the environmental damage in country j. A marginal
increase in the tax-subsidy combination ti1 − t
i
2/(1 + ρ) which can be achieved by
increasing ti1 or decreasing t
i
2 thus exerts a positive externality on the welfare in all
other countries such that we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3 (Inefficiently high pollution in (ti
1
, ti
2
)-Nash equilibrium)
The tax-subsidy combination in the Nash equilibrium with environmental taxes only is
set inefficiently low and thus aggregate first-period resource use in the first period and
pollution are inefficiently high.
Like in Eichner and Runkel (2012) for perfect spillovers, environmental and private
income externalities go in the same direction (for perfect spillovers as in this model) and
imply inefficiently low equilibrium tax rates and thus inefficiently high resource use in
the first period. By contrast, factor mobility has been shown to increase environmental
quality when pollution affects the marginal productivity of capital (Rauscher, 1997) or
when households anticipate government policies (Withagen and Halsema, 2013).
4.5.2.2 Nash equilibrium with capital tax only
If the government is restricted to use a capital tax, conditions (4.29) and (4.30) drop
out. A marginal capital tax increase reduces tax revenue due to the associated capital
outflow but may increase or decrease aggregate resource use and thus pollution. For
ti1 = t
i
2 = 0, the first-order condition (4.31) in the symmetric Nash equilibrium in
country i can be written as:
κi =
nD′(r1)
ǫ
[
p1 −
∂s
∂ρ
Fkr
]
Γ
(n− 1)Frr∆ −
∂s
∂ρ
Γ [(1 + ρ)frr + Frr] + p1frΓ
. (4.37)
The sign of the capital tax solely depends on the term p1 −∂s/∂ρFkr in the numerator:
κi R 0 ⇔ p1 −
∂s
∂ρ
Fkr R 0 , (4.38)
and is thus – like nearly all ambiguous comparative statics results in Section 4.4.3.2
– driven by the complex interplay of p1, ∂s/∂ρ and Fkr. Specifically, the capital tax
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is negative whenever the degree of complementarity between capital and resources
is sufficiently high. In this case, a negative capital tax implicitly subsidizes second-
period resource use which is desired in order to lower resource use and thus pollution
in the first period. The more substitutive the production technology is, the more
likely is it that governments discourage first-period resource use by taxing capital use
in the second period. Again, we can suspect (and it will be shown in the numerical
illustrations of Section 4.5.3) that inefficiently high first-period extraction prevails since
the externality-generating good cannot be targeted by the government directly.11
4.5.2.3 Nash equilibrium with resource and capital taxes
If each government is armed with the full set of tax instruments, additional consider-
ations enter the government’s trade-off between marginal costs and marginal benefits.
In particular, marginal changes in resource taxes now also affect capital tax revenue.
These effects are ambiguous in sign since investment in country i may rise or fall due to
a marginal increase in ti1 or t
i
2. Similarly, a marginal capital tax increase may positively
or negatively affect resource tax revenues. The first-order conditions (4.29)–(4.31) can
be rearranged to yield:
κi =
D′(r1)
ǫ
(n− 1)(Fkr − p1Fkk)
∂s
∂ρ
[Γ + (1 + ρ)frrFkk] − (n− 1)∆
> 0 , (4.39)
ti1 = −
D′(r1)
ǫ
frr
[
(n− 1) − n ∂s
∂ρ
Fkk
]
∂s
∂ρ
[Γ + (1 + ρ)frrFkk] − (n− 1)∆
> 0 , (4.40)
ti2 =
D′(r1)
ǫ
(n− 1)(Frr − p1Fkr) − n
∂s
∂ρ
Γ
∂s
∂ρ
[Γ + (1 + ρ)frrFkk] − (n− 1)∆
< 0 . (4.41)
As before, resource taxes decline over time, with a strictly positive tax in the first and
a strictly negative tax in the second period. Interestingly, the capital tax is strictly
positive. Note that moving from the Nash equilibrium with resource taxes only to the
Nash equilibrium with all instruments does not only introduce the capital tax but also
changes the size of the resource taxes. This is why the comparative statics of a marginal
capital tax increase cannot shed light on the incentives that lead to the unambiguous
sign of the capital tax in equilibrium. However, the terms in the numerator of equation
(4.39) give an explanation of the effects at work. By increasing the capital tax from
zero to a positive value, the government induces all other n− 1 countries to use more
11 Calculating the policy externalities does not yield much insight because the result would relate to
a constrained Pareto-optimum with the capital tax as the only available instrument.
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resources in the second and less resources in the first period, thereby lowering domestic
environmental pollution. This occurs through a channel which I will refer to as the
capital-tax-interest-rate channel. The latter unfolds its effects through the associated
decrease in the interest rate (see equation (4.21a)). First, the falling interest rate
makes investment in non-tax-increasing countries more attractive and thus spurs, due
to complementarity of capital and resources, resource demand abroad (first term in
the numerator of (4.39)). Second, there is a Hotelling rule effect (second term in
the numerator) which holds even for a purely substitutive technology. The fall in
the interest rate is accompanied by a fall in p2 which also induces production firms
abroad to use more resources in the second period. The positive first-period and
negative second-period resource taxes are brought about, among others, by an effect
that works through the supply-side of capital. Increasing ti1 or decreasing t
i
2 increases
the interest rate which leads, ceteris paribus, to higher savings in all countries due to
the substitution effect and thus higher private income from capital taxation.
Assessing the efficiency properties of this Nash equilibrium is slightly more compli-
cated than before since the different policy externalities contain only information as to
whether each tax rate is set inefficiently high or low in equilibrium. To assess whether
all tax rates taken together imply inefficiently high or low aggregate resource use in
the first period, assume that the government in country i is able to control ri1 directly.
Then, the impact of a marginal change in ri1 on welfare in country j 6= i, evaluated at
the symmetric Nash equilibrium, is as follows:
∂W j
∂ri1
= −D′(r1)
[
1 + (n− 1)
∂rj1
∂p1
∂p1
∂ri1
]
+ ǫ(1 + ρ)tj1
∂rj1
∂p1
∂p1
∂ri1
+
+ ǫ
[
tj2
(∂rj2
∂p2
∂p2
∂ri1
+
∂rj2
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂ri1
)
+ κj
(∂kj
∂p2
∂p2
∂ri1
+
∂kj
∂ρ
∂ρ
∂ri1
)
]
. (4.42)
Unsurprisingly, we have environmental and private income externalities as before. Us-
ing the comparative statics for ∂p1/∂ri1, ∂p2/∂r
i
1 and ∂ρ/∂r
i
1 derived in the Appendix,
it is easy to prove that all private income externalities together go again in the same
direction as the environmental externality. Therefore, we can establish the following
proposition.
Proposition 4.4 (Inefficiently high pollution in (ti
1
, ti
2
, κi)-Nash equilibrium)
In the Nash equilibrium with all instruments, first-period resource use and thus pollution
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is inefficiently high as:
∂W j
∂ri1
=
nD′(r1)(1 + ρ)frr
[
(n− 1 − n ∂s
∂ρ
Fkk)∆ + (1 + ρ)frrΩ
∂s
∂ρ
Fkk
]
[
∂s
∂ρ
(
Γ + (1 + ρ)frrFkk
)
− (n− 1)∆
]
[(n− 1)∆ − n(1 + ρ)frrΩ]
< 0 . (4.43)
In this regard, the paper generalizes the results obtained by Eichner and Runkel (2012)
and Rauscher (2000, 2005) who find that capital mobility aggravates transfrontier
pollution problems (at least for perfect pollution spillovers).
4.5.3 Numerical illustration
So far, we can state that the Nash equilibria examined in Sections 4.5.2.1 and 4.5.2.3
and supposedly the capital-tax-only scenario in Section 4.5.2.2 entail inefficiently high
resource use in the present. In order to quantify the effects at work, particularly the
additional distortion due to factor mobility, some numerical illustrations are provided.
I am particularly interested in how the size of the distortions depends on the elasticity
of substitution between capital and resources.
To have another benchmark, I first sketch the Nash equilibrium under autarky, i.e.,
when factors are immobile. In this case, there are n purely national capital and re-
source markets. I denote the prices on these markets by ρi, pi1 and p
i
2. The modified
comparative statics of unilateral marginal tax increases can easily be derived by setting
n = 1 in equations (4.18a)–(4.23f). Note that there is no leakage anymore since capital
and resources are not traded. Taking these modified comparative statics results into
account, government maximization yields the following tax rates κi0, ti01 and t
i0
2 in the
autarky Nash equilibrium in each country:
κi0 = 0 , (4.44)
ti01 −
ti02
1 + ρi
=
D′(r1)
ǫ(1 + ρi)
. (4.45)
The government now has one degree of freedom in setting the resource tax-subsidy
combination to internalize the environmental externality imposed on own utility. This
is the standard textbook case where no additional distortions are present.12 As the
capital and resource allocation in other countries cannot be influenced via tax policies,
12 To see this, refer to equations (4.35) and (4.42) where the fiscal externalities are zero under
autarky since it holds for all t: ∂rjt /∂t
i
1 = ∂r
j
t /∂t
i
2 = 0 respectively ∂r
j
t /∂i = ∂kj/∂i = 0 where
 = p1, p2, ρ.
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environmental taxes target the externality best and there is no role for capital taxation
in this closed economy.
For the numerical simulations, I choose a logarithmic first-period utility function and
a convex damage function such that equation (4.12) now reads:
W i = ln(ci1) −
1
2
(r1)
2 + ǫci2 . (4.46)
For production, I use a standard CES function:
F (kit, r
i
t) =
[
(kit)
α + (rit)
α
] z
α , (4.47)
where z describes the degree of homogeneity (for decreasing returns to scale z < 1),
and the elasticity of substitution σ equals 1/(1 − α). That is, the lower is α, the more
complementary are capital and resources. Note that for Fkr to be positive, z > α has
to hold.13
The following two tables illustrate the results obtained for n = 2 and Qi ≡ 1. The
laissez-faire scenario involves no government intervention (all tax rates equal zero)
which is obviously not an equilibrium. NE stands for a Nash equilibrium either without
factor mobility, with only κi, only ti1 and t
i
2, or all instruments at the governments’
disposal. p(i)1 and ρ
(i) denote the equilibrium prices on the national (with superscript
(i)) respectively international (without superscript) factor markets. Equilibrium tax
rates are written in brackets below the respective tax base. The displayed parameter
constellations are just exemplary and chosen to highlight some effects. However, the
derived results hold qualitatively also for all other constellations that I examined such
that they are representative in a pars pro toto sense.
The ranking of these scenarios with respect to first-period resource use remains the same
for all parameter constellations. Laissez-faire and Pareto-optimum describe the two
extreme cases. The autarky NE always performs better than all NE with factor mobility
since the environmental externality is not aggravated by factor mobility. Naturally, the
NE with three instruments entails lower first-period resource use than the resource-
taxes-only scenario which in turn outperforms the capital-tax-only NE.
Table 4.1 illustrates that the capital-tax-only policy is – as expected – not able to
internalize much of the environmental externality, the reason being that this policy
does not target the externality-generating input directly and is thus only an imperfect
13 Strict quasi-concavity requires α < 1 (Uzawa, 1962) which holds as I assume decreasing returns to
scale.
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α = −5 α = 0.5
ri1 r
i
2 k
i p
(i)
1 r
i
1 r
i
2 k
i p
(i)
1
(ti1) (t
i
2) (κ
i) ρ(i) (ti1) (t
i
2) (κ
i) ρ(i)
Laissez-faire
.893 .107 .113 .460 .751 .249 1.913 1.182
(0) (0) (0) .491 (0) (0) (0) .744
Pareto-opt.
.317 .683 .029 .996 .257 .743 1.277 1.815
(0) (-2.814) (0) 1.825 (0) (-2.287) (0) .937
NE w/o mob.
.469 .531 .093 .883 .366 .634 1.443 1.571
(0) (-2.083) (0) 1.357 (0) (-1.626) (0) .882
NE κi
.850 .150 .188 .512 .714 .286 1.810 1.206
(0) (0) (-.485) .709 (0) (0) (.169) .595
NE ti1, t
i
2
.469 .531 .093 .0003 .380 .620 1.463 .885
(.883) (-.0006) (0) 1.357 (.662) (-.313) (0) .876
NE κi, ti1, t
i
2
.469 .531 .093 .0002 .368 .632 1.411 .939
(.883) (-.0005) (.002) 1.356 (.629) (-.342) (.110) .780
Table 4.1: Simulation results for z = 0.75, k̄ = 1 and ǫ = 0.9.
α = 0.3 α = 0.7
ri1 r
i
2 k
i p
(i)
1 r
i
1 r
i
2 k
i p
(i)
1
(ti1) (t
i
2) (κ
i) ρ(i) (ti1) (t
i
2) (κ
i) ρ(i)
Laissez-faire
.632 .368 2.361 2.602 .940 .060 .606 1.020
(0) (0) (0) 2.427 (0) (0) (0) 1.039
Pareto-opt.
.443 .557 1.889 2.889 .257 .743 .075 1.180
(0) (-4.434) (0) 2.880 (0) (-2.571) (0) 2.052
NE w/o mob.
.521 .479 2.091 2.752 .379 .621 .154 1.123
(0) (-2.606) (0) 2.684 (0) (-1.894) (0) 1.658
NE κi
.628 .372 2.346 2.607 .934 .066 .579 1.020
(0) (0) (.046) 2.392 (0) (0) (.076) .971
NE ti1, t
i
2
.575 .425 2.224 2.412 .541 .459 .278 .660
(.262) (-.437) (0) 2.557 (.418) (-.382) (0) 1.389
NE κi, ti1, t
i
2
.524 .476 2.070 2.559 .482 .518 .046 .723
(.189) (-1.218) (.275) 2.414 (.369) (-.263) (1.356) .805
Table 4.2: Simulation results for z = 0.95, k̄ = 0.1 and ǫ = 0.8.
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policy substitute for environmental taxes. Furthermore, our intuition is confirmed that
a higher degree of complementarity between capital and resources makes a capital
subsidy more likely.
For a high degree of complementarity, the private income externalities are relatively
small such that first-period resource use nearly coincides in the autarky NE, the NE
with environmental taxes only and the NE with all instruments. In the latter scenario,
the capital tax is relatively small while for a higher degree of substitutability, the
additional capital tax is higher and achieves a more significant reduction of first-period
resource use relative to the NE with environmental taxes only. This can also be seen
in Table 4.2 where the additional capital tax significantly lowers the interest rate and
thus spurs second-period resource use through the capital-tax-interest-rate channel.
This channel is the stronger, the higher is the elasticity of substitution. The following
proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 4.5 (Elasticity of substitution and decentralized policy-making)
Whenever the elasticity of substitution between capital and resources is low, factor mo-
bility does not significantly worsen efficiency compared to the autarky Nash equilibrium.
A high elasticity of substitution strengthens the capital-tax-interest-rate channel and
thus makes the introduction of an additional strictly positive capital tax more attractive
in terms of lowering aggregate first-period resource use.
4.6 Discussion
I have assumed perfect mobility of capital and resources. In reality, the degrees of
mobility of the two factors might differ. Whereas the ease of resource transport de-
pends, among others, on the distance between the trading partners, on the available
infrastructure and the particular type of resource (coal, gas, oil etc.), capital may be
more easily shifted around between countries. In the theoretical model, a higher de-
gree of mobility would induce governments to lower the tax burden that it puts on
this factor, because the marginal costs of tax increases are then perceived to be higher.
Governments fear a reallocation of capital and resources to their disadvantage although
in a symmetric equilibrium all governments set the same tax rates. This means that
the more immobile production factor, resources, would be taxed at a higher rate and
capital would be taxed at a lower rate than this model predicts.
Another important issue driving the results in the model is the degree of substitutabil-
ity between capital and resources. As with all other things, I have assumed perfect
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foresight with respect to future technology. But, in fact, it may become (expectedly or
unexpectedly) easier to substitute between these factors of production in the future.
This is where innovation policy comes into play which may also be a policy instrument
in interjurisdictional competition.
I have derived rather clear-cut results for the case that the substitution effect of a
marginal change in the interest rate outweighs the income effect. For simplicity, I
used a quasi-linear specification of the utility function. In the more general case, the
income effect could exceed the substitution effect such that ∂s/∂ρ < 0. Let us assume
that ∆ keeps its negative sign. If, for example, ti2 marginally rises, then, in general
equilibrium, the interest rate (still) falls due to a marginal change in ti2 but resource
prices may or may not rise as now Ω R 0. Due to the falling interest rate and the
negative capital supply elasticity, the aggregate capital stock may rise. Consequently,
firms may demand less or more (reversal of the Green Paradox) of the resource in the
future, depending on the reaction of p1 and p2 which, in turn, hinges on the degree
of complementarity. The effects of a marginal change in ti1 on global resource use are
now also ambiguous. The comparative statics of marginal changes in the capital tax,
by contrast, can unambiguously be signed for ∆ < 0, independent of the elasticity of
substitution: a marginal increase in κi leads to a decrease in the interest rate and thus,
ceteris paribus, to a higher capital stock. Even for a very high elasticity of substitution,
future aggregate resource use rises and pollution in the present falls. In addition to the
effects described here, a generalization of preferences would encompass income effects
on savings from changes in second-period taxes which do not show up under quasi-
linear utility. To sum up, in the Nash equilibrium with all instruments, the change in
the sign of ∂s/∂ρ may – at worst – change the signs of the tax rates such that we get
a subsidy to capital and first-period resource use and a positive tax on second-period
resource use. Subsidies on resource use can indeed be observed in many developing
and emerging countries.
As a remedy to Green Paradox effects (as observed for a positive capital supply elas-
ticity in this model), Sinn (2008) suggests a source-based tax on capital income earned
by foreign resource owners in industrialized countries in order to flatten the extraction
path of fossil resources. He argues in a partial equilibrium model that this tax would
depress the net interest rate on reproducible capital and thus make it attractive for
resource owners to leave more of the resource in situ. While a tax paid by resource
suppliers (in the form of a cash flow tax, a unit tax on carbon extraction or an ad
valorem sales tax) unfolds its effects on the extraction path through its change over
time, a capital income tax as proposed by Sinn would tilt the extraction path in the
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right direction as long as it has a positive sign.14 In my model, the instrument most
similar to the proposed tax on capital income is the tax on investment, i.e., capital use,
which is also source-based. This tax, however, is incurred by the firms that rent capital
on the global market and thus does not affect capital income directly. In contrast to
supply-side policies as defined by Sinn (2008), all tax rates employed in this model
exert their influence on the extraction path through the demand-side for capital and
resources.
Finally, the open-loop Nash equilibrium is time-inconsistent as governments would
deviate from their announced future policies once the second period has arrived. The
reason is that the environmental externality which results from first-period resource
use cannot be addressed anymore by means of second-period policies. This time-
inconsistency can be addressed by taxing savings in the first period instead of second-
period investment since in symmetric equilibrium these taxes are equivalent. The
tax on (or subsidy to) savings would as well influence the interest rate in the second
period and could thus be used to induce substitution out of capital towards resources
in the second period which, in turn, slows down resource extraction. Furthermore, the
time-inconsistency is mitigated by the fact that the capital tax raises revenue in the
second period while the resource tax is negative. This implies, compared to a no-tax
policy in the second period, some redistribution from capital to resources in the second
period. As this redistribution primarily affects production firms, credibly announced
earmarking of capital tax revenue to resource subsidization would alleviate the time-
inconsistency problem although it is unlikely that tax revenues and subsidies net each
other out in equilibrium.
4.7 Conclusion
I have analyzed strategic tax-setting of governments competing for mobile resources
and mobile capital in a general equilibrium model. I found that unilateral policies are
effective in slowing down resource extraction. Green Paradox effects arise with a posi-
tive capital supply elasticity. Furthermore, factor mobility has been found to aggravate
transfrontier pollution problems because governments influence via their tax policies
the tax bases in other countries. These private income externalities unambiguously go
14 Jaakkola (2012) finds in a two-country Ramsey growth model that a tax on the resource-exporting
country’s capital income is indeed able to achieve an efficient solution whenever this country does
not produce goods. By contrast, van der Meijden et al. (2014) are able to show in a general
equilibrium framework that a tax on the resource-exporting country’s capital income may actually
accelerate resource extraction.
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in the same direction as the environmental externality (at least in aggregate). More-
over, under commitment, governments have been found to have an incentive to tax
capital in the future at a strictly positive rate even though no physical public goods
are provided.
The capital-tax-interest-rate channel has so far been neglected in the literature on
interjurisdictional competition as strategic interactions between governments have been
cast in partial equilibrium frameworks, specifically without a global resource market
(Oates and Schwab, 1988; Ogawa and Wildasin, 2009; Eichner and Runkel, 2012).
As the symmetric set-up leads to zero net resource and capital flows across borders, fu-
ture research may explore asymmetries with respect to resource or capital endowment.
An asymmetric setting incorporates the incentive for resource-importing countries to
tax away Hotelling rents from resource exporters. It would also be interesting to ex-
amine time-consistent policies in this setting.
Resource Extraction & Interjurisdictional Competition 121
4.8 Appendix
Derivation of comparative statics
Totally differentiating the first-order conditions (4.3)–(4.5) for all i = 1, . . . , n yields:
frrdr
i
1 − dt
i
1 = dp1 , (4.A.1)
Fkrdk
i + Frrdr
i
2 − dt
i
2 = dp2 , (4.A.2)
Fkkdk
i + Fkrdr
i
2 − dκ
i = dρ . (4.A.3)
For notational convenience, all functional dependencies for fr, frr, Fkk, Frr, Fkr and
thus Γ, Φ, Ω, Θ and ∆ have been dropped. Only in the symmetric equilibrium are the
functional values in all countries equal because all arguments have equal size.
Solving (4.A.1)–(4.A.3) for dri1, dr
i
2 and dk
i, we obtain:
dri1 =
1
frr
(dp1 + dt
i
1) , (4.A.4)
dri2 =
Fkk
Γ
[
dp2 + dt
i
2 −
Fkr
Fkk
(dρ+ dκi)
]
, (4.A.5)
dki =
Frr
Γ
[
dρ+ dκi −
Fkr
Frr
(dp2 + dt
i
2)
]
. (4.A.6)
Denoting wi1 = π
i
1 + Π
i
1 + τ
i
1, we have:
dwi1 = p1(dq
i
1 − dr
i
1) + frdr
i
1 , (4.A.7)
which is needed for determining the reaction of savings to changes in income induced
by tax changes. Although dqi1 − dr
i
1 is undefined for any country i, in aggregate it
holds:
n∑
l=1
(dql1 − dr
l
1) = 0 . (4.A.8)
Totally differentiating Hotelling’s rule (4.7) and the capital and resource market equi-
librium conditions (4.16) and (4.17), using (4.A.7) and (4.A.8), yields:
dp2 = (1 + ρ)dp1 + p1dρ , (4.A.9)
n∑
l=1
dkl =
n∑
l=1
∂sl
∂ρ
dρ+
n∑
l=1
∂sl
∂wl1
dwl1 =
n∑
l=1
∂sl
∂ρ
dρ+
n∑
l=1
frdr
l
1 , (4.A.10)
n∑
l=1
drl1 = −
n∑
l=1
drl2 . (4.A.11)
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Starting from a symmetric equilibrium and inserting (4.A.4)–(4.A.6) into (4.A.10) and
(4.A.11), we can write:
nfr
frr
dp1 +
nFkr
Γ
dp2 −
n
[
Frr −
∂s
∂ρ
Γ
]
Γ
dρ+
n∑
l=1
fr
frr
dtl1 +
n∑
l=1
Fkr
Γ
dtl2 −
n∑
l=1
Frr
Γ
dκl = 0 ,
(4.A.12)
n
frr
dp1 +
nFkk
Γ
dp2 −
nFkr
Γ
dρ+
n∑
l=1
1
frr
dtl1 +
n∑
l=1
Fkk
Γ
dtl2 −
n∑
l=1
Fkr
Γ
dκl = 0 , (4.A.13)
Finally, by inserting (4.A.9) into (4.A.12) and (4.A.13), it follows:
(1 + ρ)Fkr
Γ
dp1 −
Frr −
∂s
∂ρ
Γ − p1Fkr
Γ
dρ−
1
n
[
n∑
l=1
Frr
Γ
dκl −
n∑
l=1
Fkr
Γ
dtl2
]
(4.A.14)
= 0 ,
Γ + (1 + ρ)frrFkk
FrrΓ
dp1 +
p1Fkk − Fkr
Γ
dρ+
1
n
[
n∑
l=1
1
frr
dtl1 +
n∑
l=1
Fkk
Γ
dtl2 −
n∑
l=1
Fkr
Γ
dκl
]
(4.A.15)
= 0 .
These two equations jointly determine the market reactions dp1/di and dρ/di to
unilateral marginal increases in  = t1, t2, κ in country i, where a unilateral increase
in ti1, for example, is found by setting dt
i
2 = dκ
i = 0 and dtk1 = dt
k
2 = dκ
k = 0 for all
k 6= i. Inserting these results into (4.A.9) implies dp2/di.
Plugging the market reactions as described by (4.18a)–(4.18c) and (4.21a)–(4.21c) back
into (4.A.4)–(4.A.6) for the tax-increasing country i and country j 6= i, we obtain after
some rearrangements equations (4.19a)–(4.20c) and (4.22a)–(4.23f).
Proof of Lemma 4.1
We know that aggregate resource use in the first period is – for given taxes in all other
countries – a function of ti1 and t
i
2. Totally differentiating r1 = G(t
i
1, t
i
2) yields:
dr1 =
∂G
∂ti1
dti1 +
∂G
∂ti2
dti2 . (4.A.16)
We also know from the comparative statics that
∂r1
∂ti1



dti
2
=0
= −(1 + ρ)
∂r1
∂ti2



dti
1
=0
. (4.A.17)
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From these two equations follows immediately:
∂G
∂ti1
= −(1 + ρ)
∂G
∂ti2
⇔
∂G
∂ti1
+ (1 + ρ)
∂G
∂ti2
= 0 , (4.A.18)
which is a partial differential equation.
Let G(ti1, 0) = G(t
i
1) for t
i
2 = 0. If G(t
i
1) exists and G(t
i
1) differentiable, then it follows
from the calculus of partial differential equations:
G(ti1, t
i
2) = G
(
ti1 −
ti2
1 + ρ
)
. (4.A.19)
That is, aggregate first-period resource use and thus pollution only depend on the dif-
ference ti1 − t
i
2/(1 + ρ). 2
Comparative statics of marginal increases in ri1
To obtain the equilibrium effects of increases in ri1 on world market prices, set all
marginal tax changes in equations (4.A.4)–(4.A.6) to zero but note that ri1 does not
depend on p1 here. While (4.A.9) still applies, the differentiated market equilibrium
conditions read:
n∑
l=1
dkl =
n∑
l=1
∂sl
∂ρ
dρ+ frdr
i
1 +
n∑
l=1
l 6=i
frdr
l
1 , (4.A.20)
ri1 +
n∑
l=1
l 6=i
drl1 = −
n∑
l=1
drl2 . (4.A.21)
Starting from a symmetric equilibrium where drlt = dr
j
t and dk
l = dkj for all t and
l, j 6= i, and inserting (4.A.4)–(4.A.6) and (4.A.9) into (4.A.20) and (4.A.21) for all
l 6= i, we obtain:
∂ρ
∂ri1
=
(1 + ρ)frr [(p1Fkk − Fkr)(frFkk − Fkr) − (1 + ρ)frrFkkΩ]
(p1Fkk − Fkr) [(n− 1)∆ − n(1 + ρ)frrΩ]
< 0 , (4.A.22)
∂p1
∂ri1
= −
frr∆
(n− 1)∆ − n(1 + ρ)frrΩ
> 0 , (4.A.23)
∂p2
∂ri1
=
(1 + ρ)frr [(p1Fkk − Fkr)(frFkr − Φ) − (1 + ρ)frrFkrΩ]
(p1Fkk − Fkr) [(n− 1)∆ − n(1 + ρ)frrΩ]
> 0 . (4.A.24)
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